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In November 1994 the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs embarked on a process to 
develop a new energy policy for South Africa. The new policy was required because of changes 
in overall South African social and economic policy associated with the change in South African 
government following the elections during April 1994. 
The apartheid era had exerted particularly strong influences on the South African energy sector 
and by the end of this era in 1994 many parts of the sector could be seen to be structured around 
apartheid and sanctions induced needs. One of the most profound of these effects was the stifling 
of public debate on the energy sector as exemplified in the Petroleum Products Act (No 120 of 
1977) which prohibited the "publication, releasing, announcement, disclosure or conveyance to 
any person of information or the making, of comment regarding the source, manufacture, 
transportation, destination, storage, consumption, quantity or stock-level of any petroleum 
product acquired or manufactured or being acquired or manufactured for or in the Republic." 
Similar secrecy surrounded developments in the nuclear industry. 
The energy sector had been developed with huge state funding and intervention. The Rl2 billion 
Mossgas project, the R21 billion state funding of the nuclear industry and the state built Sasol 
complex, which is now an important and integral part of South Africa's liquid fuels and 
petrochemical industry, are examples. The electricity industry is also in public hands, and 
despite the fact that Eskom is the fifth largest electricity utility in the world in terms of electricity 
sold, and industry in South Africa is supplied with amongst the cheapest electricity in the world, 
at the end of the apartheid era less than 40 percent of South Africans had access to electricity. 
Whilst exceptional managerial and technological prowess had been exhibited in developing SA's 
energy sector, the allocation of state funds and the objectives of state support and intervention has 
been questioned in the light of new econonomic and social policies. In particular, the debate has 
been opened up for much wider participation. This has led to the requirement for information on 
the energy sector to be developed for making this wider participation more effective. 
The debate on policy options has been enhanced in processes such as the Energy and 
Development Research Centre's Energy Policy Research and Training Project (EPRET), the 
National Electricity Forum (NELF), the Liquid Fuels Industry Task Force, the Arthur Andersen 
report on Sasol, the Monitoring Committee overseeing developments at Mossgas and most 
recently by the White Paper process of which this document is a part. The repeal of secrecy 
legislation and these public processes have brought to light a large amount of information on the 
energy sector. 
Vol. I, the South African Energy Policy Discussion Document, published in August 1995 
attempted, for the first time since public debate has been possible, to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the most important policy issues and options facing the sector. In developing Vol. I, 
a useful set of information was gathered whilst undertaking the systematic evaluation of the 
energy sector that was required to compile the policy issues and options. Whilst Vol. I reported 
in detail on some policy issues it provided very little empirical information on the energy sector. 
The lack of a coherent compilation of such information was noted in the production of Vol. I. 
Vol. II, Overview of the South African Energy Sector, is an attempt, with the emergence of 
information on the sector which has been kept secret for years, to provide a picture of the energy 
sector as a whole and to provide details on the main energy sub-sectors. Whilst Vol. II attempts 
to provide as complete a picture as possible, it became apparent in compiling Vol. II that 
information available on the energy sector in South Africa is inadequate to meet the requirements 
of policy processes that are currently underway. Thus Vol II serves to both indicate the 
information that is available but also, as importantly, to indicate gaps in information which need 
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1 .1 Background to production of this document 
Following South Africa's first democratic elections in May 1994, the Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs (DMEA) identified an urgent need to develop a new energy policy. In terms of 
the energy sector, the previous era had been characterised by oil sanctions and the establishment 
of a large state subsidised coal-to-synfuels industry, the development of a South African nuclear 
industry including nuclear weapons production, gross inequity in provision of local government 
services such as electricity and the development of non-sustainable "homelands" where poverty 
had led to denudation of woodlands leading to widespread rural energy poverty. 
Popular and widespread resistance was associated with the development of the society in which 
the energy sector previously exisited. This is important because in terms of policy development 
one of the previous government's strategies to counter resistance was to stifle public debate. 
Whilst this clampdown on open debate was more apparent around issues such as freedom of 
movement (the pass laws) and racial discrimination in general, overall government policy 
expressed itself in all sectors. As far as debate and policy development in the energy sector were 
concerned the past government's intentions are exemplified clearly in the Petroleum Products Act 
(No 120 of 1977) which prohibited the "publication, releasing, announcement, disclosure or 
conveyance to any person of information or the making of comment regarding the source, 
manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, consumption, quantity or stock-level of any 
petroleum product acquired or manufactured or being acquired or manufactured for or in the 
Republic" . 
This Act is just an example of the many laws and regulations which prevented South Africans 
from discussing public policy. Parallel to the process of stifling public debate, the government 
developed large and powerful organisations such as the Central Energy Fund (CEF) and the 
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) that were required by law to work in secret. These 
organisations built vast asset bases and institutional structures and cultures to support the 
government of the day. This included data, information and expertise on the South African 
energy sector. 
Thus, the situation which faced the DMEA after the 1994 elections was a legacy in which no 
capacity had been built in the government energy policy development sector for open, democratic 
public policy development. The above brief history is relevant to this document on the energy 
sector because one of the main features of the stifling of the energy policy debate had been the 
suppression of information development orientated towards facilitating open debate. 
Leading up to and following the 1994 elections, laws prohibiting freedom of access to 
information and expression were repealed. However, in the energy sector, the effects of decades 
of secrecy and information suppression could not be cured overnight. The legacy of the previous 
era was that there was very little information on the energy sector formulated for development of 
policy in the new open public format. However, to meet the pressing requirements to develop 
energy sector policy in the line with the new government policies the DMEA needed to initiate an 
appropriate process. 
A two step process was decided on. The first step was the production of an energy policy 
discussion document titled the South African Energy Policy Discussion Document (EPDD). 
Work on this commenced in November 1994 and the document was completed and published by 
mid-1995. The DMEA commissioned a team of twenty five energy policy workers to produce this 
document. Each of these team members produced a set of policy issues and options in their area 
of specialty and these were edited into the EPDD. 
However, the EPDD was almost entirely focused on energy policy, very little descriptive 
information on the energy sector was included. The team members drew on their own knowledge 
and information and therefore, at the completion of production of the EPDD, there was still a 
serious lack of a compilation ofbasic information covering the whole energy sector. The idea for 
an appendix to the EPDD was born out of this need. 
The initial plan to produce the appendix was that it would be a short add-on to the EPDD project 























1950-1993. It is the long-awaited successor to South African Energy Statistics No 1 which 
provided data from 1950 - 1989 which significantly had no data related to liquid fuels. 
• The second is the production of a 360-page highly detailed publication titled "Energy Policies 
of South Africa (First Draft)'' by the International Energy Agency in December 1995. The 
lEA publication follows an in depth study tour of South Africa by the lEA in 1995 at the 
invitation of the DMEA to assist the DMEA in its task of formulating a new energy policy. 
The report became available too late for any of it to be incorporated in the current work. In 
many respects, with 360 pages of highly detailed information, it is more comprehensive than 
this Vol. II of the EPDD. However, Vol. II has a different perspective to the lEA work and 
the two works can be seen to complement each other. In particular, areas such as energy and 
the environment which have not been covered in Vol. II have detailed extensive coverage in 
the lEA work as this is an area of great concern to them and one in which they have extensive 
expertise. (After completion of work on Vol II the lEA published the final report: Energy 

























Overview of the energy sector 
This chapter summarises chapters 3, 4 and 5 which deal with energy demand and the energy 
supply system. The purpose of the chapter is to orientate the reader within the overall energy 
sector and to provide key summarised data. It also attempts to contextuali se the various elements 
of the sector in the sector, and in the economy as a whole. 
2.1 Energy in the economy and energy demand in South Africa 
(Summarised from chapter 3) 
Energy intensity and energy consumption 
By world standards South Africa's economy is highly energy intensive. In other words, more 
energy is used to produce a unit of economic output than in most other countries in the world. 
This is due to: 
• South Africa's economic structure, in which energy intensive primary mineral s extraction and 
beneficiation play a large role; 
• large accessible coal resources; 
• a synthetic liquid fuels industry based on coal and natural gas , which is much less efficient 
than refining crude oil; 
• pricing of energy - energy prices are amongst the lowest in the world, and ; 
• the country ' s relatively low level of efficiency in the use of energy . 
Energy consumption has grown rapidly over the past forty years . By 1990, four times as much 
energy was consumed in South Africa as in 1950. Demand for energy has risen in line with GDP 
(see figure 2.1.1 below), but at a lower rate . This is characteristic of developing economies. 
Developed economies on the other hand have shown a decrease in energy intensity following 
efficiency measures introduced after the first oil price shock in 1973 . After the 1994 democratic 
elections, the South African government has signaled that it intends to alter South Africa 's 
economic growth path away from energy intensive basic industries towards downstream 
industries with higher employment and value-added components. If thi s policy is successfully 
implemented, energy intensity should decrease. However, local demand for coal, electricity, 
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Figure 2.1.2 Nett energy consumption patterns 
Nett energy consumption' 
In 1993 nett energy consumption was approximately 2100 PJ represented by approximately 18Mt 
of coal, 18 billion litres of liquid fuels, 160 GWh of electricity, 12 Mt of firewood and I bern of 
coal-gas. 
In terms of quantity of energy consumed, industry accounts for more than half, with coal being 
the largest but electricity also playing a major role. In general, industry is well supplied with 
cheap energy. Transport accounts for 25 % of total energy consumed - almost all of this being 
petrol and diesel. Households use 20% of total consumption with a large disparity between 
different household types. Fifty percent of households , including most rural households and 
many urban households, do not have access to electricity. These rely largely on woodfuel , 
paraffin , coal and candles. A significant proportion of households experience energy poverty. 
Often natural fuelwood has become scarce and cash incomes are hard pressed to provide 
suffi cient paraffin . In low-income electrified households multiple fuel use is the norm, whil st in 
non-poor households a lmost all energy is supplied by electricity. 
1 Nett energy is fuel used in its final form and excludes fuels used to produce other fuels. For example coal used to 
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Primary energy and energy resourcei 
Primary energy 
Figure 2.1.3. Primary energy consumption 
Primary energy consumption in 1993 (incl uding fuel used for production of other fuels ) was 
approximately 4 200 PJ. Locally mined coal provides 70% of primary energy and is used largely 
to produce electricity, synthetic fuels and by industry. All crude oil is imported al though a small 
(20 000 b.p.d .) oil field is under development. 
Energy resources 
South Africa has the 7th largest economically recoverable reserves of coal in the world (55 billion 
tonnes) and whilst being a large producer (243 Mt in 1994) should have sufficient coal for the 
next 100 years at least. However, apart from the vast potential offered by excellent solar energy, 
reserves of other fuels such as gas (currently 20 bern) and oi l are very small. Regional hydro-
power offers realistic potential for large scale primary energy in the medium term. 
Investment, revenues and employment in the energy sector 
The energy sector is important in terms of both investment and expenditure in the South African 
economy. The energy component of the gross domestic product is more than R60 billion, or 15% 
(DMEA 1996a). 
Electricity 
An example of the importance of electricity in investment is that the largest single investment 
project in South Africa at present is the construction of the R9.1 billion Matimba power station. 
Another example is that Eskom, the national power utility, accounted for 15% of gross domestic 
fixed in vestment in 1985, at the peak of its power station investment programme. Currently, 
Eskom has total assets (re-valued) of about R82 billion (Eskom 1994a) and, although accurate 
figures are not avai lable, other electricity distributors could be estimated to have at least a further 
R I 0 billion in assets. Electricity is also important in terms of being an input to the economy and 
in consumption expenditure. In 1994 electricity sales by distributors other than Eskom (receiving 
most of their bulk supply from Eskom) were R9.8 billion (NER 1995) and Eskom sales were an 
additional R8.8 billion making total electricity sales in South Africa R 18.6 billion. Total 
employment in the electricity supply industry is about 75 000. 
Petroleum fuels 
There are also large investments in the liquid fuels production industry including amounts of 
R6.5 billion (book value - Sapia 1996) in crude refineries and R4 .3 billion in Sasol Synfuels 
(capital employed- Arthur Anderson, 1995) and R10.9 billion (fixed assets book value) in the 
2 Primary energy includes fuels used to produce other fuels but does not include the fuels produced. For example 
primary energy includes coal used to make electricity but does not include the electricity produced from the coal. 
EDRC 
2-4 Overview of the energy sector 
Mossgas gas and synfuels production facility . However, these figures are merely indicative and 
do not accurately reflect the amounts invested or the current values of these investments. For 
example, Mossgas's value is only listed at Rl.3 billion by holding company CEF (CEF 1995) and 
although Sasol synfuels capital employed is estimated at R4.3 billion above it is estimated that the 
Sasol 2 and 3 plants cost R34.9 billion (1994 Rands) to build (Sapia 1995). Also, whilst the 
book-value of crude refineries is R6.5 billion, construction of equivalent capacity greenfields 
refineries would cost about R9 .1 billion (Sapia 1996). Additional investments in liquid fuels 
include distribution , wholesaling and bulk depot assets valued at R8.2 billion and retailing assets 
of R3 .8 billion (Sapia 1996). Total sales of liquid fuels in South Africa were about R36 billion in 
1994 (Sapia 1995) which was made up mostly of petrol (60%) and diesel (25 %). Employment in 
the refining, synfuels production and marketing industries is in excess of 85 000. 
Coal 
Coal mines also represent a considerable investment but the value of the investment is difficult to 
estimate. Sales of coal in the local economy amounted to R5 .5 billion in 1994 and exports 
brought in a further R4.9 billion in foreign exchange. Approximately 60 000 people are 
employed in the industry. 
Nuclear energy 
Although nuclear power supplies less than I% of South Africa' s primary energy, because of the 
large amounts invested in the industry (R40 billion), and the large public funding of the industry , 
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2.2 The energy supply system 
(Summarised from chapter 4) 
2-5 
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Figure 2.2.1 The South African energy supply chain 
Figure 2.2.1 above depicts flows of energy from the source (either natural resources or imports) 
through to distribution and sales. The importance of coal both as a final energy product and as 
an input to the electricity and synfuels production industries is evident from the diagram. 
Figure 2.2.2 below shows the geographic location of the energy resources and main supply system 
elements. The Gauteng area, centered on Johannesburg, combined with the industrial corridor 
stretching to the east of Gauteng, and the KwaZulu- Natal area to the South, account for 65% of 
energy consumption (Cooper 1993). This area houses most of the large power-stations and 
synfuel plants and associated coal mines . Nearly 80% of liquid fuels production capacity is also 
located in this area and the large energy intensive industries are also located here, as is more than 
50% of South Africa ' s population. 
The country is relatively well covered by the national electricity transmission grid , given the low 
population densities. However, only 50% of the population has access to local-level electricity 
distribution , and reticulation needs considerable development; this is currently underway as part 
of a national electrification programme. Distribution networks of liquid fuels down to retail store 
and service station level is good but supply arrangements of paraffin and LPG to the poorest 
households could be improved as excessive mark-ups are common. Coal supplies are good in the 
areas near to the coal fields. Coal rail transport tariffs are not regulated and have been noted as 
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Figure 2.2.3 The coal supply chain 
(1) South Africa has economically recoverable coal reserves of about 55 billion tonnes (7th 
largest in the world) and produced 243Mt in I994. Most of the coal is high in ash but has a 
low sulphur content- less than I%. Only small amounts of metallurgical coal (about 950Mt) 
and anthracite (about I I OOMt) are present in the reserves. 
(2) The coal mining industry is privately owned and controlled. However, state owned entities or 
entities strongly influenced by government regulation consume the the majority of 
production: most output goes to the Eskom parastatal (56%) which negotiates long-term 
contracts with private suppliers, and to Sasol (34%) which has its synfuel output strongly 
influenced by state regulation. Three companies, Ingwe (28%), Amcoal (23%) and Sasol 
(23% ), account for 74% of production. lngwe is the largest steam coal exporting company in 
the world. 
(3) Low-grade coal with an average energy content of about 20MJ/kg and a very low price of 
R30/tonne is used for electricity generation. 
(4) 87% of exports are steam coal. South Africa provided 23% of the world market in I994, 
making it the second largest exporter in the world. Nearly all exports are handled by the 
Richards Bay Coal terminal which is operating at full capacity. 
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2.2.2 Liquid fuels and gas 
1994 figures 
(1) (2) (5) 
Crude imports SSF strategic stock 115m b.p.a Crude oil refineries 11 850MI bulk supply_.. 
~ 45 m barrels ~ capacity 455 000 BPD ~ 
I• Marketing (6) 
18 800 Ml Retailing 4 900 
I..- Service stations 
(3) (3) 
Indigenous coal Sasol coal mines 25 Mt p.a Saso12& 3 5 800 Ml exports .. ~ ~ Coal to synfuel plants ...-
2.7 Ml 
(4) (4) 
Off-shore gas, F-A gas field 1.8 bern p.a Mossgas gas to 1350 Mil 
~ ~ synfuel plant 
Condensate and oil 
Figure 2.2.4 The liquid fuels supply chain 
Refinerv Location Capacity [TBSD**l Ownersh~ 
Sap ref Durban 165 BP 50%, Shell 50% 
Genref Durban 105 EnQen 
Cal ref Ca!)e Town 100 Caltex 
Natref SasolburQ 85 Sasol 64%, Total 36% 
Sasol2+3 Secunda 150 Sasol 
MossQas Mossel Bay 45 Central Energy Fund 
Total 650 
** TBSD- thousand barrels per stream day (Crude equivalent for Sasoi/Mossgas) 
Table 2.2.1 South African liquid fuels production facilities 
(1) South Africa's oil stocks have been drawn down from a peak of 158.5m barrels in 1988 to 
45m barrels and a level of 35m barrels is aimed for. The 45m barrel storage facility at the 
port of Saldanha is being promoted for use of third parties. 
(2) South Africa has four crude oil refineries: two at the port of Durban, one in Cape Town and 
one in Sasolburg (see map in figure 2.2.2). 
(3) The Sasol 2 and 3 coal-to-synfuel plants were established in 1980 and 1982. The scale of 
these plants is unique in world terms They have received subsidies totalling at least 
RIO billion although the subsidy will be phased out by 1999. 
(4) South Africa has 20 bern of proven natural gas reserves, 134 bern (recoverable) of coal bed 
methane, and is developing a 20 000 barrel per day oilfield. Currently 1.8 bern p.a. of the 
gas reserve is fed directly into the Mossgas gas-to-synfuel plant 
(5) Petrol and diesel are marketed under eight brand names by eight oil companies. Most liquid 
fuel outlets are supplied by refineries in their vicinity, regardless of brand name and the oil 
companies share transport and depot facilities and operate product exchange agreements. 
Under complicated agreements made during the establishment of the synfuels industries by 
the state, oil companies other than Sasol and Mossgas are obliged to market nearly all synfuel 
production. 
(6). Most petrol (92%) is sold by service stations (of which there are 4 900) while most diesel 
(85%) is sold in bulk. Paraffin and LPG are sold by a wide variety of enterprises ranging 
from oil companies to small informal dealers. 
Gas 
There is one coal gas distributor in South Africa, namely Sasol Heating Fuels (22 PJ p.a) which 
supplies about 1% of net energy consumption. However, regional gas fields, Pande and Kudu in 
Mozambique and Namibia respectively, are believed to show increasing potential to provide piped 
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2.2.3 Electricity 
Energy sources for e!ectrjcjty generatjoo 
(1) 
Indigenous coal Privately .~ ... oVv'l'led coal mines 









Koeberg nuclear 10 TWh 168 TWh 
power station 
1.9GW (6%) 
Hydro and pumped 
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(1) 92% of South African electricity is produced from coal. Eskom produces 96% of all 
electricity for distribution in South Africa and five local authorities also operate power 
stations. Privately owned coal mines supply coal within long-term contracts in which the 
mines are often guaranteed a return on their investments. Most of the coal used is low grade: 
with a high ash content up 40% and low calorific value (average 20MJ/kg). The average 
Eskom selling price of 10.32 c/kWh is among the lowest in the world. Eskom sales of 160 
293 GWh of electricity in 1994 makes it the fifth-largest utility in the world by sales. 
(2) The nuclear fuel supply chain was built up with large state subsidies but, because of changes 
in policy, is under transition. Whilst South Africa used to operate a full chain from mining 
of uranium through to fuel fabrication, the enrichment facility was closed in 1995 because it 
was un-economic. 
(3) Eskom owns and operates the national electricity grid. The main transmission system, 
operating from 132 kV to 765 kV, consists of 25 181 km of transmission lines. The primary 
distribution system operating from 33 kV to 165 kV, consists of 38 122 km of lines, and 
additional reticulation lines add a further 176 154 km to give a total of 239 457 km for the 
Eskom national grid. Peak demand on the system in 1994 was 24 798 MW. Local authority 
networks represent significant further assets in terms of distribution and reticulation lines. 
While five local authorities have significant generating capacity, none is independent of the 
Eskom grid. In addition to power supplied by Eskom local authorities produce 7 TWh of 
power using their own facilities. 
(4) Eskom provides direct supplies to its own customers, bulk supplies to local authorities (who 
re-sell via their own distribution networks) and direct supplies to comercial farms mainly in 
previously defined white areas. Local authorities make an annual surplus of some 
Rl.7 billion on electricity sales. The household electrification programme aims to add a total 
of 6.3 million additional household connections compared with a total of 2.9 million existing 
connections in 1992. 
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2.2.4 Biomass3 
Fuelwood 
Biomass is very important in South Africa because rural areas house half of South Africa's 
population and most of 3.2 million rural households comprised of 0.9 million farmworker 
households and 2.3 million rural households in previously defined homeland areas depend on 
woodfuel as a basic energy source for cooking and heating. 
Natural woodlands provide most of the supply and have deteriorated in many areas to the point 
where households experience difficulty in obtaining sufficient fuelwood. A project called the 
Biomass Initiative has been running for a few years with the aims of investigating the fuelwood 
supply problem and methods to solve it. The scale of the project is still at the pilot level. 
Conventional economic supply/demand models have been shown to have limited usefulness in 
addressing fuelwood supply problems. The following figures are provided for reference purposes. 
Gandar (1994) estimated national fuel wood use at 11 million tonnes per year, of which 6.6 
million tonnes is used by rural households in former homelands, 3.5 million tonnes by 
farm worker households and 0. 7 million tonnes in urban areas. Aaron et al (1991) estimated the 
total sustainable supply of wood from natural woodlands for all the former homelands to be 11.6 
million tonnes per year. Williams (1996) estimates that no more than half of the 11.6 million 
tonnes can be regarded as fuel wood. Williams concludes that these figures indicate a significant 
shortfall in wood fuel production. 
Bagasse 
Bagasse is a waste product of sugar refining and all consumption is by the sugar-refining 
industry. The DMEA (DMEA & Eskom 1995) reports that bagasse use accounted for 47 PJ in 
South Africa in 1993. This is significant as it represents more than five per cent of total industrial 
energy consumption. At 7 MJ/kg, 47 PJ is equivalent to 6. 7 million tonnes of bagasse. 
2.2.5 Renewables4 
Solar and wind energy 
South Africa has huge potential sources of renewable energy mainly in the form of solar radiation 
and wind. Daily solar radiation levels in the range between 4.5 and 6.5 kWh/m2 are experienced 
and along the coast mean annual wind speeds are greater than 4 m/s and in localised areas the 
value of 6 m/s is exceeded. 
A total of 5.1MWp of photovoltaic electricity generation is in operation and 483 600m2 of solar 
water heating panels. About 400 kW of small wind turbines for power generation have been 
installed. Windpumps for water supply in rural areas are very common in South Africa and 
about 300 000 such machines are in operation. 
Hydro power 
South Africa has a dry cimate and is classified as a water stressed country with low rainfall and 
few large rivers. Estimated hydro potential is 8 360 MW. South Africa has a total of 2 222MW 
of hydro power plants greater than 10 MW in operation, including pumped storage schemes, and 
65 MW of plants smaller than 10 MW. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 has summarised key facts and figures from chapter 3 and 4 which contain a far more 
detailed description of the energy sector in the context of the economy and the energy supply 
system in South Africa. 
3 All data on biomass supplied by Anthony Williams of the Energy and Development Research Centre at the 
University of Cape Town. 
4 All data on renewables supplied by Anthony Williams of the Energy and Development Research Centre at the 




































Energy in the economy and energy demand 
Recent work on energy policy development has indicated the importance of energy policy being 
sensitive to the needs of energy users, within the goals and constraints of economic, social and 
environmental policy. So whilst the energy supply industry is an important part of the economy, 
is a large employer, and needs to be viable, its raison d'etre is the effective provision of energy 
services. In this vein, contemporary energy policy studies begin with an understanding of needs 
for energy services and the economic context of the energy sector. This includes suppressed 
demand, i.e. those energy services for which there is a need which is not met, an example of this 
would be non-electrified households' need for electricity. Following this rationale we now firstly 
consider energy in the South African economy and energy use in South Africa in chapter 3 before 
moving on to the energy supply system in chapter 4. 
3.1 The economic context and energy-economy linkages 
GDP structure, growth and energy demand 
The linkage between overall output of the economy and associated energy consumption is a 
measure of the energy intensity of the economy. What is of particular interest is the degree to 
which growth in the overall economy (GDP growth) results in growth in energy demand and 
conversely how meeting demand for energy by various sectors facilitates growth in those sectors. 
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Figure 3.1.1: Sectoral contribution to GDP 1971- 1993 
















South African GDP grew steadily and rapidly from the I 950s until the beginning of the 1980s 
and then stagnated until the democratic elections. Since then growth has been of the order of 
3% p.a and, although economic analysts differ on exact figures, even better growth rates have 
been forecast for the next few years at least. For instance the South African Chamber of Business 
forecasts a rate of between 3.5% and 4% for 1996 (Business Day, 7 December 1995). 
In terms of the structure of GDP there has been a systematic decline in the relatiye contribution of 
the primary sector while the share of the secondary sector, especially manufacturing, has 
increased substantially and has overtaken the mining sector by a considerable margin over this 
period. 
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Energy intensity 
Energy intensity refers to the amount of energy consumed in order to produce economic output. 
Although countries with higher GDPs tend to use more energy, this does not imply that increased 
energy use leads inevitably to increased economic activity: at best it could be argued that energy 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic development. South Africa's GDP is 26th 
highest in the world, but its primary energy consumption ranks 16th. Its energy intensity is above 
average, i.e. more energy is used per unit of economic output than in many other countries. Only 
10 countries have commercial primary energy intensities higher than South Africa. 
South Africa's high energy intensity is largely a result of the structure of the economy with large-
scale energy intensive primary minerals benefication industries and its reliance on coal for 
production of most electricity and a significant proportion of liquid fuels. Both of these energy 
transformation processes are relatively inefficient in their conversion of energy. South Africa also 
does not generally employ the latest developments in energy efficient technology. Energy costs 
are relatively low and government energy policy has favoured supply side actions rather than 
encouraging the efficient use of energy. 
Most developed economies have shown a steady decline in energy intensity as the structure of 
their economies has shifted away from heavy resource based industry. Since the oil price 
increases of the 1970s there have been significant further improvements in energy efficiency and 
conservation, and the trend in industrialised countries has been a sharp decline in energy 
intensity; i.e. the growth in energy consumption has been slower than the growth in economic 
output; significantly less energy is used per unit of economic output. The same trend is not yet 
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Figure 3.1.2: Trends in nett commercial energy consumption and GDP growth for OECD 
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Figure 3.1.3 Trends in nett commercial energy consumption and GDP growth in South 
Africa 
(DMEA 1995) 
The historical trends for the industrialised countries suggest that, as the structure of economies 
change from one of domination by primary industries to larger commercial and service sectors, 
the energy/GDP ratio tends to reach a peak and then decreases so that many industrialised 
countries currently experience constant energy usage with increasing economic output. With 
growing environmental awareness, constraints may be imposed on increased energy consumption 
by developing countries which have not yet reached this "hump". This is an important national 
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The energy intensity for individual subsectors as shown in table 3.1.1 indicates that base metals, 
an important component of South African exports, have the highest energy intensity both for total 
energy use and for electricity use. Thus, while mineral processing remains important in South 
Africa the relatively high energy intensity of the economy can be expected to continue. The 
second highest intensity for electricity is recorded for the mining industry. This is largely owing 
to the deep level gold mining industry which is in decline. Ceramics, glass and cement are by 
their nature energy intensive and this sector will most likely continue to experience growth. 
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3.2 Changes in South African economic policy 
Macro-economic indicators 
In order to form a view on what possible future growth paths can be envisaged for the energy 
sector in South Africa it is necessary to have a view of what direction the overall economy might 
take. The following is an edited extract from the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry's (DTI's) 1994 Annual Report. The extract gives an indication in which directions the 
South African economy may be expected to move in the years ahead. 
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The year 1994 marked a turning point in South Africa's history. Fundamental political 
and social transformation was accompanied by important shifts in the economic policies of 
the Government of National Unity. The Department of Trade and Industry has noted the 
new guiding objectives for trade, industrial and investment policy as outlined in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and in subsequent decisions taken by 
our first democratically elected Parliament, namely: 
• Achieving a 5% economic growth rate by 1999. 
• Building up to the creation of 300 000 - 500 000 sustainable non-agricultural jobs per 
annum by 1999. 
• Significantly raising the exports of manufactured goods to maintain macro-economic 
balances. 
• Substantially increasing net domestic and foreign investment in the manufacturing 
sector. 
• Industrial transformation. 
With regard to macro-economic targets for industrialisation, 1994 did not represent a 
healthy start. Although the gross domestic product (GDP) rose by 2.0% - 2.5%, growth 
was lower than required and it was largely due to improved contributions by agriculture 
(9%). In the manufacturing sector, growth was registered in the contribution of those 
sectors spurred by expenditure on the Columbus stainless steel and Alusaf aluminum 
megaprojects and other large-scale projects, mostly within the mineral processing, fuels-
chemical complex (most of these megaprojects rely on very low prices for energy). 
The associated capital-intensive path for manufactures is reflected in its stagnant/declining 
employment patterns. Informal sector employment is known to have grown. A recent 
survey estimates that informal manufacturing activities (including sewing, weaving, shoe 
repair and food processing) in 1994 was about 209 000 or 14% of that indicated by official 
statistics. 
Since the 1970s, investment in manufacturing has been concentrated in the three capital-
and energy-intensive manufacturing subsectors of steel, basic chemicals and mineral 
processing. Lumpy private and public investments contributed to high capital absorption 
in these "primary" subsectors of manufacturing, and these megaprojects had a significant 
impact on the engineering subsectors of manufacturing. The latter sectors have 
traditionally "floated" on GDFI (gross domestic fixed investment). 
The challenges for the future are twofold. In the first instance, we (the DTI) must ensure 
that the intermediate commodities that will be produced from these megaprojects, are 
made available to domestic industries for further processing at competitive prices. 
Secondly, investment in the relatively more labour-intensive downstream or "finished 
manufacturing" activities should be encouraged. In 1992, for the first time since 1970, 
GDFI in the non-primary subsectors of manufacturing overtook "primary" sector 
investment. This trend in the composition of investment needs to be encouraged along 
with overall levels. 
South Africa's balance of payments on the current account has deteriorated. Previous 
surpluses have masked a crucial structural deficiency in the overbearing dependence of our 
economy on the import of finished manufactures (including capital and intermediate 
goods) and the export of primary commodities (raw materials and, to a lesser extent, 
agricultural products) and processed primary commodities (or "primary" manufactures). 
The manufacturing sector's trade balance highlights this weakness and outlines the 
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The contribution of the industri al sectors associated with such exports, namely mining , 
mineral processing and chemicals (which are often integrated in mineral production), has 
not diminished. More than half of South African exports are produced within · fo ur 
"primary" manu fac turing subsectors. In fact , their contribution to exports is likely to 
increase in 1995 as the large and continuing investments made in these sectors in recent 
years come on-stream. Exports from "finished" manufacturing sectors have risen only 
slightly in real terms from their 1972 levels . If thi s trend continues, it will undermine the 
employment creation objectives of the RDP. In determining export promotion strategies , 
the DTI will , therefore, aim to increase the contribution of finished manufac tures produced 
far downstream of primary and processed primary commodities. 
Emerging vision 
The economy in general , and much of South African manufac turing in particular, is 
uncompetiti ve. Industri a l and trade policy will be aimed at moving from a low-wage, low-
consumption economy (on aggregate), based on an old technological capacity and 
dependent on the export of primary and primary processed commodities, to an economy 
characterised by high wages , higher consumption , developing and using leading-edge 
technology and exporting finished and increasingly complex manufac tures and services . 
Some difficult decisions , will have to be taken by policy makers, firms and participants in 
the economy in order to shift to thi s path. 
The above extrac t from the DTI report is important for energy demand in that it indicates that 
future industri al policy will have to take into account the large investments in energy-i ntensive 
mega-projects of the past. However, policy for the future will attempt to move away from the 
focus on these industri es and attempt to encourage less capi tal and energy intensive industries. 
The emphasis will be on moving downstream from primary or beneficiated primary commodities 
towards manufacture of high value fini shed goods requiring hi gh wages , leading-edge technology 
and greater sc ientific and economic support and integration . The implication is that higher 
quality but lower vo lume energy services will be required. This means decreasing energy 
intensity for the South African economy if the policies are effective. 
3.3 Global supply and demand 
In addition to changes related to internal transformation in South Africa. two other fac tors are 
important in considering the economic context of the energy sector: first ly the effect of the 
opening of the South African economy to the world economy and , secondly, changes in the world 
energy economy. 
In terms of the first factor, South Africa ' s energy policy has already responded to the new 
openness of the economy. A good example is the decision by the South African Government to 
phase out the subsidy to Sasol. Whereas a cornerstone of the apartheid government 's energy 
policy was the establi shment and support of manu fac ture of liquid fuels from indigenous coal and 
natural gas, one of the first major energy policy moves of the new government has been to plan to 
end that support. The macro-economic result is that more than R1 .5 billion extra per annum will 
be made available to the fisc us when the support has been completely phased out. 
Changes and trends in the global energy economy have become more important because of the 
new openness of the South African economy. However, predictions of the world energy market , 
which is strongly affec ted by the volatile oil market are fraught with uncertai nty. 
Mindful of thi s uncertainty the best approach is to avoid speculation on the world market and to 
re fer the reader to the many volumes covering thi s topic. A standard reference would be the 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook. The most important conclusion for South 
Africa in thi s publication is that energy demand in most developing countries is set to increase 
signi ficantl y. The base case scenario indicates that, while the share of OECD countries' demand 
of world energy will fa ll from 53 % in 1991 to 46%, in 2020 the demand in the developing 
countri es will ri se from 27% to 40%. Thi s will be based on growth in demand by both groups. 
What thi s means is strong growth in energy consumption in countries such as South Africa and 
corresponding growth in the energy supply industri es. As will be seen in chapter 4 there is 
already ev idence of thi s in South Africa. The South African oi l refineries have recently 
undergone large capacity expansions and more are planned . The elec tricity system is also 
undergoing rapid expansions and coal production, both for local consumpti on and export, is 
nsmg. 
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Figure 3.4.1: Final energy consumption by main user categories 1950- 1993 
(DMEA 1995) 







Figure 3.4.2: Net energy consumption in South Africa in 1993 by sector. 
(DMEA 1995) 
The fig ures above show that in terms of quantity of energy used, industry is the most important 
consumer, accounting for nearly half of total consumption . Households and transport make up 
most of the other half consuming roughly a quarter each. Agriculture accounts for only 3% of 
energy consumed. The proportion of total energy consumed by industry rose rapidly until 1982 
but has declined since then . The commissioning of new primary beneficiation plants such as 
Columbus stainless steel and Alusaf aluminum may reverse thi s trend. However, rapid growth in 
household and transport energy, directly related to electrification and increased motor vehic le use 
could maintain their position . Overall , there is a strong likelihood of growth in all of these main 
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It is important to note the differences in fuels used. Coal and electricity make up nearl y a ll 
industrial consumption and liquid fuels nearly I 00% of the transport sector. Woodfuel dominates 
the household subsector although coal , electricity and petroleum fuels play an important role. 
Thus, even from thi s highly aggregated data , it is apparent that different subsectors have very 
different energy consumption patterns and needs . 
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Peta-joules Elect- Solid Biomas 
ric ity fuels s 
Heat Mech- Chern- Light Tran- Non- Total Coke Coal Total Heat 
anical ical sport Energy heat heat 
Industry 85.7 219.2 24.8 15.3 1.1 4.2 345.3 105.3 392.3 497.6 11 .0 
Metallurgy 38.5 14.8 15.1 2.1 0.0 0.1 70.6 104.4 61 .3 165.7 0.2 
Mining & 15.4 99.9 1.0 3.8 0.5 1.2 121.8 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.0 
quarrying 
Other 32.1 104.5 8.7 9.4 0.6 2.9 152.9 0.9 329.6 330.5 10.8 
indust ry 
Manufac- 18.1 49.4 5 .5 6.3 0.6 0.4 75.0 0.3 108.1 108.4 10.7 
turing 
Chemicals 11.4 42 .9 3.2 2.4 0.0 2.3 62.2 0.0 165.7 165.7 0.0 
Other 2.6 12.2. 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 15.7 0.6 55.8 56.4 0.1 
Commerce 37.7 11.6 0.0 8.7 0.0 0.0 58.0 0.0 32.5 32 .5 0.0 
Transport 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.2 0.0 14.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Household 62.2 3.7 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 74.0 0.0 43.7 43.7 229.0 
Agriculture 8.8 5.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL 194.4 239.6 24.8 32.8 15.3 4.2 506.1 105_3 468-5 573.8 240.0 
Peta -joules Liquid Gase- TOTAL 
fuels ous 
fuels 
Heat Mech- Light Tran- Non- Total Coal Blast Coke Pro- Re- Total 
anica l sport Energy heat furnace oven ducer- finery 
heat heat heat 
Industry 22.4 2.0 0.0 19.2 0.0 43.6 19.4 15.2 13.2 4.3 1.8 53.9 951.4 
Metallurgy 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.1 4.1 15.2 13.2 4.0 0.0 36.5 275.1 
Mining & 0.2 1.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 125.6 
quarrying 
Other 21 .0 0.3 0.0 17.9 0.0 39.2 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.8 17.3 550.7 
industry 
Manufac- 6.4 0.1 0.0 11 .0 0.0 17.5 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 220.8 
turing 
Chemicals 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 13.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.8 4.1 245.9 
Other 1.3 0.2 0.0 6.3 0.0 7.8 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 84.0 
Commerce 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.7 
Transport 2.6 0.0 0.0 455.5 1.0 459.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 473.3 
Household 23.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 24.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 371 .1 
Agriculture 2.7 38.6 0.1 12.9 0.0 54.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68 .9 
TOTAL 51-2 40.6 1.2 487.6 1.0 581.6 19.4 15.2 13.2 4.3 1.8 53.9 1955.4 
* Note: Although the total consumption does not tally exac tly with totals from other sources the table is 
still very useful because of the level of detail provided. The total does not tally because the information is 
compiled from energy survey return s and not all users ryave submitted return s. The di fference between thi s 
total ( 1955 PJ ) and the official DMEA total (2083 PJ) is beli eved to be insignificant for the purposes of thi s 
analys is. 
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The table above gives a more disaggregated view of energy consumption by considering to what 
use the energy is put by the various consumers. Although the table appears dense with data, 
closer inspection reveals that energy needs are concentrated in different subsectors. The clearest 
example is liquid fuels in the transport sector. The data in this table also gives an idea of where 
fuels may be substituted, - for example the large amount of heat energy provided by electricity to 
industry, and where fuels could probably only be substituted at significant extra cost- such as the 
coal used for heat in industry or the electricity used for mechanical energy in industry. The table 
is rich with information of which the above are only a few examples. 
3.4.1 Energy use in industry and mining 
Peta joules Electricity Coal & coke Other fuels Total %of Total 
Mining 118 9 8 135 
Minerals & 85 174 75 334 
metals 
Manufacturinq* 94 164 51 309 
Sub total 297 347 134 779 
Other industry** - - 63 63 
Total 297 347 197 841 
* Includes chemicals 
** Accounts for data inadequacies 








The industry and mining subsectors accounted for 51% of energy consumption in 1993, making 
them the most important subsectors in terms of energy consumption. The table above gives 
consumption figures for the two most important fuels, electricity and coal. Roughly equivalent 
quantities of these two fuels are used and together they make up about three-quarters of fuels 
supplied to these subsectors. The balance is made up largely by coal, coke and blast furnace 
gases, and small amounts of heating oils. The different industrial sectors are also clearly 
dependent on different fuels as shown below. 
Percent Electricity Coal & coke Other 
Mining 87 6 7 
Minerals & metals 26 52 22* 
Manufacturinq 30 53 17 
* Nearly all of this is coke oven gas and blast furnace gas in basic ferrous metals 
beneficiation. 






The mmmg industry depends heavily on electricity, and accounts for 87% of consumption. 
Supply of electricity to the mines was the main factor which spurred the initial development of 
South Africa's large electricity sector. Minerals and metals uses large amounts of both electricity 
and coal, mostly in large scale minerals benefaction. Manufacturing also uses large amounts of 
coal and electricity. Both these fuels are extensively used for heating applications. 
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Energy intensity in South African industry 
Major groups Net energy Value added Energy intensity 
consumption (R million) (Mj/Rand) 
(PJ) 
Coal 11.1 4 797 
Metal ore 29.4 2 910 
Gold and uranium 87.2 13138 
Diamond 3.7 1 390 
Other 5.3 4 770 
Total mining 136.7 27005 
Food 90.0 8 697 
Beverages 11.0 2 685 
Tobacco 0.9 401 
Textiles 17.5 2 617 
Clothing 1.6 2 099 
Leather 1.3 277 
Footwear 0.4 759 
Wood except furniture 8.0 1 404 
Wood furniture 1.1 1 015 
Paper and paper 66.4 3 319 
products 
Printing 2.9 2 863 
Industrial chemicals 54.9 1 860 
Other chemicals 12.8 1 982 
Rubber 5.8 991 
Plastics 3.6 1860 
Potterv 2.3 111 
Glass 8.1 781 
Other non-metal 82.9 2 170 
minerals 
Ferrous basic metals 288.1 4 413 
Non-ferrous metals 25.4 1 407 
Fabricated metals 14.0 4888 
Machinery 5.8 3407 
Electrical machinery 5.1 3175 
Motor vehicles 6.5 3 699 
Transport equipment 1.1 1 082 
Professional and 0.4 360 
Scientific 
Other manufacturin~l 7.3 583 
Total manufacturing 725.3 60 254 
Total industry 862.0 87 259 
Table 3.4.4 Energy intensity of South African industry 




































It is apparent that base metals, the largest single industrial energy consuming subsector, is also by 
far the most energy intensive industrial subsector. The pattern of energy expenditure by some 
other industrial subsectors is also important. The food sector shows both a high total use and 
relatively high intensity, although, in terms of value added its energy requirements are very 
modest in comparison with the basic minerals and metals industries. The chemicals and paper 
and pulp industries consume large amounts at high intensities. South African industries exhibit 
energy intensities similar to other developing countries, typically 15% to 50% higher than 
. equivalent industries in Western Europe and the USA. 
The table below shows a comparison of some important industrial subsectors. The study that 
produced these figures (de Villiers 1993) suggests that amongst the chief causes of South Africa's 
poor efficiency are cheap prices of energy, the fuel mix (with South Africa having amongst the 
world's highest uses of coal and electricity and lowest of fuel oil and gas) and the use of older, 
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Paper Bricks Cement Steel 
GJ/ton GJ/ton GJ/ton GJ/ton 
South Africa 31-37 4.0-4.5 4.6 29.0 
USA 28-35 4.1 21.4 
UK 26 2.9 19.8 
Sweden 22 19.7 
Japan 3.0-4.0 17.6 
Brazil 20 4.2 20.6 
Hungary 4.2 25.6 
Taiwan 3.7 23.2 
Canada 3.5 23.7 
Western Europe 22-29 2.6-3.8 3.6-3.8 16-21 
Developing 23-54 4.0-5.0 4.0-6.0 24-39 
Countries 
Table 3.4.5 International comparison of energy consumption in large industrial subsectors 
(de Villiers 1993) 
3.4.2 Transport 
Liquid fuels comprise 92% of energy consumption for transport. Availability is good and prices 
are average and stable by international standards. Rail transport accounts for 5% of total 
electricity consumption. Although some electricity and coal are used in transport they are 
relatively unimportant in this sector and this section focuses on liquid fuels. Electricity makes up 
2.5% and coal less than I% of demand. 
Total demand in South Africa for petrol in 1994 was 9 600 Ml and for diesel 5 100 MI. This 
represents market growth of 4-5 % for petrol since 1993 and 3-4 % for diesel. The markets for 
petrol and diesel can be expected to grow by approximately 3 % per annum over the next six 
years. South Africa is a spacious country with 202 00 km of roads in relatively good condition 
and six million motor vehicles. The total number of vehicle kilometres travelled in South Africa 
in 1992 was 98 000 million, ranking South Africa fifteenth in the world on this statistic. 
Changes in socio-economic policy of the post-apartheid government aim to spread the benefits of 
the economy. In other countries similar increases of wealth have led to rapid rises in the number 
of motor vehicles and in vehicle usage. A corresponding rise in South Africa will most probably 
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Excepting the dips corresponding to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, when strict conservation 
measures were implemented, nominal petrol demand has shown steady growth. Considering that 
South Africa was in economic recession from 1989 to 1993 it is expected that the current upturn 
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Demand for diesel, on the other hand, has remained relatively flat since the beginning of the 
1980s. This is to be expected as diesel is largely used in the commercial transport sector and by 
industry-and agriculture. The demand in these sectors is less price-elastic than the demand for 
petrol by private motorists. Demand for diesel is also strongly coupled to economic output 
because of the role in the economy of commercial transport. The sluggish demand for diesel 
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Jet fuel demand is affected by a complex group of fac tors ranging from touri st travel to business 
confidence. The strong dip in the mid eighties refl ects South Africa's increas ing international 
isolation and economic cri sis towards the end of the apartheid era. However, with most econoillic 
indicators in South Africa having improved considerably since the democratic elections in 1994 it 
is likely that jet fuel will continue with a strong upward trend. 
3.4.3 Energy demand by households and community facilities 
Households can be di vided into the fo ur categories shown in the table below. 
Household category 
Poor rural households 
Poor non-electrified urban 
households 
Poor electrified households 
Non-poor households 
Energy use pattern 
- dependent on often inadequate supplies of fuelwood 
- increasing use of paraffin , candles , batteries but find 
these very expensive and a drain on cash resources 
- fuelwood related indoor air pollution is a major health 
problem 
-use paraffin, coal (in areas where coal is cheap) , LPG, 
candles and batteries 
- purchase of these fuels a very heavy burden on 
resources 
- coal related air pollution is a major health problem 
-largely use electricity but keep paraffin , LPG or 
candles for security because of supply quality except 
that households in areas where coal is cheap maintain 
high usage of coal stoves for cooking and space 
heating 
- coal related air pollution is a major health problem 
- all have access to electricity 
- electricity use dominates and is not a burden on 
household 
Table 3.4.7 Household energy use 
(Eberhard & Trollip 1994) 
At the end of 1995 only about 50% of households had access to electri city. However, the 
government' s RDP electri fication programme pl ans to electri fy a further 2. 5 mill ion households 
by the year 2000, raising thi s proportion to 64% Other key issues faci ng households are the 
securi ty of fuelwood supplies, and cost, health and safe ty issues related to coal and paraffin use. 
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The low-income household sector has historically been ignored in government energy policy. 
Because major changes are not expected in the non-poor household category this section focuses 
on the energy demand of the urban and rural poor 
Energy demand by the urban and rural poor 
The household sector is characterised by its extreme diversity in energy use paterns.The figures 
below are an example of the distribution of household energy use across household types and 
geographic region . These figures indicate the large number of permutations of the key variables. 
(An exhaustive description would be out of place in this document; the reader is referred to the 
EPRET outputs (EDRC 1995) for details on household energy usage.) 
In addition to extreme diversity, low-income urban households in South Africa exhibit three main 
characteristics in their energy usage patterns. First, for individual households , multiple fuel use is 
common, and it is not unusual to find two, three or more fuels being regularly used for the same 
end-use . Second, the structure of energy usage is different for differing types of households. 
Third , patterns of consumption are dynamic , changing over time and social contexts , reacting to 
fuel price movements , changes in access to fuel sources and many other factors. Moreover, with 
security of service being of prime importance to poor households, which often experience 
interruptions in supply and volatile economic conditions, appliance-fuel combinations for 
different end-uses change frequently. 
Urban households 
In South Africa it has been found that one of the primary macro-determinants of energy 
consumption patterns in a low-income urban household is its geographical location. Two major 
geographical factors appear to be relevant: climatic conditions and access to cheap coal. It is 
informative to compare the distribution of these two factors with the percentage use of various 
fuels at different geographic locations. The figure below depicts an overview of percentage use of 
different fuels in households in major urban centres. Where coal prices are low, coal use 
predominates. Paraffin is important in all regions but where coal prices are higher non-electrified 
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The quantities of different energy carriers used are often problematic to measure. The data in 
figure 3.4.9 and 3.4 .1 0 were compiled from the EPRET (Trollip 1994) database and are 
indicative of the demand for household fuels in two representative areas of South Africa. 
Figure 3.4.9 Monthly delivered energy consumption in Megajoules in the PWV 
(Trollip 1994) 
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These figures are used as representative example~ of a region with low-priced coal and cold 
winters and a region where the coal price is high and the climate can be described as temperate 
coastal. The total quantity of energy delivered to households in the Gauteng is far higher than in 
the Eastern Cape. The availability of cheap coal lessens general energy poverty although the 
health and safety implications of the resulting pollution are severe (Terblanche et al 1992). It can 
be seen that when electricity is available it is used and that paraffin use is pervasive. 
Significant quantities of paraffin are used in all non-electrified households. In areas where coal 
is expensive the major source of energy for poor is paraffin. The figure below shows the 
consumption of paraffin in South Africa since 1950- households account for most of this. 
The consumption record raises two issues. The large dip between 1976 and 1988 corresponds 
with a rise in the paraffin price starting in 1973 and sharpening in 1979. The recovery in 
consumption levels in 1983 matches a decrease in the paraffin price. This corroborates other 
evidence (Me Gregor 1992) of paraffin demand being price-elastic . The reality described by these 
figures is of the poorest of the poor, already suffering serious energy poverty, having to cut their 
paraffin consumption even further in the face of price increase . 
A second observation based on the figures above is that concurrent with the mass electrification 
programme of the past years paraffin consumption has risen steeply. Thus , issues of paraffin 
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Figure 3.4.11 Nominal and per capita consumption of illumination paraffin 
(DMEA 1995) 
Expenditure on fuels 
A good indication of the energy burden that poor South African households experience is given in 
the figure below. Note that this only includes actual consumption expenditure on the fuels 
themselves and does not include the costs of appliances, - which can be high and are an integral 
part of acquiring energy services. 
The most significant feature is the high percentage of income spent on energy by the poorest 
category. The high expenditure suggests that a certain minimum energy consumption is required 
to sustain very basic needs and that poorer South African households forego many other items to 





























































Figure 3.4.12 Energy expenditure as a percentage of income in Gauteng 
(Golding & Hoets 1992) 
Rural households 
3- 17 
Rural households comprise the majority of poor homes in South Africa. About 0.9 million of the 
3.2 million households are farmworkers on commercial farms while 2.3 million are situated in 
previously defined "homeland" areas. Most of these households are characterised by severe 
poverty and in terms of basic energy services the energy poverty is exacerbated by growing 
denudation of local biomass resources. Wood and paraffin are the main energy resources for 
rural households with only about 2.5% (Horvei & Dahl 1994) of homeland houses and 15% 
(Hofmeyr 1993) of farm worker households having access to electricity. High coal use is found in 
a few areas and LPG is also used in some cases although prevalence of this is low. 
The overall picture that emerges from an examination of many rural energy surveys that have 
been undertaken is one of a multiple fuel economy adapting to changing conditions. As local 
biomass resources are put under pressure these are commercialised and other commercial fuel s, 
mainly paraffin, are introduced. While in the not too distant past wood was a "free" fuel , 
collected by household members. it has become increasingly commercialised and in many areas 
household expenditures on wood and paraffin are reaching parity (Ward 1994). This reliance on 
commercial fuels is not welcomed by poor rural households and expenditure on both paraffin and 
wood is often seen as an onerous burden on meagre cash resources and in many surveys is cited, 
together with wood fuel shortages, as one of the biggest problems experienced by these 
households (Ward 1994). 
There is a considerable range in living conditions experienced by farm worker households, 
largely determined by the farm owners. In energy terms farmworkers are often better off than 
other poor rural dwellers because commercial farms often have considerable fuelwood resources 
(Hofmeyr 1993). However, despite this, there are many cases where workers do not have access 
to these resources and experience shortages. Because of their lack of ready access to commercial 
centres , farmworkers are ob liged to pay high prices for alternative fuels at rural retailers, placing 
a heavy burden on their often extremely low cash incomes. 
Community facilities 
The results of apartheid planning have had a simi lar effect on community facilities as on 
households . Facilities in the former black "homelands" and black townships are poorly 
resourced. 80% of South African schools do not have electricity and many clinics are also not 
supplied. 
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Household electricity 
One of the many blatant inequities of the apartheid energy system was the unequal access to 
electricity offered to households in previously defined black local authority areas compared with 
white local authority areas. In general , just about all white households have access and most 
black households do not. One of the cornerstones of the RDP is the national household 
electrification programme. The table below indicates the achievement of the programme to date. 
Electrification 
1992 1993 1994 1995 Inception to date 
Eskom 145 522 208 801 254 383 313 179 
Farmworkers** 12 698 16 074 16 838 15 134 
Local authorities 62 214 91 222 129 951 118 173 
Other 12 121 16 074 34 584 32 281 
Total 232 555 331 909 435 756 478 767 
** 1992 figure is connections from January 1991 to December 1992 
Table 3.4.8 The electrification programme to date 





1 478 987 
By the end of 1995, 20 million South Africans (about half the population) still did not have 
access to electricity. (A large scale electrification programme is described in sec tion 4.3 on 
Electricity). Eskom has been given responsibility for a portion of the urban areas and all rural 
areas. The arrangements for the remainder of the urban areas are not clear and are bound up in 
the problems caused by the fragmented supply of services which resulted from previous race-
based local authorities. The degree of resolution of the arrangement of urban electricity supplies 
could have a large impact on the success of the programme. 
Agriculture 
Liquid fuels account for 78 % of energy consumption in this sector. Electricity allows use of 
sophisticated technology on commercial farms whilst subsistence agriculture is severely 
hampered by lack of access to electricity and other fuels even for basic services such as water 
pumping. 
Diesel plays a major role in commercial agriculture. In 1995 the agricultural subsector 's 
expenditure on liquid fuels was Rl.72 billion, making up 15% of the sector' s total intermediary 
goods and services bill (Business Day, 3 April 1996). Diesel is currently priced in the same 
range as petrol in South Africa (an abnormal situation internationally - see section 4.3 on liquid 
fuels) , and large amounts of diesel are currently exported because of a structural local surplus of 
diesel. 
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The pattern of fuel use has changed over time as shown in the figure below. It can be seen that 
the complete dominance of coal which made up 65 % of consumption in the 1950s has been 
steadil y eroded and now accounts for about 25 %. The change in consumption patterns reflects 
the changing structure of the economy and society. For example, the rapid increase in motor 
vehicle use has led to liquid fuels accounting for the largest amount of final energy consumption. 
The growth in consumption of liquid fuels reflects both the increase in ownership and use of 
private motor vehicles and minibus taxis and the use of heavy diesel-powered road transport. The 
growth in electricity reflects both a changing industrial structure, with higher technology 
manufacturing tak ing an ever-increasing share over primary industri es and also the substitution 
of fuels such as coal in the household sector. 
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Figure 3.4.14 Use of different fuels from 1950- 1993 
(DMEA 1995) 
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Growth in electricity consumption has also been very strong. In terms of economic development, 
electricity is acknowledged as being of particular importance. The portion of electricity utili sed by 
different sectors is shown in the figure below. This illustrates the relative importance of elec tricity 
in different subsectors , with the combination of industry, commerce and minin g making up more 
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Figure 3.4.15 Sectoral consumption of electricity in South Africa 
(DMEA 1995) 
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Whilst households only consume about 15% of the energy component of electricity their effect on 
the capacity of the electricity sector is far greater. Firstly, the complexity and cost of installing 
and operating the household distribution system is far higher, per kWh sold, than that for bigger 
consumers. But the second effect, on the shape of the daily demand curve, has very important 
implications, both for system capacity and for demand side management. The figure below 
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Figure 3.4.16 South African electricity system demand on day of peak demand 1992 
(Eskom 1994b) 
The peak demand occurred at about 18h00 on a cold day and coincided with the peak demand 
from residential consumers. Electricity load research in low-income residential areas shows a 
high correlation between demand and low temperatures (Berrisford & Bluff 1991). 
This has implications for all components of the South African energy system. The political and 
economic recovery in South Africa, combined with the mass housing and electrification 
programmes, will lead to rapid growth in the total number of households using electricity. If 
growth in the demand by households for electricity is allowed to go unchecked, the form of the 
daily demand curve shown above will dictate a requirement for huge additional capital 
expenditure in generation plant. This will have a considerable negative impact on electricity 
costs. 
3.6 Primary energy consumption 
The nett energy consumption above refers to energy, such as petrol for example, consumed in its 
final state. However, most energy consumed in South Africa has first been transformed from 
some other energy carrier. For example, petrol is produced from crude oil (imported to South 
Africa) or coal or natural gas . Most electricity in South Africa is produced from coal. The next 
chapter deals in detail with energy supply, which considers these transformation industries in 
detail. However, in terms of demand, the nett energy demand described in the proceeding 





















































South African energy supply 
This chapter aims to describe the energy supply sector in terms of institutional arrangements and 
main quantitative parameters for each of the main subsectors. 
Energy supply industries in South Africa are owned and managed by a mixture of private and 
state-owned organisations. Commercial energy production is dominated by a limited number of 
large organisations. With one main exception, these large organisations currently specialise in 
one energy subsector: coal, electricity or liquid fuels. Whilst these large organisations also have a 
strong presence in retailing, the retail component of the supply chain is largely characterised by a 
large number of smaller operators . 
4.1 The coal subsector 
Overview 
The indigenous South African energy resource is dominated by coal. Many of the very large coal 
deposits can be exploited at extremely favourable costs and as a result a large coal mining 
industry has developed. Proven reserves total 61 billion tonnes (the seventh largest in the world) 
and annual production exceeds 200 million tonnes (Chamber of Mines 1995a). In addition to 
extensive use of coal in the domestic economy, large amounts of coal are exported, making an 
important contribution to South Africa' s foreign exchange. South Africa is the world's sixth-
largest coal producer and the second-largest exporter of steam coal. 
To achieve success the coal industry has had to overcome problems with poor quality coal. Much 
of the coal has a high ash content making it unsuitable for export and problematic for local 
utilisation. However, the local electricity generation, synthetic fuels and chemicals industries 
have overcome these problems. For export and specific local purposes beneficiation (largely 
washing) processes have been developed. 
1994 Million Tonnes Million Rands 
Run of mine production 243 




Table 4.1.1 Basic coal production and sales statistics for 1994. 
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Figure 4.1.1: South African coal production, local sales and exports 1974- 1994 
(Chamber of Mines of South Africa 1995a) 
Figure 4.1 .1 above shows trends in production and sales since 1974. The South African coal 
industry has experienced rapid growth over the past two decades. Total production in 1994 was 
nearly three times what it was twenty years before. Growth was fastest over the period from the 
early nineteen-seventies until the mid eighties. However, since then a combination of the effects 
of sanctions on exports and the local economic downturn stopped growth. While the coal 
industry expects the local market to show negligible growth in the short term (Munro 1995), 
export sales value for 1995 was expected to rise almost R1 billion to R5 .5 billion, owing largely 
to increased prices . (Munro 1995). 
Since 1987 coal sales have exceeded saleable production with resulting stockpile draw down. 
Most coal for export first goes through a beneficiation process which produces up to 30% 
discards. The increased focus in the industry on exports , and also an increase in the supply of 
beneficiated coal locally, resulted in an accumulation of more than 500 MT of coal discards in the 






















































Figure 4.1.2 Coal production and sales 1994 
(Chamber of Mines 1995a) 
4-3 
Most (91 %) coal consumed locally is not utilised as a final energy product but in the production 
of other energy carriers , namely electricity and synthetic fuels . Both these industries have large 
capital investments in coal-using plant and the demand for coal by these entities is expected to 
remain firm. Sasol is unlikely to expand its oil-from-coal synfuel operation, but Eskom demand 
for coal will probably grow in the medium term as its surplus coal-fired electricity generating 
capacity is more full y utilised. 
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4.1.1 South African coal resources 
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Figure 4.1.3: Map of coal fields of South Africa 
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Figure 4.1.4 South African coal reserves in comparison to other coal producers 
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Estimates of South African coal reserves vary and are confused by a lack of uniform terminology. 
Terms such as "mineable reserves" depend on opinions on technology and future markets, and 
measures of in-situ reserves depend on survey methods that can be less than exact. 
The following extracts from Dutkiewicz (1994) and Thamm et a! (1995) give an indication of the 
different measures and the spread of estimates. 
Dutkiewicz 1994 states -
Estimates of South Africa's coal resources have been confused by the lack of uniform 
terminology. Estimates go back to the work ofWybergh in 1928, but the first significant 
analysis was carried out by the Coal Advisory Board who differentiated between in-situ, 
extractable, and saleable. 
The Table below shows various estimates that have been made of coal resources over the 
years. 
Coal reserves (million tonnes) 
Year In-situ Mineable 
1947 11 065 
1969 18 877 
1975 24 915 
1981 110 000 51 000 
1982 113 329 57 541 
Table 4.1.2 Coal resource estimates for South Africa 
(Dutkiewicz 1994) 
The general increase in the reserve estimates is similar to that of world oil reserves which 
increased over a number of years and are now approaching an asymptote. It is likely that 
the true South African reserves will be higher than current estimates. 
Thamm et al 1995 state -
Estimates of South African coal reserves are 121 218 Mt of which 55 333 Mt are expected 
to be economically recoverable (Bredell and Louw, 1992). Other published estimates are 
117 675 Mt (Coakley et al, 1992) in-situ resources, reliably estimated. The Council for 
Geoscience classifies resources in terms of proven, probable and potential reserves. Its 
estimate is 96 699 Mt proven, 33 850 Mt probable and 28 084 Mt potential coal reserves. 
In the Witbank coalfield, depths of the upper seam (# 5) are in the region of 30m, the 
deepest seam (# 1) at approximately 90m depth, with seam dips usually less than 5 
degree's. The Highveld coalfield has the #5 seam at an average 20-80 metres, the # 1 at 
80-170m depth and dips less than 5 degrees. The Eastern Transvaal coalfield seam depths 
range from 50-150m. In the Northern Transvaal coalfields such as Limpopo, 
Soutpansberg and the western parts of the Waterberg depths are greater and usually in 
excess 200m. The depth to which local opencast collieries can operate profitably is in the 
region of 60-65m. The Waterberg coalfield is South Africa's largest reserve of 
unexploited coal, where some 36% of the in-situ reserves are estimated (Dreyer, 1991) to 
be extractable by opencast methods. Ninety percent of mineable reserves are at depths less 
than 200m (NCA, 1993). 
Although the estimates in the two quotations above vary considerably they give a reasonably 
useful picture of the size and main characteristics of the reserves. For mineable (economically 
recoverable) reserves, a figure of around 56 000 MT would seem to be acceptable while in-situ 
resources are at least 113 000 MT and increasing steadily as more exploration is done. In terms 
of quality, South African coal in general has a sulphur content below 1% but is high in ash. 
Dutkiewicz (1994) comments as follows-
Most of the in-situ coal (66%) has a calorific value of between 20 and 26 MJ/kg, and 11% 
is better than 26 MJ/kg. Most of the coal is of steam quality, with only small amounts 
occurring sporadically mainly in north Natal, of coking coal. It is estimated that of the 
total coal reserves of 57 541 million tonnes, some 947 million are suitable for 
metallurgical purposes if beneficiation is employed. There are only small amounts of 
anthracite and reserves are estimated at 1 112 million tonnes. 
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Discards 
The benefication of coal, particularly for export, results in large quantities of coal discards being 
produced. Close to 50 MT of discards are produced annually. Thirty percent of coal mined for 
the export market is discarded and between 15% and 25% of local demand (excluding power 
station coal) is discarded (Dutkiewicz 1994). Total discards by the year 2020 are estimated at 
2 300 MT. There is opinion that greater quantities of discards can be utilised and that policy 
should be developed to this end (Dutkiewicz 1994). 
Resource depletion 
Opinions on resource depletion depend on the estimates of the reserve - including as yet 
undiscovered or un-measured reserves and estimates of demand. 
Dutkiewicz (1994) produces the following scenario-
EDRC 
If it assumed that the production of coal with time will follow a "bell-shaped" curve, then 
there will be a period of exponential growth followed by a decrease in the rate of increase 
leading to a peak in production followed by a general decrease. Such a curve would 
translate into an "S-shaped" curve of production. Figure 4.1.5 below has been shown to 
show the shape of a production curve to a total coal reserve of 60 000 million tonnes, i.e. 
57 541 million tonnes of reserves at 1982 and a cumulative production of 2 400 million 
tonnes up to 1982. It will be seen that up to the present South Africa has used 
approximately 7% of its total mineable reserves. This will increase to around 11% by the 
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Figure 4.1.5 Coal production- actual and theoretical (including discards) 
(Dutkiewicz 1994) 
The actual mathematical shape of the curve is not important, but it is indicative of the fact 
that there is not likely to be a shortage of coal in the medium term, even at a greatly 
increased coal export trade. By around 2012 the inflection point of the curve will be 
reached and there will thereafter be a growing pressure on coal and a need to start the 









































South African energy supply 4-7 
The peak demand for coal will be reached around 2070. It is worth noticing that, with the 
assumptions made, the production in 2150 will be the same as it is at present. 
Whilst the production curve in the future will be a function of supply and demand economics, the 
above shows that there clearly does not have to be any urgent attempt to contain coal production 
expansion and that the export market could be an increasingly important contributor to foreign 
exchange. 
4.1.2 Coal production 
South Africa's coal production comes from collieries ranging from amongst the largest in the 
world to small-scale producers with outputs in the range of 5 000 tons per month. Sixty one 
collieries were active producers in 1994. Of these, a relatively small number of large-scale 
producers supply coal to the electricity and synfuel producers. About 50% of South African coal 
mining is underground and this makes it difficult for South Africa to reach the productivity levels 
of Australia, for instance, where 60% of mining is open cast. Some 4.6% is produced by long 
walling, 12% by stope recovery, 33.7% by board and pillar mining, while 49.6% is produced by 
open cast methods (Chamber of Mines 1995a). Bord and pillar was more extensively practiced in 
the past and this has resulted in vast coal reserves being locked up in previously formed pillars. 
Work is underway to investigate recovery of this reserve. 
The coal mining industry is highly concentrated. Three companies, Amcoal, Ingwe Coal and 
Sasol, account for 75% of local production. Production is concentrated in large mines with 13 
mines accounting for 70% of production. 
Major companies Production (saleable) MT 
lngwe 50.2 




Table 4.1.3 Major South African coal producing companies 







The coal mining sector employed around 59 000 people in 1994 as compared with 100 000 in 
1986. Of labour, 68% is drawn from within South Africa while 22% are migrant. 
(Ruiters 1995). 
Institutional and regulatory aspects related to coal mining 
Thamm et al ( 1995) state -
Entrepreneurs and new entrants to this industry are regulated primarily by the provisions 
of the Mineral Act (No. 50 of 1991) and its amendments and provisions of the Income 
Tax Act as applied to mining and prospection activities. In South Africa, mineral rights 
are held both privately and by the state. Future ownership of these rights is subject to 
active debate (Jourdan, 1994; Segal, 1994). Coal utilisation, marketing and exports in 
particular have been deregulated since the enactment of the Coal Resources Repeal Act 
(No. 2 of 1992). Industry exports are primarily self regulating, with volumes limited by 
the capacity of the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT), Durban and Maputo harbours. 
In recent years producers who are not part of the RBCT consortium have been 
investigating the viability of a second terminal at Richards Bay, the proposed Coalex 
terminal. 
In practice those who wish to explore for minerals negotiate contracts of "options to 
purchase" with the minerals rights owners. When enough acreage has been secured the 
DMEA Regional Director is approached for a prospecting permit and later, if exploration 
is successful, a mining authorisation. If exploration is successful then the options to 
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A number of state departments are responsible for the management of the environmental 
impacts of mining - the DMEA, Water Affairs and Forestry, Agriculture, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism and Health. Mining environmental impact assessment is managed 
depending on which business phase the mining proponent is operating i.e. construction, 
operation or decommissioning. Until a closure certificate is issued by the DMEA, the 
owner is legally obligated to manage environmental impact, rehabilitation as directed and 
make financial provision as necessary. 
The most important financial measures that affect mining or prospecting are ring fencing 
provisions. These ring fencing provisions exist to isolate certain types of mining related 
activities with respect to income or losses for tax purposes (Greyling Odendaal 1992) and 
were introduced to protect the tax base of the fisc us. The most important of these are: 
1. the tax payer ring fence, in which taxable income is determined separately for each 
taxpayer, 
2. the mining activity ring fence which taxes mining separately from non-mining 
income, 
3. the capital expenditure "per mine" ring fence which in effect restricts the capital 
expenditure on a particular mine against income from that mine only, subject to a 
25% breach and 
4. prospecting ring fences, which isolates prospecting deductions outside lease areas. 
Expenditure related to prospecting operations and capital expenditure is deductible against 
mmmg income. Mining operations can deduct capital expenditure immediately as 
opposed to the 20 % over five years as in the case with other companies. South African 
company tax rates typically 5-10% higher than those countries actively seeking (mining) 
investment. 
4.1.3 The market for South African coal 
There is a synergy between local consumption of poor grade steam coals for large, stable users 
such as Eskom and Sasol and the development of exports of better quality beneficiated coals. For 
example, the development of infrastructure and a stable market for the very low grade (up to 
40% ash) coals connected to supplies to Eskom has allowed the development of the benefication 
industry supply of coals with ash contents of less than 16% to be exported to international 









Figure 4.1.6 Local coal market 1994 
(Chamber of Mines 1995a) 
In 1994 138.8 MT of coal was consumed in the local market. As can be seen in the figure above, 
90% of this was used in electricity and synfuels/chemical production. The electricity, exports, 
synfuels and chemicals sectors are characterised by economies of scale which dictate that security 
of supply, quality and reserve base are prime considerations when sourcing supplies. Thus, in 
order to secure their requirements these sectors can either integrate backward, as Sasol and Iscor 
did, and run their own collieries or enter into long-term supply agreements with close links to 
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resulting in contracts between 20-40 years, with coal suppliers being guaranteed an average 
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Figure 4.1.8 Subsectoral coal consumption (excepting electricity generation and synfuels 
production) 1950 - 1993 
(DMEA 1995) 
Local coal consumption in sectors other than electricity, exports, synfuels and chemicals was 
about 18Mt in 1993 and has ranged from 15 to 25Mt since 1950. Industry, including 
metallurgical minerals beneficiation accounts for most of this coal consumption. 
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Coal prices 
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Figure 4.1.9 Coal prices 
(Eskom 1994b, Chamber of Mines 1995 South Africa, DMEA 1995) 
Most local consumption is for electricity generation by mine-mouth power stations. Prices for 
this coal are very low by international standards (Section 4.3 - Electricity provides details). The 
second largest consumer, Sasol Synfuels, sources its coal from mines owned and operated by 
Sasol so these prices are not subject to market pricing. For other areas, the current F.O.R. price 
is R45/tonne (1996 figure - DMEA 1996b) also low by international standards. Export prices 
allow South Africa to compete on world markets but railage costs, owing to the distance of the 
coalfields from export ports add considerably to the low mine-mouth prices. 
Figure 4.1.9 shows price trends. The export price has consistently been significantly higher than 
local prices. As the proportion of coal exported begins to increase, the export price can be 
expected to have an effect on local prices. The cost differential attributable to beneficiation and 
transport from the mines to the coast will play a moderating factor. Also, long-term contracts 
will provide protection to prices for power station coal. 
The household market: 
Households are supplied largely by coal traders who have established informal but organised 
networks in townships. Wholesale mark-ups are of the order of 75% and in the areas where coal 
is commonly used wholesale prices are constant, of the order of 9c/kg (Palmer 1994 ). However, 
retailers are believed to apply excessive mark-ups with prices ranging from 17c/kg to 32c/kg. 
Prices increase between pithead and the end consumer by 306% and 166% in urban and rural 
areas respectively. The urban (Gauteng) household price of D-grade coal is in the region of 
R200/ton delivered) (Palmer 1994 ). 
The export market 
Steam coal makes up 87% of exports with metallurgical and anthracitic coals making up the 
balance. The market has grown rapidly, both in terms of volumes and sales revenues and is 
expected to be R5.5 billion for 56 million tonnes in 1995 (Munro 1995) - accounting for more 
than 5% of total exports. South Africa accounted for 23% of the 1994 world seaborne steam coal 
market, making it the second largest exporter of steam coal in the world. The bulk of consumers 
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Table 4.1.4 World seaborne steam coal market 1994 









Most of South Africa's export coal is sold on a contract basis. Contract prices were negotiated up 
by over of 20% in US$ terms in 1995 and spot prices have risen sharply in the period since mid 
1993 reflecting tighter market conditions. 
Most South African coal is exported through the Richard's Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT) which is 
the largest coal export terminal in the world. Transport costs from the mines are of the order of 
R30/tonne. The nominal terminal capacity is 60 Mt, per annum. The terminal is controlled by 
Amcoal and Ingwe through their large shareholdings, and the frustration of other exporters such 
as Sasol at limits imposed by the terminal have led to (as yet unsuccessful) initiatives to build 
another terminal. Sasol has recently been provided with an allocation by the RBCT shareholders 
which has resulted in it shelving plans for another terminal (DMEA 1996b). 
4.1.4 Transport 
Whilst much of South Africa's coal is consumed at the mine-mouth a large amount is also 
transported by rail, either for export, to power stations not situated on mines, or to the industrial 
and other markets. Although definitive data are lacking, comments have been made that some 
coal railage tariffs are excessively high. For example railage charges from Saaiwater to Cape 
Town in August 1995 were R190.95/tonne and R218.31/tonne for coal and anthracite 
respectively. 
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4.2 Liquid fuels and gas 
Overview 
South Africa consumes about 20 billion litres of liquid fuels annually. Thirty-eight percent of the 
demand is met by synthetic fuels (synfuels) produced largely from coal and a small amount from 
natural gas. The rest is met by products refined locally from imported crude oil. Synfuels 
production is not expected to increase and in the medium-to-longer term may be curtailed. Thus, 
unless large commercially viable oil fields are discovered, South Africa will be increasingly 
dependent on imported crude for liquid fuels production. 
Apart from limited gas and oil reserves in the Mossel Bay area South Africa does not have 
significant commercially exploitable gas or crude oil reserves. If exploration and/or development 
costs are written off, production of some of the small gas and oil fields can be viewed as 
commercially viable and this is being done for the F-A gas field and the E-BT oil fields. In 
addition, further larger gas discoveries are considered a possibility. 
4.2.1 Oil and gas resources and production 
Oil (Strategic stock) 40 million barrels 
Oil (E-BT field) 20 000 b.p.d. potential 
Natural Qas 20 bcm (proven reserves) 
Natural gas production 1.8 bcm/year (Mossgas) 
Coal bed methane 134 bcm (recoverable) 
Coal Qas production 0.6 bern/year 
Crude imports 109 million barrels p.a 
Table 4.2.1: Basic upstream oil and gas statistics 1994 
Petroleum and gas production is currently limited to the F-A gas field producing 1.8 bern/year. 
In 1995 the CEF chairperson gave the go-ahead for development of production of the 
20 000 b.p.d. E-BT oil field also in the Mossel Bay area. 
The physical environment 
There is potential for the discovery of more oil and gas in South Africa, and a description of the 
energy sector would be incomplete without details of the South African exploration environment 
and history. 
South Africa has a relatively large surface area of about 1.2 m sq. km and a coastline of about 
3 000 km. The west coast from the Orange River to Cape Point is about 900 km long and the 
remainder, from Cape Point to Ponta do Ouro on the Mozambican border, is more than 200 km 
long. The continental shelf is 20-160 km wide off the west coast, 50-200 km wide off the south 
coast but rarely more than 30 km wide off the east coast. Similarly the continental slope is fairly 
wide on the west and south coasts but narrow to the east. 
South Africa's offshore basins can be divided into three distinct tectono-stratigraphic zones 
1. The western offshore comprises a broad passive margin basin related to the opening of the 
South Atlantic in the Early Cretaceaous. This is known as the Orange Basin. 
2. The eastern offshore is a narrow passive margin that was formed as a result of the breakup of 
Africa, Madagascar and Antarctica in the Jurassic. Very limited deposition has occurred 
here and only the Durban and Zululand Basins contain an appreciable sedimentary section. 
3. The southern offshore region, known as the Outeniqua Basin, shows a history of strong strike 
slip movement during the late Jurassic- Early Creataceous break-up of Gondwanaland. The 
Outeniqua basin consists of a number of en echelon sub-basins (the Breadasdorp, Pletmos, 
Gamtoos and Algoa basins) each of which comprises a rift half graven overlain by various 
thickness' of drift sediments. 
The onshore areas of the Karoo, Algoa and Zululand basins are thought to have poor potential. 
Exploration history 
The first organised search for hydrocarbons in South Africa was undertaken by the Geological 
Survey of South Africa in the 1940's. In 1965 Soekor (Pty) Ltd was formed by the government 
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In 1967 a new Mining Rights Act was passed and offshore concessions were granted to a large 
number of international companies including Gulf Oil, Esso, Shell, ARCO CFP and Superior. 
This led to the first offshore well being drilled in 1969 and to the discovery by Superior of gas 
and condensate in the Ga-Al well situated in the Pletmos Basin. 
In 1970, Soekor (together with Rand Mines) broadened its efforts to the offshore whilst, despite 
further encouraging discoveries, international companies gradually withdrew, largely as a result 
of political sanctions against South Africa. Effectively, Soekor has been the sole exploration 
company operating offshore in South Africa since the mid 1970s, although it is now partnered by 
Engen, a South African listed company, in part of the Bredasdorp Basin. Soekor has carried out 
an active exploration and appraisal programme during the past 20 years of offshore activity. 
Including work by previous operators, some 180 exploration and 60 appraisal wells have been 
drilled. In addition, approximately 157 000 km of 2-D seismic and 23 000 km of 3-D seismic 
have been acquired. Exploration drilling was most active from 1985- 89 when 71 exploration 
wells were drilled. 
Work to date has resulted in 20 gas and nine oil discoveries. These discoveries are almost 
entirely within the Bredasdorp Basin which has been the focus of most of the activity since 1980. 
The F-A gas field is in production and Soekor is in negotiations with potential partners regarding 
the development of at least one other discovery. The gas is supplied to the Mossgas facility, the 
core of which is a large petrochemical plant located at Mossel Bay. This was designed to take gas 
from the F-A field and its satellites and to convert the gas and condensate into liquid fuel at the 
rate of 25 000 barrels per day for 25 years, although limited gas reserves will probably curtail this 
life drastically. 
Institutional and legal framework 
Soekor 
Soekor is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund Pty Ltd (CEF). The main 
business of Soekor is the coordination, promotion and undertaking of oil and gas exploration 
activities of South Africa and to exploit any oil and gas fields which are discovered. 
Soekor was responsible for the management of the F-A Platform in terms of a management 
agreement with Mossgas (Proprietary) Limited, until 31 October 1993, at which date 
management was relinquished to Mossgas. 
As part of re-alignment with new policies of the post-apartheid era Soekor has been re-structured 
into three units: exploration and production, offshore drilling, and licensing. Since 1993 Soekor 
has shed more than two-thirds of its staff and now employs 262 people. From 1 April 1985 the 
company has been financed by CEF (Pty) Limited by means of loans for capital expenditure of a 
material nature and grants for exploration costs. Since 1 April 1988 all activities of the company 
have been financed by means of loans. 
The Auditor General reported that the total amount made available to Soekor for the search for 
petroleum and natural gas and to finance related activities has amounted to R2 351 779 000, up 
to and including 31 March 1994 (Republic of South Africa 1995). However, Soekor, in its 1995 
annual report stated that accumulated funding by shareholder (CEF) amounted to Rl 316 million. 
This is the total for loans advanced to Soekor. 
Consolidated net expenditure for 1994/1995 was R112 million and Soekor's loan liability to 
parent CEF increased by Rll3 893 for the year. Net exploration cost for the year was 
R52 996 million. 
Cash used for operating activities (45 995) 
Cash utilised in investing activities* (67 898) 
(113893) 
Cash effects of financinQ activities 
- increase in long-term liabilities (holding company) 113 893 
113 893 
* This item was almost wholly due to an increase in investment in subsidiary companies of 
R68 831 million. 
Table 4.2.2: Summarised cash flow statement - Soekor 1994/1995 
(CEF Annual report 1994/1995) 
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Soekor undertook a major planning exercise in 1994/95 and reports the following outcome for 
plans for the future: 
It proposed the separation of the company into three separate business units. 
• A joint venture to manage Soekor' s drilling rigs on a commercial basis. 
• An independent agency responsible for petroleum exploration licensing and regulation which 
would ensure the optimal development of the off-shore hydrocarbon potential. 
• An exploration and development company that would move . rapidly to gain economic 
independence. 
Soekor will continue with a much-reduced commercially driven exploration and production 
programme in South Africa. In addition, assistance will be provided to neighbouring countries in 
the optimal development of their own gas and oil resources for the benefit of the entire region. 
Soekor will align its domestic activities with the RDP through the following key issues: 
• International licensing of exploration off South Africa's coast. The closing date for the 
submission of bids for licences was targeted for mid-April 1995. However, in view of the 
vast amount of data to be processed and the relative lack of knowledge of the complicated 
geology of South Africa offshore, purchases of data are being responsibly accommodated 
where extension of time is required. Sales of technical data are very encouraging and data to 
the value of R7 -million have already been sold. The award of exploration sub-leases will 
benefit the country by reducing the need for committing government funds to exploration off 
our coast, providing income to the state through sub-lease fees and royalties (and, in the case 
of production, tax), and by attracting new ideas and technology. 
• The exploration of the E-BT oil field with Engen as partner. The success of this project will 
open the way for the development of a number of already discovered small oil fields in the 
Bredasdorp Basin with a resultant positive impact on the economy. 
• Active exploration for further oil fields within a 15 km radius of the E-BT development, for 
tie-back into this facility. 
• The promotion and development of gas as an alternative, affordable and clean energy fuel for 
industry and the people of South Africa. Studies initiated by Soekor are very encouraging. 
The market shows promise of sufficient present and future growth potential to take additional 
gas from other off-shore gas discoveries owned by Soekor. 
• Active exploration and appraisal of further gas fields adjacent to the F-A platform facility. 
• The development of the regional gas potential with provision of assistance to neighbouring 
countries which will contribute to overall regional prosperity in Southern Africa. 
Database 
A substantial database has accumulated over more than 25 years of offshore exploration. This 
includes basic well, seismic, gravity, magnetic, geochemical, biostratigraphic and other data 
together with a large volume of interpretation reports and related studies. All this material is 
held by Soekor and is well organised and accessible and is the basis of Soekor's promotion 
operations. The quality of this database varies considerably from area to area. Seismic data 
coverage for example, varies greatly in quantity and vintage from one basin to another. Drilling 
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Figure 4.2.1 2-D seismic acquisition by basin 
(Soekor 1994) 
Legal framework and fiscal terms for oil and gas exploration and production 
Legal framework 
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Soekor is the controlling and coordinating body dealing with petroleum exploration offshore. 
Soekor functions in two ways: 
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1. As an agent of the government to allocate areas to others for exploration, subject to 
ministerial approval; to regulate and supervise the conduct of other exploration companies; 
and to encourage, through various means, the efficient conduct of exploration of the country. 
2. As an exploration company involved in joint ventures, farmouts and operating in 
dependantly in unallocated areas. 
The South African legal regime for petroleum operations is characterised by the fact that the 
entire offshore area is held by Soekor under a long-standing prospecting lease. Soekor is 
empowered by the state to regulate and coordinate prospecting in two ways, either by sub-lease or 
by participation agreement. 
The prospecting sub-lease 
The contractor incurs 100% of the exploration costs. Upon discovery Soekor has the right to 
retain a negotiable percentage age of the mining lease without reimbursing past costs. This 
percent is negotiable but is normally 20%. Key features of the sub-lease arrangement are 
summarised below: 
• Contractor participates in Soekor's exploration rights granted to it by its prospecting lease 
OP26. 
• Contractor's participation level corresponds to a 100% interest in the exploration block cut 
out of Soekor's lease area. 
• Exploration period is negotiable but likely to be 5-8 years. 
• Periodic partial relinquishments will be required. 
• Work programme and minimum exploration commitment will be negotiable. 
• During the exploration phase the contractor's rights are purely contractual. The state does 
not directly transfer any right to the contractor. All rights of the contractor are contained in 
the sub-lease document which is binding on the state, Soekor and the contractor. 
• During the production phase Soekor has the right to retain a participating interest share in 
the mining lease. Soekor also has the right to enter into a joint operating agreement. All 
relevant terms are contained in these documents. 
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The participation agreement 
Soekor retains operatorship but the contractor participates in the operations at a negotiable level. 
Fiscal terms 
• A license fee, negotiable gross royalty (typically 5%) and income tax are payable. 
• All allowable costs are immediately expensed for income tax purposes. 
• Outstanding capital expenses carry interest of 12% for offshore fields. 
• The basic income tax rate is 35%; an additional profits tax is levied as a function of the ratio 
of accumulated net revenues (revenue loss operating costs) to accumulated capital costs. If 
the ratio is <1 (i.e. costs have not been fully recovered) the additional tax rate is 20%. It the 
ratio is between I and 2 the additional tax rate is 30%, and thereafter it is 40%. 
• State participation through Soekor of up to 20% is carried through exploration. There is no 
direct reimbursement of exploration costs by Soekor but all exploration costs are recoverable 
against income tax. 
The ring fence for cost recovery is around all oil and gas activities. 
4.2.2 Procurement, crude refining, synfuels production and liquid fuels 
marketing 
Industry size 
In 1994 total oil industry sales, including Sasol, amounted to an estimated R36 billion. Of this 
amount Rl2 billion is estimated to have been collected in taxes. The 1 estimated gross profit 
margin on revenue amounted to R3.2 billion, including the Sasol subsidy. Excluding the Sasol 
subsidy the profit margin would have been R2.1 billion (Sapia 1995) 
Brief history of the South African liquid fuels industry 
Countries in Southern Africa began importing liquid fuels initially for lighting purposes in the 
late nineteenth century, and by 1897 demand was sufficient for the establishment of the first 
overseas oil company's local operation based in Cape Town. All fuel consumed in South Africa 
prior to 1954 was imported. The products were distributed and marketed by the local subsidiaries 
of four international oil companies, BP, Caltex, Mobil and Shell or their predecessors. 
During the 1930s the government first became involved in the oil industry to prevent cartel 
practices and to promote fuel availability and the stability of the strategic industry. Government 
involvement has continued until the present day. 
Demand increased to the extent that by 1954 commercially viable domestic refining became 
possible. Standard Vacuum Refining Company, which later became Mobil Refining Company, 
commissioned a crude oil refinery in Durban in January of that year. As demand grew other 
refineries were established as shown in the table below. 
Year Location Refinery's Established by 
current name 
1954 Durban Genref Mobil 
1955 Sasolburg Sasol1 South African state 
1964 Durban Sap ref Shell, BP 
1966 Cape Town Cal ref Caltex 
1971 Sasolburg Nat ref Sasol (South African state), Total, National 
Iranian Oil Company 
1980 Secunda Sasol2 South African state 
1982 Secunda Sasol3 South African state 
1992 Mossel Bay Mossgas South African state 
Table 4.2.3 Liquid fuels production plants in South Africa 
From the beginning of the 1950s, for political, strategic and economic reasons, the South African 
government, firstly using Sasol as the vehicle, embarked on a programme to manufacture fuel· 
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in 1954 and culminated with the commis~oning of the Mossgas plant in 1992. While the 
Mossgas plant is uneconomic the Sasol plants could have been competitive with crude refiners if 
crude oil prices had been higher by a margin quite conceivable in the years during which they 
were planned. They have, however, received large state subsidies over the years. Recent studies 
(Arthur Andersen 1995) indicate that they are profitable and the subsidy to Sasol has been halved 
for 1996 and will be completely phased out by 1999. 
It is more difficult to adjust the output proportions of the various products of synthetic fuel plants 
than those of conventional crude refineries as market demand changes. Also, for reasons of 
effective utilisation of capacity, the government has had a strong interest in running the state-
sponsored synfuel plants at full capacity. These factors led to an ever increasing influence of 
synfuels production on the entire structure and operation of the liquid fuels industry. For 
example, after the state (with partners) established the Natref crude oil refinery close to the 
physical location of the Sasol I synfuel plant (and far from the coast, an unusual practice for 
crude refiners) an agreement was established whereby Sasol undertook not to establish a service 
station network and in return, the oil companies would uplift the synthetic fuel product. The 
agreement was extended when the oil companies agreed to uplift all of Sasol 2 and Sasol 3's 
product even though this resulted in the mothballing of part of their crude refining capacity. The 
agreements were complicated further by complex considerations of the economic value of the 
positioning of Sasol's refineries close to major markets in terms of avoided transport costs 
(further complicated by non-regulated tariffs of government owned-rail and pipeline networks). 
The government played an active role in this structuring, instituting state-controlled mechanisms 
by which the oil companies were partly compensated for not utilising their investments in 
refinery capacity but also for staying in South Africa in the face of intense international political 
pressure to divest. All of this was carried out in a climate where the Petroleum Products Act (No 
I 20 of 1977) prohibited the "publication, releasing, announcement, disclosure or conveyance to 
any person of information or the making of comment regarding the source, manufacture, 
transportation, destination, storage, consumption, quantity or stock-level of any petroleum 
product acquired or manufactured or being acquired or manufactured for or in the Republic". 
The development of the oil industry in this climate of secrecy, and with the introduction of huge 
state owned synfuel production capacities leading to overall refinery over-capacity and complex 
industry agreements, led to an overall industry structure including marketing and retailing that 
was closely controlled by government and a complex set of agreements between Sasol, Mossgas 
and the oil companies. In general, profit margins for refining, marketing and retailing were set 
by government and prices controlled. This situation, with modifications, continues today. The 
relaxation of the pressure of international sanctions is leading to re-evaluation of the 
appropriateness of the industry's structure in terms of new economic and social imperatives. The 
government, now no longer as concerned about divestment, has not met obligations to oil 
companies such as synlevy payments, and the adjustment of wholesale margins in terms of the 
MPAR system. (The synlevy and MPAR are examples of a complex set of payments, levies, and 
profit margin calculations around control of the liquid fuels industry; they are explained later). 
The lifting of sanctions pressure has also led to a re-evaluation of subsidies to Sasol. A Cabinet 
decision on 6 December 1995 will lead to Sasol subsidies being phased out. The decision will 
mean that Sasol will receive about R500 million less in the year to come (1996) than it would 
have under the old arrangement. (It received Rl.I billion in 1995- the subsidy amount depends 
on international product prices. The subsidy will then be reduced yearly until it is entirely 
removed by mid 1999. Sasol will now receive Rl.8 billion in subsidies over the phase-down 
period instead of the R5.2 billion it would have received under the previous system (Sunday 
Times, December I 0, I 995). 
The Cabinet has also accepted proposals by the DMEA minister that an attempt be made to 
dispose of the Rl2 billion Mossgas investment. However, evidence is mounting that a buyer will 
be difficult to find unless very favourable conditions are offered. 
In conclusion, the above brief history shows a strong involvement by the state in the oil industry 
for at least sixty years, which involvement increased during the oil sanction years. However, 
after the I 994 elections the industry has entered a state of flux. 
The next section attempts to describe the basic system of procurement, production and marketing 
assets and physical product flows and financial flows associated with the institutions that control 
them. 
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Procurement and strategic storage 
Sasol and Mossgas are situated directly on their feedstock sources and the feedstocks are owned 
by the producers. However, the crude refineries rely totally on imported crude. During the years 
of oil sanctions South Africa built up a considerable stockpile of crude oil owned and managed by 
the Strategic Fuel Fund (SSF), a subsidiary of the Central Energy Fund (CEF) a wholly state-
owed company. the strategic stock is stored in containers in disused coal mines at Ogies, in 
conventional steel tanks in Cape Town, and in underground concrete containers at Saldanha. 
The mine containers have a capacity of 118 million barrels and this method of storage has proven 
very efficient. The six tanks at Saldanha each have a capacity of 7.5 million barrels. 
From the early 1980s the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF) was responsible for coordinating the 
procurement of crude for South African refineries in the face of sanctions. SSF then re-sold the 
crude to local refiners. Since 1993 operations have changed, and almost all crude is currently 
procured directly by the refiners. 
The 1988 SSF crude stock levels of 158.5 million barrels (about 1.5 years supply) have been 
drawn down to 45 million barrels (February 1996 - CEF 1996). The SSF storage facilities at 
Saldanha with a capacity of 45 million barrels remain a useable asset in terms of South Africa's 
energy system. This facility is conveniently situated at the port of Saldanha with facilities for 
handling super-tankers. The Iranian government has shown a strong interest in utilising some of 
this capacity as trade storage for its markets in northern and western Europe and the Americas, 
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Table 4.2.4 South African strategic' crude oil stocks 
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The target level strategic stock, as approved by the government, is 35 million barrels, which 
equates to four months of import requirements. Thirteen million barrels of crude oil from the 
mine containers in the Eastern Transvaal were sold during the SFF 1994/95 financial year to the 
operators of the Natref refinery. Crude oil sold from these facilities is replaced in Saldanha in 
order to achieve a target of 25 million barrels in Saldanha and 10 million barrels in the mine 
containers. 
Figure 4.3.4 below gives an indication of South Africa's recent crude oil requirements. The 
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re 4.2.2 Imports of crude and crude stocks 1987-1995 
(Sapia 1995: Wong & Dutkiewicz 1995) 
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Figu 
The value of crude imports, of course, is closely related not only to import volumes but also to the 
volatil e price of crude. In 1994 crude imports cost South Africa R4.3 billion. 
Imports and exports of fu el products 
Import of products is restricted to special cases where local producers cannot meet demand. The 
state controls such imports with a view to promoting local refinery utili sation. Small amounts 
relati ve to local production are imported. For example in 1993 just over 300 Ml of petrol was 
imported, representing 3% of local production. Export permits are required and these are 
granted, provided that both South Africa's and other South Afri can custom union member's 
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South Afri can Petro leum Industries Association data (SAPIA 1996) gives 1993 
petro l imports at 329 Ml and ex ports at I 780 MI. These figures differ 
significantly from Wong and Dutkiewi cz above. 
Figure 4.2.3 Petrol imports and exports 1987 - 1994 
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South Afri can Petroleum Industries Association data (SAPIA 1996) gives 1993 
diesel imports at 368 Ml and exports at I 780 MI. These figures differ 
significantly from Wong and Dutkiewicz above . 
Figure 4.2.4 Diesel imports and exports 1987- 1994 
(Wong & Dutkiewicz 1995) 
More diesel than petrol is exported due to the balance of supply and demand of petrol and diesel 
in South Africa relative to refinery configurations. Demand for petrol , in comparison with diesel, 
has risen sharply over the past few years with the growth of South Africa' s petrol-powered 
minibus taxi fleet from a small number to around 100 000. If the skew in petrol demand 
continues additional excess diesel will be produced because each barrel of crude produces 
approximately the same amount of petrol as diesel. 
Although petrol and diesel make up 85 % of total liquid fuel exports, South Africa is also the 
main supplier of all other liquid fuels to Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swazi land. These 
countri es also provide most of the export market. In 1993 export proportions of a total of about 
I 400 Ml were as follows: 
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South African energy supply 4-21 
Production of liquid fuels 
The refineries mentioned in the brief history above have undergone significant expansion and 
upgrading over the years and currently have the capaci ties shown in the table below. 
Refinery Location Capacity** 1 Ownership 
Sap ref Durban 165 BP 50%, Shell 
50% 
Genref Durban 105 Engen 
Cal ref Cape Town 100 Caltex 
Natref Sasolburg 85 Sasol 64%, Total 
36% 
Sasol2+3 Secunda 150 Sasol 
Moss gas Mossel Bay 45 Central Energy 
Fund 
Total 650 
** I TBSD- thousand barrel s per stream day (Crude equivalent for Sasol/Mossgas) 
Table 4.2.6 Current liquid fuels production capacities and ownership 1996 
(Sapia 1995) 
International oil companies own 62% of capacity . Engen is a South African company that was 
formed when Mobil divested from South Africa in the apartheid era and currently contributes 
16% of refi ning capacity. Thus, the international oi l majors, with their resources , international 
expertise and trans-national nature , are very strongly represented in terms of liquid fue ls 
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Figure 4.2.6 South Africa refinery capacity 




115 million barrels 
25 .5 million tonnes of coal 
1 .8 bern natural gas 
Table 4.2.7 Feedstock quantities for 1994 
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Figure 4.2.7 Production of liquid fuels in South Africa 
(Arthur Andersen 1995) 
Figure 4.2.7 shows four main components of the South Africa liquid fuels production industry 
drawing on three main feedstock sources . Total demand for liquid fuels in South Africa in 1994 
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Figure 4.2.8 Demand for liquid fuels by fuel type 1950-1993 
(DMEA 1995) 
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Liquid fuel consumption 1994 
Petrol 
51 % 
Table 4.2.8 Structure of liquid fuels demand by product 1994 
(SAPIA 1995) 
The crude oil refining industry 
Apart from the Natref refinery which is owned by Sasol and which was positioned in Gauteng to 
act in conjunction with the Secunda plants and strategic oil stocks in the sanctions era the crude 
refineries are located at the major ports of Durban and Cape Town. Because an attempt is made 
to operate the oil-from-coal Secunda plants at full capacity and because their output mix is not 
flexible , the crude refineries operate as so called "swing" producers , catering for variations in 
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Figure 4.2.9 Crude refinery product category mix 
(Wong & Dutkiewicz 1995) 
In the past fo ur years crude refi ners have embarked on a large expansion of their refi ning 
capacity. 
Post- expansion Pre expansion 
'000 Bpd '000 Bpd 
Sap ref 165 120 
Cal ref 100 50 
Genref 105 70 
Natref 85 78 
Total 455 318 
Expansion 130 
Table 4.2.9 Crude refinery expansion programme 
(SAPIA 1995) 
A total of 137 000 barrels a day has been added to the pre-expansion capacity of 318 000 for 
crude refi ni ng add ing 43 % to crude refinin g capacity and 21% to overall South African capacity. 
The accumulated cost of thi s expansion has been R3.2 billion (US$ 823 mill ion x 3.9)(SAPIA 
1995). Most of the expansion has been de-mothballing. Recent statements by the oil industry 
suggest that , including expected increased demand by the Southern and East African regions, an 
equivalent increase will be required every fi ve to six years in the coming decades. 
The crude refineries represent a considerable asset for South Africa. In terms of value added they 
are estimated to contribute around R1 .4 billion to the South Afri can GOP on turnover of 
Rl 0.4 bi llion. Foreign exchange savings are estimated at Rl.2 billion. Valued at historic cost 
the refi neries ' combined book value is about R6.5 billion. The recent expansion programme 
represented an investment of about R3.2 billion. The crude refining industry employs about 4 000 
employees (Sapia 1995). 
The synfuel production industry 
The synfuel industry comprises Sasol Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Sasol and Mossgas (Pty) Ltd, owned by CEF (Pty) Ltd. The sole shareholder of CEF is the South 
African government. The development of the South African synfuels industry started after the 
Second World War when internationally, some experts predicted that world oi l reserves would 
run out within 10 to 15 years. The State, convinced of the strategic importance of indigenous fuel 
production and mindful of the fact that South Afri ca had no crude oil reserves, granted the first 
licence to produce synfuels in terms of legislation at that time, namely the Liquid Fuel and Oil 
Industry Act of 194 7. This legislation granted a measure of protection to the proposed synfuels 
industry. 
Synthetic fuels 
The fi rst oil-from-coal enterprise (Sasol 1) was incorporated in 1950 in terms of the provisions of 
the Companies Act. The state provided the share capital through the Industri al Development 












































South African energy supp ly 4-25 
agreement with the oil industry whereby Sasol was allowed one pump per service station in a 
limited geographic area, to market its to tal petrol production. During the 1960s the company 
started diversifying into chemicals, producing ethylene, butadiene, styrene, ammonia and 
downstream nitrogenous fertili sers. Gaskor was formed by Sasol I in 1964 for the di stribution of 
manufac tured pipeline gas , a by product of the synfuel process, to local industri es. Sasol also 
acquired a majority shareholding in the Natref crude-oil refinery built in Sasolburg and 
commissioned in 197 1. 
Partl y as a result of the international oil cn s1s of 1973 resulting in world crude-oil prices 
increas ing from around $3 to $ 12 per barrel, the State established a second Sasol plant , Sasol 2, 
at Secunda, which was commissioned in 1980. While Sasol 2 was still under construction, the 
second world oil cri sis of 1979 resulted in the world price of oil escalating from $ 12 to well over 
$30 per barrel, and a decision was taken in 1979 to build a duplicate oil from coal plant alongs ide 
Sasol 2, which started production three years later. The full costs, met by the state, to build Sasol 
2 and Sasol 3 are es timated at R35.1 billion (in 1994 Rands) (Sapia 1995). 
Currentl y the synfuel capaci ty of Sasol is of the order of !50 000 barrels per day (crude-oil 
equ ivalent). Products include petrol, di esel, illuminating paraffin , LPG, so lvent gas and a vari ety 
of chemical feedstocks. The synfuel capacity of Saso l represents about 23 % of the total South 
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Figure 4.2.10 Synthetic oil product category mix 
(Wong & Dutkiewicz 1995) 
The Sasol synfuel process produces a far higher proportion of the lighter products than the crude 
refineri es. Diesel is currentl y priced at a higher level than petrol in South Africa (March 1996) 
despite a large surplus- almost a unique situation, as most countri es price diesel much lower for 
example, in the USA the diesel price is about 65% of the petrol pri ce. 
Petrol, diesel, paraffin , LPG and other fuel products are sold on a long-term contractual basis to 
oil companies operating in South Africa. This agreement provides for the upli ft ment of products 
from Sasol Synthetic Fuels to a specific maximum vol ume at a price determined in a fo rmula 
based on international product prices (see pricing section later). 
In 1994/95 more than 75% of Sasol Synthetic Fuel's production volume was suppl ied to fuel 
markets, with fuel product volumes totalling about 5 600 Ml although output of chemical 
feedstocks have grown faste r than output of fuels. Since 199 1/92 fuel sales volumes have 
increased 8% while chemical feedstocks have increased 30%. The table below summari ses 
overall Sasol Synthetic Fuels operating stati sti cs . 
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1995 1994 %Change 
Turnover (Rm) 5 667 5 374* 5.4 
Operating profit (Rm) 1 224 1 200 2.0 
After-Tax profit (Rm) 710 603 17.7 
Contribution to Group 
operating profit 43.7% 47.6% 
Number of employees 8150 8 444 {3.5) 
Production 
(million cubic metres) 8.0 7.5 6.7 
* The turnover for 1993/94 has been reduced in order to exclude feedstocks returned from chemical 
companies. 
Table 4.2.10 Sasol Synthetic Fuels operating statistics 
(Sasol 1995) 
In the 1994/95 financial year Sasol's Synthetic Fuels business produced a value added component 
of R1 .3 billion (excluding protection or subsidy) . It is estimated that in 1994/95 the crude import 
savings equivalent to the output of Sasols Synthetic Fuels business will be R3 .1 billion . The 
foreign exchange profit made by the Sasol Synthetic Fuels business in 1993/94 was 
R 1 190 million. This was on capital employed of R4 314 billion(Arthur Anderson 1995). 
The changing situation regarding Sasol Synthetic Fuel 's strategic position in South Africa in the 
post oil-sanctions era has been extensively discussed by the Liquid Fuel Industry Task Force 
(LFITF) of the National Economic and Labour Council over the past few years. A major output 
of thi s was a study , by independent consultants Arthur Andersen, on Sasol's subsidies. Because 
of Sasol Synthetic Fuel's importance in the South African economy owing to its sheer size and in 
particular its importance in the energy sector as a user of electricity, a miner and user of coal, a 
supplier of liquid fuels and gas , it is useful to look at the operation in more detail. Whilst this 
may not immediately appear to be of direct relevance to the fuels industry it is important in that 
an understanding of Sasol in the context of the South African economy requires an informed 
perception of the backward and forward linkages of Sasol into other sectors of the economy. 
Thus, additional information, drawn from the Arthur Andersen study and other sources, is 
presented here to provide more of an understanding of Sasol's context. 
Although Sasol was initially set up primarily as a liquid fuels producer, the scale of the coal-to-
fuels process has provided the opportunity, and necessity, for expansion into chemicals 
production and Sasol has become a major player in the South African chemicals industry as well 
as a significant exporter into world markets. The export of chemical products using feedstock 
from the synfuels operation is forecast to amount to R 978 million , and the value of products 
placed in South African markets that would otherwise have needed to be imported is forecast to 
be R I 920 million for 1994/95 (Arthur Andersen 1995). The synthetic fuels business has thus 
become an important component of a large integrated operation. In 1994/95 Sasol Synthetic 
Fuels contributed only 38% to Sasol group turnover, about 5% down on the previous year, while 
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Figure 4.2.11 Contribution to turnover and profit of Sasol group divisions 
(Sasol 1995) 
Contribution of Sasol Synthetic Fuels business to the South African economy 
4-27 
The South African Central Economic Advisory Services (CEAS) has developed an economic 
model which contains detailed information of the South African economic structure. The table 
below is a summary of the results of the model when it was used to consider the contribution of 
Sasol Synfuels to the South African economy. 
The direct contributions refer to each businesses ' own value added and employment plus any 
value added and employment arisi ng from the immediate supply of intermediate inputs to that 
business. The indirect economic activity and employment's effects take the backward linkages 
one step further upstream to capture the relationship between immediate intermediate suppliers 
and their own suppliers 
R million Coal Sasol Synfuel Down-stream Total 
business chemicals 
Direct 1 084 2 122 1 812 5 018 
Indirect 246 438 412 1 096 
TOTAL 1 330 2 560 2 224 6114 
Employment 
Direct 11 914 17 382 11 068 40 364 
Indirect 4 596 7 958 5 776 18 330 
TOTAL 16 510 25 340 16 844 58 694 
Table 4.2.11 Sasol contribution to South African economy (R million - 1995) 
(Arthur Andersen 1995) 
Sasol Synfuel subsidies 
Subsidies for the indigenous production of synthetic fuels dates back to the 1930s when the first 
oil was produced from oil shale (Torbanite) by Satmar at Boksburg in Gauteng. The subsidy was 
then two pennies per gallon, or about 20% of the price of fuel. Sasol I commenced production 
with the same protection as Satmar, plus a further half-penny refinery protection (the excise duty 
on refined petroleum products manufactured by the first crude-oi l refinery built in the early 
1950 ' s in Durban was pegged at a half-penny lower than for imported products ). 
When Sasol was privatised in 1979 subsidies of 4.5 c/litre (3.6 c/litre actual protection plus 
0.9 c/litre rebate on excise duty) were applicable for all liquid fuels produced from indigenous 
sources. The state gave an undertaking to the shareholders, in terms of the prospectus of the share 
offer, that protection might be adjusted upwards or downwards should the ratio between the rise 
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in general cost factors and the rise in the prices of petroleum products materially deviate from 
assumptions used in the economic evaluation of the Sasol 2 and 3 projects. The subsidy received 
by Sasol has averaged I 2.5% since I 979 (i .e. the nett back on its fuel products was I 2.5 % higher 
than the IBLC of imported fuels) . 
No subsidy was received by Sasol during 1985 and part of 1986 as a result of the high price of 
imported crude. The subsidy was introduced again when the crude-oil price dropped from about 
$28 per barrel in 1985 to below $15 per barrel in 1986. 
This subsidy received by Sasol's synthetic fuel business is funded from the proceeds of the 

















Volume c/1 on R million (MOD) 
synfuel 
production 
2750 4.5 124 
2750 4.5 124 
2750 4.5 124 
5500 4.5 248 
4801 4.5 217 
5159 0.0 0 
5494 0.9 49 
5394 3.6 194 
5502 6.0 330 
4529 8.2 373 
4892 6.2 305 
5456 6.0 325 
5552 10.5 581 
5580 13.6 761 
5552 20.8 1 155 
4 912 




















As mentioned before, the Cabinet decision (6/1211 995) will lead to the Sasol subsidy being 
phased out by 1999. While one of the reasons has been the lifting of UN sanctions the other has 
been a debate which has become increasingly heated, over the need for the subsidy. South 
African crude oil refineries represented by the South African Petroleum Industries Association 
(SAPIA) , have been an active player in the debate. They claim that their members earn 6.8% 
after tax return on total assets excluding cash against Sasols' 12.7%. The table below, from the 
official government investigation in Sasol ' s "tariff protection" also indicates that the profitability 
of Sasol at R2.8 billion (more than R 1 billion of which was subsidy for 1995) was out of line with 
norms (Business Day, November 29, 1995). Whilst the December decision to phase out the 
subsidy decreases this profitability substantially it seems that, until the subsidy has in fact been 
stopped, the area will remain contentious, particularly as, on the one hand , Sapia members 
believe that no subsidy should be given , and on the other Sasol holds such an important position 
in the economy. 
SSF (with protection) 20.7% 






(The benchmark groups are broadly-based South Afncan and mternatwnal compames including 
integrated oil companies , refining companies, and petrochemical companies). 
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Moss gas synfuel production 
The Mossgas project was one of three synfuels projects proposed to the government (the others 
being an AECI coal-based synfuels project and a Gencor Torbanite project) in the late 1980s. In 
terms of the energy policy of the time, a target level of self-sufficiency of 40% of liquid fuel 
requirements (petrol and diesel), which was achieved after the completion of Sasol 3, was to be 
maintained for the foreseeable future. This strategy was mainly because of the increasing 
isolation of South Africa and the UN oil boycott in reaction to its apartheid policy. Due to 
increasing fuel demand, forecasts indicated a drop in the achieved level to about 30% by the mid-
1990s, unless a further synfuels project could be brought on-stream. The three projects were 
evaluated and it was decided that the Mossgas project, utilising the recently discovered off-shore 
gas reserves near Mossel Bay in the Cape Province, was the most favourable from a macro-
economic perspective. The project was approved by the Cabinet in 1987 at a cost of about 
R6 200 million and predicted lifespan of over 25 years. It was finally completed in 1991 for 
nearly twice this estimate due to cost escalation's, which resulted in several official enquiries and 
a detailed investigation by the Auditor-General, published in 1993. 
The Mossgas project currently produces about 1 350 Ml per year, or about 8% of South Africa's 
present liquid fuel demand, resulting in foreign exchange savings of around R500 million per 
year. About 1 200 people are employed. The complex includes an offshore production and 
treatment platform with nine wells. Gas and condensate are separated offshore. Two lines take 
condensate and gas to shore. To ensure reliability of supply, a small LNG plant and storage tank 
have been constructed onshore. The whole output of this operation is owned by and dedicated to 
the Mossgas liquids synthesis plant. Gas production is currently running at about 1.8 bc/y. 
Summarised income statement R'OOO 
1995 1994 
Sales at selling price 729 706 562 294 
Synthetic-fuel levy 117 500 123 981 
Sales at IBLC 847 206 686 275 
Operating expenditure (615 983) (628 050) 
Net surplus before tariff 
Protection 231 223 58 225 
Tariff protection 285 480 110 700 
Net surplus 516 703 168 925 
Table 4.2.14 Summarised income statement for Mossgas for the 1994/95 financial year 
(CEF 1995) 
If the capital cost of Moss gas is seen as a sunk cost and written off then the project can be seen as 
cash-positive at R114 million p.a. Gas production estimated at 1.8 bcm/yr would place a value of 
Rl.70 (or $0.47) per GJ on the gas production as utilised in the synfuel plant. (This is in 
comparison to a price of R30/GJ paid for Gaskor gas in Gauteng). 
Gas reserves in the FA-field will run out at the beginning of 1997, four years after Mossgas start-
up. An amount of R850 million has been estimated as necessary to extend the life of the gas 
fields by five years (Report of CEF request in Mail and Guardian 16 to 22 February 1996). 
Mossgas upliftment 
At present the upliftment of Mossgas fuels by the oil industry is taking place without a formal 
long-term agreement. The wholesale price paid for Mossgas products is not import parity (based 
on Singapore/Bahrain postings), but a lower price based on the commercial value of these 
products to the oil industry. This is determined by establishing the value of these products in the 
export market (mostly other African countries) using Mediterranean postings plus transport 
differentials. Mossgas product volumes marketed locally displace similar volumes to those 
produced by the coastal refineries into foreign markets. Due to shipping cost differentials and 
other pricing considerations, the nett back is usually lower and thus Mossgas receives less than 
the IBLC price. At present the state makes good this difference by way of a compensation 
payment to Mossgas. 
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Distribution, wholesaling and retailing of liquid fuels 
This section considers the regulation, structures and operations concerned with taking liquid fuels 
products from the refineries to the points of final delivery for use. 
History of government regulation of petroleum product marketing1 
Prior to the establishment of the refining industry in the 1950s, petrol was distributed at first by 
general dealers, then by service stations as the motor vehicle population increased during the 
1930's and 1940's. Selling prices were determined by the oil companies in consultation with the 
Government Motor Traders' Association (MTA), presently the Motor Industries Federation 
(MIF). Retail price maintenance (RPM) resulted and price cutting was excluded. 
The government adopted the Unlawful Determination of Prices Act (UDOPA) in 1931 with the 
aim of leaving price determination to market forces. A price war developed leading to poor 
service station quality and closure of the smaller service stations. UDOPA was amended in 1937 
authorising RPM in respect of petrol. Agreement was also reached with the MTA to control the 
number of service stations. Applications for service stations had to be made to committees called 
Joint Petrol Advisory Committees (JPACs). In practice the MTA exercised a measure of control, 
resulting in protectionism. Numerous appeals against these monopolistic practices were made 
against the state by the public. A National Appeal Board was created in 1947 to deal with 
applications for retail outlets rejected by the JP AC' s, but failed to function effectively. 
Subsequently, the government introduced the Undue Restraint of Trade Act of 1949 (UROTA). 
Petrol was declared a controlled article under the Act and qualifying standards for service 
stations, including the provision of a workshop and the employment of a qualified mechanic, 
were mandated. This led to increased competition and a reduction in profits. The application of 
UROTA in the strict form prescribed by the regulations was too rigid and consequently the Act 
was revoked. The oil companies did, however, undertake to honour the obligations originally 
imposed, and this arrangement has been operative until recently. 
One of the problems experienced with the UROTA system was that, while applicants often met 
the qualifications, the volumes of fuel accruing to these outlets were too small to economically 
justify the installation of pumps by all companies, as was originally done. The oil companies and 
the states then together devised a roster system which obliged one company to supply the 
necessary pumps and equipment to such sites, even though conditions were frequently 
unprofitable. 
The growth in the number of retail outlets contributed to a general reduction in fuel sales at 
individual outlets and because the oil companies were represented at so many outlets, unnecessary 
capital investment and high operating costs were incurred. A single-brand marketing system of 
marketing petrol in all towns with more than four retail outlets was subsequently approved by the 
government in 1951, on condition that indigenous fuel produced by Sasol (as from 1956) should 
also be sold. In 1958 the single brand-system was extended to all towns, resulting in additional 
sites being established. 
Prior to 1984 the marketing margin was kept as low as possible by state control, and the oil 
industry was able to survive through rationalisation, the implementation of efficiency 
programmes and other measures. At that stage the refining margin provided a higher return 
compared to the marketing margin, which was inadequate. In effect, therefore, the poor return on 
marketing activities was subsidised by the higher return on refining activities. The state then 
commissioned an investigation to determine the income on and assets of both the refining and 
marketing activities (known as the petroleum activities return, or PAR). A composite margin, 
called a post-refining margin, was introduced so as to provide a total return of 15% (before tax 
and interest) on the depreciated historical value of the assets employed in the refining and 
marketing activities. 
In 1991 the Cabinet decided to lift control on return on refining investments but to retain 
regulation of marketing activities on this basis (by using a formula to calculate the so-called 
marketing petroleum activities return, or MPAR). It aimed to allow the marketing industry to 
earn a 15% return on marketing assets (before tax and interest). This has never been achieved. 
1 This section on the history of regulation of the industry was contributed by Dr. Robert Scott as an input to the 
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Current liquid fuels marketing arrangements 
Distribution and wholesaling 
It is immediately apparent from a cursory examination of the spatial locations of import ports, 
fuels production facilities and markets that, unless extensive duplication of facilities and the 
associated inefficiencies in distribution were admissible, the liquid fuels marketing industry needs 
to cooperate extensively. So, as in most countries, the refineries in each area effectively supply 
most of the fuel products for that area, regardless of the brand names the products are sold under. 
Transport and depot facilities are shared and the industry operates product exchange 
mechanisms. There are agreements between members of the oil industry on joint ventures and 
hospitality. 
Wholesale marketers obtain refined products at the refinery gate and transport these products to 
some 200 depots throughout the country either by pipeline, rail tank cars, road or sea tankers. 
Products are then transported from the depots to service stations and other consumers by rail and . 
road. 
Eight oil companies market in South Africa under their own brand names. (In August 1995 a 




























Most petrol (92%) is sold by service stations while only 15% of diesel is sold by service stations. 
The rest is sold directly to bulk users. Illuminating paraffin is marketed through service stations, 
routers and general dealers. 
The supply chain and pricing 
In short, pricing in the supply chain works as follows (a detailed description is given later): 
Feedstock price 
• Procurement at prices negotiated privately with supplier 
Product wholesale price 
• Referred to below as Estimated landed cost or In-bond landed cost (IBLC). 
• Calculated using a formula based on international product prices and transport costs. 
Product retail price 
• Petrol, diesel and IP prices controlled by government 
• Calculated using a formula based on wholesale price plus a number of costs associated with 
transport, storage, distribution and retailing (plus taxes). 
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South African Petrol 95 Petrol 93 octane Diesel IP 
cents octane Gaute-ng Gauteng Gauteng 
coast 7 Feb. 1996 6 March 6 March 
7 Feb. 1996 1996 1996 
Estimated landed 51.903 51.903 68.755 76.730 
cost 
NRSC 0.200 0.200 0.200 -
Customs and 4.000 4.000 4.000 -
excise 
MMF 9.000 9.000 5.800 -
Fuel Tax 62.900 62.900 55.400 -
Equalisation Fund 9.400 9.400 8.000 -
Transport cost - 10.200 10.100 11.000 
Wholesale margin 14.058 14.058 14.050 14.262 
Delivery cost 5.100 5.100 5.100 12.100 
Retail marqin 18.100 18.100 11.900 -
Final price 174.661 184.861 183.305 114.092 
Table 4.2.16 Price build up of liquid fuels (the components are explained below) 















Figure 4.2.12 Composition of petrol price in South Africa in cents per litre, 26/1/96 -
26/2/96 
Refinery gate price 
The price of refined products is based on the in-bond landed cost (IBLC). The broad principle of 
the current South African pricing formula is that prices are based on, and thus influenced by, 
supply and demand for petroleum products in "east of Suez" markets such as the Arabian/Persian 
Gulf, Pacific Rim Countries and Australia. These prices would be the purchase prices should 
South Africa be required to import significant volumes of such products at the most economical 
freight rates. 
The South African price of petrol (used as an example-other refined product prices are 
determined in a similar way) comprises international and domestic elements. The international 
element is the average of the free-on-board (FOB) petrol price listed by, in an 80/20 proportion, 
refineries in Singapore and Bahrain (combined with the spot price), plus freight, insurance and 
ocean leakage costs. Freight cost is determined on a monthly basis using a standard international 
tariff for product transport voyages from Singapore and Bahrain to South African ports. 
Insurance tariffs are determined by Lloyds of London according to prevailing risks for different 
product types. The ocean leakage element pertains to normal leakage, clingage and evaporation 
losses incurred during shipping (about 0.3%). Landing and wharfage charges (1.78% of FOB 
value) are added to arrive at the (IBLC). The IBLC (in USc/gallon) is converted to South 
African c/1 by applying the average RJUS$ exchange rate. This represents the transfer price from 
the refineries (including Sasol) to the marketing divisions of the South African oil companies. 
The IBLC principle is regarded as an arms-length method of determining the basic prices of 
refined products which is an attempt to ensure that local refineries operate cost-effectively and as 
efficiently as their international counterparts. 
Various costs are then added to the IBLC to make up the final pump price in a given price zone 
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Inland transport cost 
Determined by the cost of transporting product from the coast (Durban, Port Elizabeth, East 
London, Mossel Bay and Cape Town) to the inland depot/s serving the zone. 
Service differential 
This element compensates marketers for the cost of operating the depots and distributing the 
product to the service stations. It is calculated on actual historic costs for the previous year for 
the whole oil industry, averaged country-wide. 
Wholesale margin 
The wholesale or marketing margin is monitored and controlled by the state using a formula 
known as MPAR (marketing of petroleum activities return). It is set at a benchmark of 15% 
(10% to 20% range) nominal return on the depreciated book value of assets (with allowance for 
additional depreciation and before interest and tax) as determined for the whole oil industry by an 
independent firm of accountants. The previous year's results are used to calculate profitability 
and determine whether adjustments to the margin are required. Although the benchmark is 15%, 







Average returns, 1991 - 1995 9.60 
Table 4.2.17 MPAR results since inception- return on assests before tax and interest 
(BP 1995) 
Marketing assets 
Pre-interest and tax income 
Return - pre-interest and tax 
Retailing 
Table 4.2.18 MPAR returns 1995 
(Sapia 1996) 
Rands 
8 149 000 000 
711 000 000 
8.7% 
There are approximately 4 900 service stations in South Africa. Of these 58% are owned or 
leased by dealers, 24% are owned by oil companies and 18% are leased by oil companies. 
Although the sizes of service stations vary greatly, the following rough estimates can be made of 
basic service station statistics. (McGregor 1995). 
Number of service stations 4 900 
Staff (per service station) 15 
- service attendants 9 
-workshop, cashier, management 6 
Employment at service stations 73 500 
- service attendants 44100 
- workshop, cashier, management 29400 
Total capital investment in service stations• R3.8 billion 
* It costs an average of approximately R2.5 million to build an urban service station, excluding the cost of 
land. 
Table 4.2.19 Estimates of basic service station statistics 
(Sapia 1996) 
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Retail pricing 
Retail price maintenance (RPM) on petrol is enforced by the DMEA in terms of the Petroleum 
Products Act (Act no. 120 of 1977). The retail price of diesel is not controlled, while in the case 
of illuminating paraffin a gross retail mark-up of 33% is permitted. The retail margin for petrol 
is determined by the DMEA on the basis of the actual costs incurred by approximately 80 
representative service stations with an average monthly petrol sales volume equal to the country's 
average (153 000 1/month). 
Equalisation Fund levy 
For more than a decade until the early 1990s South Africa had to pay premiums for imported 
crude oil as a result of the oil embargo. These were financed by a levy on retail sales of petroleum 
products, known as the equalisation levy, which has been imposed since January 1979. The oil 
companies collect and pay the levy into the equalisation fund, managed by the Central Energy 
Fund (CEF) (Pty) Ltd and controlled by the Ministers of Mineral and Energy Affairs and of 
Finance in accordance with the Central Energy Fund Act, No. 38 of 1977. The levy is currently 
applicable to petrol, diesel and illuminating paraffin. Although the need to finance premiums on 
imported oil has fallen away, the equalisation fund is utilised for the following purposes by 
Ministerial directive: 
• temporary financing of margin increases; 
• payments to Sasol and Mossgas; 
• synlevy payments to the oil industry for uplifting Sasol products; 
• funding of fire-fighting and security projects at key fuel. 
The need for an equalisation levy will depend on whether the above payments can be justified in 
terms of future energy policy. Most of the equalistion fund is currently used to pay subsidies to 
Sasol and Mossgas, although the recent decision to cut Sasol's subsidy in 1996 will make a 
surplus of about R600 million available in 1996. 3c/l has been transferred to the fuel tax from 
3 April 1996 while a further I ell will be transferred in July 1996. This should raise , 
approximately R61 0 million for the fiscus in the 1996/97 financial year. 
Fuel tax, customs duty and excise duty 
The state collects tax on fuel, currently equal to approximately 40% of the retail price of petrol 
and 30% in the case of diesel. An equalisation fund levy equal to 7% of the illuminating paraffin 
price used to be levied on illuminating paraffin used as a household fuel but this was discontinued 
in July 1996. The 3.6 c/1 equalisation fund levy on LPG was also discontinued in July 1996. 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund levy (MMF) 
Compulsory third party insurance is financed via a levy on petrol and diesel. The exact amount is 
determined by the budget of the Fund, which is approved by the Minister of Transport in 
concurrence with the Minister of Finance. 
The retail or pump price of petrol is the sum of all of the above elements. This is calculated by 
the CEF, and pump price adjustments are made on the first Wednesday of each month. 
Paraffin marketing 
Despite the quasi-regulated maximum retail mark-up on paraffin of 33% the actual practice in 
most cases is to apply a higher mark-up (Palmer Development Group 1993). Marketers buy 
paraffin in bulk from refineries and distribute to depots around the country. From the depots the 
fuel enters an often complex supply chain leading to retail outlets many of which are in~ormal 
"spaza" stops which sell small amounts of paraffin in a variety of containers often supplied by the 
customers. While wholesale prices are relatively stable, fair and constant across many 
wholesalers surveyed retail prices vary widely and the average mark up at 505 dealers surveyed, 
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Figure 4.2.13 Real (1990 Rands) price of petrol, diesel, and paraffin 
(DMEA 1995) 
Comparison of South African prices with other countries 
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Figure 4.2.15 International comparison of South African diesel price 1990 
(Dutkiewicz 1994) 
Ratio of diesel price to gasoline price 
Sa diAr bia 1 I 
I 
lndi 




















A us ralia 
SOL TH!I RIC!'-
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 
Price ratio Diesel/Gasoline 
Figure 4.2.16 Ratio of diesel price to gasoline price 1990 
(Dutkiewicz 1994) 
Internationally many countries price diesel significantly below petrol largely using a duty on 
retail sales. The main reason for this is to encourage users to take advantage of the inherent 
technological advantages offered by diesel engines for public, freight and goods transport and 
commercial applications (Many users are discouraged by the higher capital costs of diesel 
equipment and therefore an additional incentive is required). An additional reason is that this is 
an effective policy instrument for differentiating between key economic sectors. 
The vast majority of countries promote the use of diesel through a price differential. On average, 
world diesel prices are 28% lower than petrol prices. The figure above shows some typical prices. 
There is a world-wide trend towards diesel use irrespective of price differentials. However, the 
higher capital cost of a diesel engine constrains uptake unless, either the vehicle is used for a 
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(Note: The South African pricing formula has recently led to diesel being priced above petrol in 
South Africa - March 1996). 
Fuel Transport 
Fuel is transported in four modes, namely coastal shipping (by oil industry-owned coastal 
tankers), road, rail and pipeline. 
A number of companies in the oil industry own and operate a single buoy mooring facility outside 
Durban harbour. This allows for the discharging of crude oil from tankers without the necessity 
of entering the port. However, a wharfage charge is levied. 
Portnet, the state port parastatal, handled 24.2 million tonnes (163 million barrels) of petroleum 
products at its harbours in 1994/95. 
The transportation of crude oil from the coast to the only inland refinery, Natref, as well as from 
bulk-storage facilities to the refineries, and of petroleum products from the refineries and storage 
facilities to inland depots is largely carried out by Transnet, the state-owned transportation 
company. Transnet owns and controls all crude oil and petroleum-product pipelines in South 
Africa through its subsidiary Petronet. The transportation of fuel by rail and road is done by other 
Transnet subsidiaries, Spoornet and Autonet respectively, as well as the road tankers of the oil 
companies. 
Petroleum products are distributed from the refineries or coastal supply points to the inland fuel 
depots and from the depots to the service stations mostly by oil industry-owned road tankers, in 
the most economical mode or combination of modes available. The transport cost element in the 
controlled retail price of fuel is dependent on the area in which the fuel is sold, increasing with 
distance from the coast. The country is divided into three zones, categorised by the dominant 
mode of transport in each, and the costs determined for the various magisterial districts which are 
used as pricing zones. DMEA uses Transnet rail tariffs as benchmark costs to determine the 
transport cost element of the fuel price for each zone. 
It has been argued that the Transnet tariffs for transporting fuel, especially pipeline tariffs, are 
excessive and do not reflect an equitable return on the capital investment and operating costs. It 
is believed that there is a level of cross-subsidisation of other transportation activities operated by 
Transnet. Also, there are no economy-of-scale advantages (lower tariffs for high-volume areas 
and higher tariffs for low-volume, outlying areas). This is of benefit to fuel users in outlying areas 
but results in a higher transport cost-element in the price of fuel for the majority of users. 
Also, even though fuel supplied in the Gauteng area by Sasol (which accounts for most of the 
supply) is not transported from the coast, the controlled price paid for this fuel contains a 
component reflecting the cost of transport from the coast. 
Petronet2 
The Petronet parastatal operates a network of some 3 OOOkm of high pressure liquid fuels 
pipelines. The pipeline network was built over a 15-year period from 1965 onwards. Fuel 
products transported include white products (diesel, petrols, alcohol and jet fuel) for the oil 
industry and Sasol, and crude oil for the Natref inland crude refinery. Recently Petronet has 
entered into an agreement with Sasol to transport methane-rich gas from Secunda to the Durban 
area. A liquids pipeline is to be converted. 
Petronet is a division of the Transnet parastatal transport conglomerate. In 1994/95 it 
transported 14.3 billion litres of fuel, an annual increase of 8.3%. The megalitre kilometres 
transported equalled 3.8 million. Its customers are the major oil companies in South Africa: BP, 
Shell, Engen, Caltex, Total, Zenex and Sasol. 
The transportation of white products is done from three supply areas, namely: 
• the two crude refineries in Durban (Sapref and Genref); 
• the crude refinery at Sasolburg (Natref); and 
• the two synfuel plants at Secunda (Sasol 2 and 3 plants). 
2Much of the following information comes from an unpublished internal Petrone! document, titled: Petronet. 
EDRC 
4-38 South African energy supply 
These products are delivered to 18 delivery points in five provinces and the existing pattern is 
that about 47% of all white products taken in and delivered originate from Secunda, 39% from 
the Coalbrook refinery Natref, and only 14% from the two coastal refineries. 
The transportation of crude oil is done from two supply points to the Natref refinery. These 
intake points are in Durban (imports) and Kendal in the Mpumalanga province (from strategic 
stockpiles in oldcoal mines). At present (1995) about 56% of all crude transported is supplied 
from coast and 44% from the stockpiles. 
Petronet' s market share of the various market sectors is as follows: 
• The pipeline share of petrol and diesel transported from the Secunda refineries is 
approximately 91%. 
• The pipeline share of petrol and diesel transported from the Natref refinery is approximately 
80%. 
• The pipeline share of petrol and diesel transported from the coastal refineries by pipe, road, 
rail and sea cannot be determined due to insufficient information of the volumes transported 
by the other modes of transport. However, the volume of white products transported from the 
coast by pipeline was I 442 billion litres for the period April 1994 to March 1995. Petronet 
believes this volume to be below 15% of all volumes transported from the coastal refineries. 
• The pipeline share of crude oil from the coast and inland is 100%. 
• The pipeline share of Avtur (aviation turbine fuel) transported from Natref to Johannesburg 
International Airport is 100%. 
Since 1993 Petronet has also diversified into the area of depot management. This segment of the 
Industry was traditionally owned and operated by the oil industry. Petronet's Tarlton depot, with 
its tank farm ability to carry 30 million litres of fuel at any one time is a leader in this market. 
Petronet has recently started diversification into the area of gas transportation. One of their 
liquid lines is being decommissioned during 1995 to be converted to transport gas by April 1996. 
The current estimated replacement cost of the approximately 3 000 km of pipeline and related 
assets is about R4.5 billion. However, a recent revised estimate suggests that this could be as 
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Petronet's return on assets managed (ROAM) is about 20%. In real terms this gives real return 
of about 10.5%. From an international benchmarking exercise undertaken, Petronet found UK 
and USA pipeline companies making between 7% and 14 % real return on assets managed. 
Petronet ROAM is determined largely by the existing pattern of supply and demand of fuel in 
South Africa and not the tariffs. The majority of fuel transported by Petronet is transported over 
short distances at tariffs leading to much lower income than would have been the case had all 
products been transported over the longer distances. Using the ROAM-arguments, therefore, is 
important in evaluating Petronet operations, because looking at tariffs in isolation can be 
misleading. 
Although Petronet is a natural monopoly and is part of the highly regulated fuel industry, it is not 
formally regulated. This is an exception to common international practice where even state 
utilities are run along rules of a specific regulation regime. 
Petronet' s entire nett profit goes directly to Transnet to help address the Transnet Pension Fund 
liability. 
The links between petroleum product pricing and Trans net tariffs 
Three ofTransnet's divisions (Spoornet (rail), Petronet (pipe) and Autonet (road) are involved in 
the transportation of fuel. These division's tariffs play an important role in the final price-setting 
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cheapest combination of modes (using Transnet tariffs) of transport from the nearest port where 
oil companies distribute petroleum products. This system had over the years ensured that 
products have been nationally available including rural areas. The published tariffs of the 
different modes of transport in Transnet are used to determine the cheapest transport cost from 
coast to inland sources. Some zones use the rail tariffs (where there are no pipelines), some road 
tariffs (where there is no rail or pipeline transport available), and there are the zones that use the 
pipeline and a combination of pipeline and rail (so-called onrailing) tariff to determine the 
associated transport costs. These transport costs are fully recovered in the pump price. The 
transport cost does therefore not add expenditure to the accounts of members of the oil industry -
it gets fully recovered at the pump under the existing regulatory rules. 
It is through this mechanism that the extent of Sasol's locational advantage is determined. Sasol 
charges the oil industry wholesalers the IBLC plus transport costs as if product had been 
transported from the coast but pays Petronet only for the transport from the inland plants and 
refinery - the difference being retained by Sasol. There is thus a clear link between Transnet 
tariffs and Sasol's revenues- even for the fuel not transported from the coast. 
4.2.3 Gas 
In addition to coal gas and LPG, South Africa produces about I.8 billion cubic metres per year of 
natural gas from the F-A field near Mossel Bay in the Bredasdorp Basin off the South coast. The 
entire output is dedicated to the state-owned Mossgas liquid fuels synthesis plant and accounts for 
about 1.5% (70PJ) of total primary energy supply. (South Africa gas resources and Mossgas are 
dealt with in section 4.2.I and 4.2.2). Gas manufactured from coal accounts for between I% and 
2% of total net energy consumption (about 24 PJ) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) accounts for 
about one half of a percent (about I2 PJ). 
Natural gas and coal gas play separate roles in the energy system with natural gas being used 
solely as a feedstock for production of synthetic fuels and coal gas as an industrial and domestic 
fuel. However, current development of regional gas fields will most probably lead to gas 
becoming a more important fuel in South Africa. 
Sasol Heating Fuels (Gaskor) 
(As a result of changes at Sasol Gaskor has ceased to exist and Sasol Heating Fuels is now 
responsible for Gaskor's previous areas of business.) 
In I964, Sasol established the South African Gas Distribution Corporation Limited (Gaskor) for 
the distribution of gas which was a by-product of its synthetic fuel process from the plant in 
Sasolburg. Currently Gaskor, a not-for-profit, company, IOO% owned by Sasol, accounts for 
about 90% of gas sales in South Africa. Gaskor owns about 700 km of distribution pipe and sells 
mainly to about 700 industrial customers in the Gauteng area. Gaskor sources its gas from the 
Sasol I plant in Sasolburg and the Sasol 2 and 3 plants in Secunda. 
The gas from the Sasol I plant has a calorific value of 20.5 MJ/cm but the Secunda plants 
produce methane-rich gas which has a higher calorific value of some 34 MJ/cm (compared with a 
typical value of 38 MJ/cm for natural gas). Recent expansion in Sasol's gas business involves the 
higher calorific value gas. For example, the recently completed IOO km pipeline from Secunda to 
industries in the Witbank area and the Richard's Bay pipeline negotiated with Petronet (see 
earlier) are for methane-rich gas. 
The price of Gaskor gas is geared to maximise the load factor. No volume discounts are given 
above the smallest loads and load factors are monitored closely. Customers have individual 
contracts, but prices are set by a published tariff that is reviewed annually although contracts for 
customers supplied by the new Witbank line have been negotiated outside of this tariff structure. 
A single sliding- scale tariff is used that ranges from about R12/GJ at load factors of 90% and 
above R31/GJ at load factors below 40% (World Bank 1995). 
An interesting and pertinent point for future industry development is that depreciation on gas 
pipelines is not allowable for tax purposes. This has been connected with Gaskor's curious 
arrangement whereby it is set up as a "Section 2I" non-profit company which owns pipeline 
networks but has no staff. Sasol carries out all sales, operation and maintenance. 
Johannesburg Water and Gas Department. 
Most of the remaining 10% of gas sales in South Africa is on-selling of Gaskor gas by the 
Johannesburg Water and Gas department (JWDG) which owns 1 300 km of distribution pipe and 
supplies 12 000 domestic and 3 000 industrial customers. The industrial customers take 87% of 
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the gas and the domestic consumers account for the remainder. JWGD's prices are high 
compared with Gaskor's and are in the range of R28 to R30/GJ. JWGD claims that their 
position, in terms of sharing overhead costs and structures with other municipal service 
departments, makes it difficult to expand their business, and that it is in fact in decline. 
Cape Town and Port Elizabeth 
A small number of about 600 industrial and domestic customers in Cape Town are served by the 
privately-owned Cape Gas in Cape Town. Cape Gas operates a very old coal gas plant. A 
privately owned company in Port Elizabeth distributes a small amount of LPG/ air blend by pipe. 
Future development of gas in South Africa 
There is consensus that any significant expansion of the South African gas industry would most 
likely firstly be based on piping gas from the Pande field in Mozambique, which has proven 
reserves of about 54 bern, to the Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal markets. Private 
investors have shown interest in the Pande development and there are strong possibilities that a 
pipeline from Pande to South Africa will be built in the next few years. 
An additional source of gas could be the Kudu field in Namibia with a discovery of 57 bern but 
this resource has yet to be proved up to reserve status. However, Kudu has upside possibilities of 
being up to ten times larger. If this is realised Kudu could represent a relatively large source of 
gas for South Africa. 
The Central Energy Fund (CEF) has made estimates of the size of the potential gas market in 
South Africa and estimates that excluding large baseload customers, could be as large as 7 bern 
p.a. by 2010 (compared with current Gaskor sales of 0.6 bern p.a.). Additional baseload 
customers such as a 2000 MW power station and a large minerals beneficiation plant could 
increase this by 5 bern p.a. This level of demand would represent about 10% of current primary 
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4.3 Electricity 
4.3.1 Overview of the South African electricity supply industry 
Industry structure 
The electricity supply industry (ESI) in South Africa is structured in three layers as shown in 
figure 4.3.1 below: 
GENERA110N 
TRANSMISSIOO 
Figure 4.3.1: Structure of the electricity supply industry in South Africa 
The backbone of the middle layer is the Eskom owned national grid which links all major power 
generating systems in the country to electricity distributors and large customers. It also has links 
to all neighbouring countries. Eskom generates about 95% (DMEA l996b) of the electricity for 
distribution, with some large municipalities providing the balance. While the generation and 
transmission systems are well organised and efficient by world standards the lower layer in figure 
4.3 .I, the electricity distribution industry (EDI), is highly fragmented. About 400 separate 
distributors, ranging from Eskom through large metropolitan councils to small transitional 
management boards, are responsible for supply of electricity to consumers. 
The re-structuring of the EDI has been affected by the re-structuring of apartheid local 
government which had wealthy white local authorities running profitable electricity distribution 
departments and 100% household electrification along side politically and economically 
impoverished black local authorities often with no households electrified in their areas. The 
white local authorities usually included the commercial and industrial areas within their 
jurisdiction and showed large surpluses on their electricity accounts. This annual surplus of 
some RI.7 billion is a key factor in the transformation of the EDI as it has historically been used 
by the previously defined white local authorities to subsidise other services. 
Re-structuring of the industry 
The need to overcome the lack of access to electricity by the majority of South African households 
has been recognised as a key element in the social and economic renewal of South Africa in the 
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post-apartheid period. A range of electricity industry stakeholders, including the government of 
the day, formed the National Electrification Forum (NELF) in 1992. The NELF analysed the 
various obstacles to accelerating the national electrification programme and debated policies to 
overcome these. Following these debates certain recommendations were put to the Cabinet, an 
important component of which was a proposal to empower the existing Electricity Control Board 
(ECB) to regulate the entire ESI. This newly empowered National Electricity Regulator (NER) 
came into being on 1 March 1995. The NER has had considerable difficulties in its first period 
of operation. This led to the establishment of another policy advisory body, the Electricity 
Working Group (EWG) which is dealt with briefly at the end of section 5.1.1. on Electricity 
Governance. 
Eskom 
Before describing the different layers of the ESI in more detail it is useful to provide a description 
of Eskom because of it pervasive presence in all three layers. It is the ~orld's fourth largest 
electricity utility, with an installed generating capacity of 39 000 MW. In 1994 it produced the 
cheapest electricity in the world (Van Horen 1995). The national electricity utility is the largest 
and most significant of energy institutions in South Africa, with fixed assets (in 1994) of 
R73 billion, revenue of Rl5.4 billion, a net income of R2.3 billion and 42 000 employees (Eskom 
1994). 
Eskom (originally the Electricity Supply Commission) was established in terms of the Electricity 
Act of 1922 and was controlled by a commission appointed by the State President. It is currently 
regulated by the 1987 Eskom Act and also by the 1987 Electricity Act. It is controlled by the 
Electricity Council which is appointed by the government according to specific categories defined 
in the Act. 
While Eskom does not have an exclusive right to generate electricity (some industries and 
municipalities have their own generation plant), it has a practical monopoly in bulk electricity 
sales. In 1994 it supplied 9% (DMEA 1996b) of electricity in South Africa. Eskom operates the 
integrated national high-voltage transmission system and supplies directly to large consumers 
such as mines, mineral beneficiators and other large industries .. It also supplies directly to 
commercial farmers and recently, to a large number of residential consumers. It sells electricity 
in bulk to local municipal authorities who in turn distribute to industry, commerce and residences 
within their municipal boundaries. It has also recently been made responsible for the national 
rural electrification programme. 
Although Eskom is a public corporation, it is largely self-financing, through internal reserves and 
external borrowings. An exception regarding this financial autonomy, occurred in the form of 
ad hoc subsidies made available by the DMEA over the years for the electrification of remote 
commercial farms. 
Eskom plays a significant role in the economy. This is particularly apparent if one examines the 
record of GDFI in the 1970s and early 1980s. During this period strong growth in GDFI by 
public corporations, except for a marginal lapse in 1976, was largely attributable to Eskom as can 
be seen in the figure below. Significant investments undertaken by Eskom included the 
commissioning of the Kriel (3 000 MW) and Arnot (2 I 00 MW) power stations in the period 
1975-1977; the Matla (3 600 MW), Duvha (3 600 MW), Lethabo (3 708 MW) and Matimba 


























































0 ;::. "' ..... ,.._ ;!' ;!' ;!' 
-
"' "' ..... ..... ;!' ;!' 
4-43 
/"\ 




"' "' ..... <X> 0> 0 ;;; "' "' i2i "' "' ..... <X> 0> 5\ ..... ..... ,.._ ..... ..... <X> <X> <X> <X> <X> <X> <X> <X> ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' \!? ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' ;!' 
Year 
Figure 4.3.2: Contribution of investment in the electricity sector to total South African 
GDFI 
(Eskom 1992) 
By the middle of the 1980s, however, it became apparent that Eskom had over-estimated the 
demand for electricity in South Africa, as is apparent in figure 4.3.3 below. Existing project 
plans, specifically the Majuba and Kendal projects, were deferred and the drop in investment 
from 15 % of GDFI to about 6 % by 1992 had a significant effect on South Africa's macro-
economy and on the local construction industry. 
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Figure 4.3.3: South African electricity generation capacity vs demand 
(Eskom annual reports) 
An indication of the relative sizes of power station investments in South Africa is that the largest 
single current project in South Africa in 1995 in terms of capital investment is the Majuba power 
station which will have a nominal capacity of 4 149 MW. The total value of the project is 
R9.1 billion. The first of Majuba's six generating units is due to be commissioned in April 1996 
with the final to be brought on line by the beginning of the next century. This rather more 
restrained style of investment is in contrast to the history of building six large power stations in 
the period 1975 to 1985. 
Eskom value added 
Another indication of Eskom' s impact on the macro economy is the measure of "value added" by 
the parastatal. Table 4.3.1 below shows salient figures. 
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VALUE CREATED 1994 Rm % 
15 417 
Revenue 
Less: Cost of primary energy, materials 4 991 
and services 
SUBTOTAL 10 426 100 
VALUE DISTRIBUTED 
To remunerate employees for their 2 868 28 
services* 3186 30 
To providers of finance for monies 
borrowed 
6 054 58 
VALUE RETAINED 
To maintain and develop operations 4 372 42 
10 426 100 
* Excluding capitalised manpower costs: 1994 (R297 million); 1993 (278 million) 






9 239 100 
2 562 28 
3 147 34 
5 709 62 
3 530 38 
9 239 100 
Value created increased by 13% over I993. Similarly, value distributed to employees increased 
by I2% during the same period. The value retained in the business for the replacement of, and 
addition to, assets has increased to 42%, which remains relatively high. 
Eskom 's financing 
Eskom is largely self-financing through internal reserves and debt. 
Net interest bearing debt 










Eskom's funding is managed in a single pool consisting of debt and investments made up as 
follows: 
Interest-bearing debt 
Local registered stock 
Other local debt 
Foreign debt 
- Bonds and loans 
- Project finance 
Less: Investments 
Net interest-bearing debt 
Rm (1994) 









Eskom has continually managed to attract finance on extremely favourable terms. The 
benchmark "Eskom I68" stock repayable in 2008 has an II% coupon rate. 
Eskom is exempt from paying income tax and, while VAT is payable on electricity, Eskom's 
contribution to the fiscus is limited. It is able to retain its full surplus which amounted to 
R2 268 million in I994, a real return on assets of 4.3%. The surplus is retained as reserves. 
Eskom employment 
Employment by Eskom has dropped significantly from a peak of 66 000 in 1985 to 39 760 at the 
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electricity production and a large increase Ln the number of customers, part icul arl y household 










1985 1986 1987 1986 1989 1900 1991 1992 
Year 
Figure 4.3.4 Eskom employment 
(Eskom 1994b) 
1993 1994 
Divisionalisation of Eskom 
Eskom plays a signi ficant role in generation, transmiSS IOn and distribution. Wi th effic iency 
improvements (evidenced by, for example, the employment figures shown in the figure above and 
a number of restructuring exercises) have come suggestions that Eskom separate its generation, 
transmission and di stribution/sales functions. Current Eskom annual reports give a breakdown of 
these components in some aspects such as investment in pl ant. However, Eskom retains a hi gh 
level of vertical integration (from outside measures a least). The rest of the electricity section 
now deals with each of these layers . However, information on revenues , profit levels or returns 
on assets for each of these levels is not immediately apparent from published data and so in many 
cases in fo rmed es timates will need to be made. Also, in many cases data for Eskom is readily 
available whereas data fro m the fragmented EDI is inconsistent. 
4.3.2 Electricity generation 
Table 4 .3.4 below shows the main sources of South African electric power. The contribution of 
small coal-fired stati ons operated local authority electri city departments is not included. The map 







1994 production Net max. capacity % of 
Generation (GWh) % (MW) capacity 
Coal 148 003 94 31 744 88 
Hydro 1 074 <<1 600 2 
Pumped storage 1 517 <1 1 400 4 
Gas turbine 2 <<1 342 1 
Nuclear 9 697 5 1 840 5 
Total 160 293 100 35 926 100 
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Figure 4.3.5 Map showing South African base-load power stations 
(EDRC map) 
In South Africa, electricity is produced mai nly from coal, with smaller amounts from nuclear, 
pumped-storage and hydro-electric power stations (I %), and very small amounts from stand-by 
gas turbines , diesel and petrol generators and photovaltaic panels. At the end of 1994 Eskom had 
4 II 0 MW of generating plant on order and an equi valent amount of plant has been mothballed. 
The peak demand on the integrated Eskom system was 24 798 MW, an increase of 7% over 1993 
but sti ll indicating significant overcapacity in generation. However, demand is expected to grow 
by 6 000 MW p.a. over the next few years. 
Maximum simultaneous one-hour Date 
demand of total Eskom system 
MW 
1994 24 798 26.07.94 
1993 23 169 22.06.93 
1992 22 640 08.07.92 
1991 2 342 21 .06.91 
1990 21 863 29.06.90 
1989 21 871 21 .07.89 
Increase 1993-94 % 7.0 
Average yearly 2.6 
increase 1989-94 % 
*Note the shift to an evening peak reflecti ng the growing importance of household demand . 
Table 4.3.5 Maximum demand on the Eskom system since 1989 
(Eskom Statistical Yearbook 1994) 








The abundance of coal reserves and low coal prices in South Africa results in most electricity 
being generated from coal. (Information on coal supplies to power stations is contained in 
section 4. I. on coal. ) Eskom operates 12 coal fired power stations. In 1994 six power stations 
were decommissioned or di sposed of. Its newer power stations comprise six turbo-generating sets 
each with installed ratings totaling 600 MW and more. They are generall y located adjacent to 
dedicated coal mines. In 1994, Eskom burned 76.8 million tonnes of coal (45 % of South Africa's 
coal output) at an average of 0.52 kg coal per kWh sent out. Eskom has developed expertise in 
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20.09 MJ/kg, not very much higher than fuelwood. The average cost of coal burnt was R29.98 
per ton in 1994. The average thermal efficiency at Eskom power stations has increased from 
30.5% in 1982 to 34.4% in 1994. 
Most of Eskom' s coal power stations are Mpumalanaga. Declining availability of consolidated 
coal fields, increased air pollution and water scarcity are becoming serious constraints to further 
development of very large coal-fired stations. Eskom has pioneered the development of dry-
cooled power stations and its Kendal plant, near Witbank, is the largest indirect dry-cooled power 
station in the world (Eskom 1991). 
Electricity from nuclear plants 
Koeberg, South Africa ' s 1930 MW nuclear power station, is situated 30 km north of Cape Town 
and was commissioned by Eskom in 1984. On Eskom' s own admission , it is very much more 
expensive than coal-fired stations and was built more for strategic than other reasons. Koeberg 
technology is based on the French pressurised water reactor system and reprocessing of expended 
fuel is undertaken in France. Low-and-medium level waste is buried in trenches at Vaalputs in 
the desert expanses of the Northern Cape, but no solution has yet been proposed for storage of 
high-level waste returned from France . 
Electricity from pumped storage and hydro-electric power 
Eskom' s two hydro-electric power stations at the Gariep and Vanderkloof dams on the Gariep 
river (DMEA 1996b) have a sent-out rating of only 540 MW. 
South Africa pumped storage schemes are used to provide electricity at peak demand periods. 
Water is pumped from a lower to a higher reservoir during periods of low demand and then run 
down through a hydro-electric turbine during periods of peak demand. Eskom 's two pumped-
storage stations (Drakensburg and Palmiet) have a sent out rating totaling 1 400 MW. The Cape 
Town City Council has a 90 MW pumped storage system at Steenbras. 
A very small number of micro hydro-electric systems are installed on farms on the Eastern 
Transvaal escarpment, the Drakensburg foothills and the coastal belt from the Eastern Cape to 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
Electricity from gas turbines and diesel and petrol generators 
In the South African electricity supply system, gas turbine power stations are only used as stand-
by units. Eskom's units have a sent out rating of 342 MW (DMEA 1996b) and are run for a few 
hours each year. They are able to come into instantaneous operation in the event of emergency 
failures elsewhere on the network. 
Petrol and diesel generators ranging from less than one Kilowatt to a few Megawatts supply 
electricity in areas remote from the national electricity grid and also provide stand-by emergency 
power in mines, industry and institutions such as hospitals. Households in informal settlements 
also use small generators to produce electricity . 
Electricity from renewable energy sources other than hydro-electricity 
In areas remote from the grid, renewable energy technologies, particularly photo-voltaic (PV) 
systems, are increasingly cost-effective. Typical examples are power requirements for 
telecommunications, remote farm homesteads, water-pumping, vaccine refrigeration and 
educational television. Many thousands of small home-lighting kits have been sold. It is 
estimated that photovoltaic installations in South Africa total approximately 3 MW. Electricity 
from wind generators and biomass gasifiers is negligible and installations can be counted in tens 
rather than hundreds or thousands , although there are hundreds of thousands of windmills 
pumping water on farms, even in areas of fairly low wind potential. 
The government has recently announced a programme to provide PV systems to 2.5 million rural 
households, 16 000 schools and 2 000 clinics. Eskom is playing a major role in this. It is a new 
area of business for Eskom and between 1995 and March 1996, 24 schools had been electrified 
using PV. Further 800 are planned to be contracted by March 1996. (Engineering News, 16 
February 1996). 
Generating system assets 
Eskom values its generation plant at R29.6 billion (at historic cost) and R20.9 billion 
(depreciated) in its 1994 balance sheet. However, this is not a fair reflection of the amount 
invested in the assets because of the high inflation rates which have been experienced since the 
construction of much of the plant. If one uses the cost per MW of capacity at Eskom' s latest 
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Majuba plant, a figure of R2.5 million/MW could be estimated as replacement cost for Eskom ' s 
generation system asset. Applying this to total capacity of 33 568 MW for Eskom ' s coal-fired 
stations would yield a replacement cost of approximately R80 billion. This exceeds Eskom' s total 
net asset value in its current value balance sheet. 
Employment in the generation industry 
In 1990 a total of 20 500 people were employed in the electricity generation industry : 
19 000 (Eskom 1991) at Eskom stations and 1 500 (CSS 1990) at municipal generation stations. 
Electricity prices 
Because of the fragmentation of the electricity distribution industry more than 2 000 tariffs are in 
operation in South Africa. A national tariff has been proposed as one of the necessities to achieve 
a more rational and equitable industry and to facilitate the achievement of the goals of the 
national electrification programme. Households and small businesses are largely the victims, and 
beneficiaries, of the current arrangement which still reflects apartheid-style allocations. For 
instance, it is common for households in the old white mid-to-high income local authority areas 
to pay less per unit for their electricity than household customers in the newly electrified old 
black low-income local authority areas . 
Larger users are generally in a better position to negotiate electricity prices which reflect the costs 
of supply (or better) . Because South African costs are amongst the lowest in the world, large 
users benefit greatly and low electricity prices are seen as often providing an important 
competitive advantage to South African industry. For example a recent large-scale aluminum 
smelting plant uses imported feedstocks and local electricity to produce aluminum for the export 
market. In a sense this can be seen as exporting low-cost electricity. 
However, South African government regulations have not caused the internalization of 
environmental costs that has become mandatory in many industrialised countries. Emissions 
from South African power stations exceed limits that often apply in the industrialised countries , 
and were South Africa to apply these limits , electricity prices would be raised considerable. 
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Figure 4.3.6 International comparison of South African bulk electricity prices 
(Dutkiewicz 1994) 
As noted before, in section 4.1 on coal , the most important factor contributing to low electricity 
prices is the low price of South African coal. Figure 4.3.7 below shows the trend in prices of coal 
for Eskom power generation . After a significant rise after 1973 (also the year of the oil price 
shock) a variable price has changed to a low stable price. Eskom enters into long-term contracts 
with suppliers and is often in a strong monopsonistic position - real prices to Eskom have 
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Figure 4.3.7 Eskom coal cost versus production price index (PPI) 
(Eskom 1994) 
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Figure 4.3.8 below shows very clearly the cost benefits enjoyed by South Afri ca electricity 
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Figure 4.3.8 International comparison of coal prices for electricity generation 
(Dutkiewicz 1994) 
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Figure 4.3.9 Map of the national electricity grid 
(EDRC map) 




Eskom owns and operates the national electricity grid. The main transmiSSIOn system which 
connects the power stations, large urban and industrial areas and all neighbouring states is shown 
in the map above. This system consists of lines operating from 132 kV to 765 kV, consists of a 
total of 25 18 1 km of transmission lines. Eskom has been the first utility in the world to 
successfull y operate transmission lines at 765 kV at hi gh altitudes above sea level (Eskom 
1994a). 
The primary di stribution system operating from 33 kV to 165 kV consists of 38 122 km of lines 
and the reticulation system operating at 22 kV and below adds a further 176 154 km to give a 
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1994 
Main transmission system, km 765 kV 1 153~ 
533 kV DC (monopolar) 1 031 
400 kV 13 930 
275 kV 7 220 
220 kV 1 243 
132 kV 604 
Total 25181 
Distribution 165-132 kV 17 483 
88-33 kV 20 639 
Total 38122 
Reticulation lines, km Total 22 kV and lower 176 154 
Total all lines , km 239 457 
Cables , km . 165-132 kV 60 
88-33 kV 272 
22 kV and lower 5 509 
Total all cables, km 5 841 
Table 4.3.6 Transmission and distribution equipment in service at 31 December 1994 
(Eskom 1994a) 
Investment in the electricity grid 
Eskom gives a value of R5.2 billion (at hi storic cost), R3.6 billion (deprec iated) in its balance 
sheet for the transmiss ion sys tem. Data on revenues from operation of the grid . return on 
transmiss ion assets and the basis for tariffs are not readily available. 
The distribution system is valued at R8.9 billion (historic cost) , R6.8 billion (deprec iated). Assets 
in di stribution include the investment in reticulation made as part of the national RDP 
electri fication programme. 
R billion Historic cost Depreciated 
Transmission 5.2 3.6 
Distribution·· 8.9 6.8 
TOTAL 14.1 10.4 
Table 4.3.7 Summary of Eskom transmission and distribution investments and assets 
(Eskom 1994a) 
A considerable investment has also been made in reti cul ation by electricity distri butors other than 
Eskom. Accurate figures of the value of thi s investment are not readil y available but it is possible 
to make estimates for thi s part of the electricity supply system. This will be done in dealing with 
the EDI later. 
Operation of the transmission system 
Eskom 1994a reports that the transmission system exhibited an acceptable quality of suppl y in 
I 994. Figure 4.3.9 below shows the low-frequency incidents history for the system and fi gure 
4.3. 1 0 the total transmiss ion system interrupt time. Eskom also reports that suppl y failures cost it 
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4.3.4 The electricity distribution industry (EDI) 
The right to supply electricity 
The history of electricity supply in South Africa is one of gross inequity based on race. The most 
important issue for the electricity distribution industry (EDI) in the post apartheid reconstruction 
period is the restructuring of the EDI to address this past inequity . Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 
details the consti tutional, legal and regulatory situation regarding thi s restructuring. The section 
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The position with regard to the supply of electricity within local government areas is as 
follows: 
I . Local government bodies (TMCs, TLCs, and LGCCs) have the right to supply 
electricity within their areas of jurisdiction provided that they acquire a license from 
the NER to do so. The NER is the body which determines whether local government 
bodies can meet the criteria to supply set out in the Constitution, the Local 
Government Transition Act and also comply with the NER's own licensing criteria. 
2. Eskom or any other private undertaker can acquire the right to supply electricity 
within any local government area with the consent of such local government and 
provided further that they obtain a license from the NER to do so. 
3. Where Eskom or any private undertaker wishes to acquire the right to supply 
electricity within any local government area and the local government body 
unreasonably withholds its consent, the NER has the power to decide the issue and 
has the power (on good cause) to dispossess the local government body of its rights to 
supply. 
4. TMCs have now acquired the right to the bulk supply of electricity provided that the 
NER licenses the TMC accordingly. (This is necessary because the TMC is a new 
concept which had to be specifically catered for). 
The position about the right to supply is confusing especially because conflicting rights are 
possible. The whole issue around rights to supply will have to be clarified in future legislation. 
On I September 1995, 398 electricity distributors were licensed by the newly instituted National 













Joint service boards, regional councils 
Provinces 
Privately owned (e.g. Tongaat Hullet, Mines, Sasol , AECI -largely 
supply to themselves) 
Previous homeland and self governing territory utilities - being taken 
over by Eskom 
National government distribution 
Total 
Table 4.3.8 Electricity Distributors in South Africa 
(NER 1995) 
The total number of customers for Eskom and the other distributors is estimated in table 4.3.9 
below based on figures from (DMEA 1992) (National Electricity Regulator 1995), and (Eskom 
1994b). 
Eskom Other Total 
Domestic 1 053 725 2 177 464 
Farming 125 864 7 000 
Commercial 20 112 149 888 
Industrial 5 707 19 293 
Other 1 645 46 355 
Total 1 207 053 2 400 000 
Table 4.3.9 Electricity connections in South Africa (1994) 






3 607 053 
The total number of connections is expected to increase by more than six million connections 
between 1992 and 2012 if the RDP electrification programme succeeds. The programme will 
increase the number of connections by more than 100 % since before the programme started. 
Distributors other than Eskom had revenues of R9.8 billion in 1994 of which R 1.75 billion was 
profit (NER 1995). Separate figures just for the distribution component of Eskom are not 
available. 
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The asset value for the distribution industry is difficult to calculate from available data. Eskom' s 
investments in its transmission and distribution network have been detailed earlier. If one values 
the non-Eskom reticulation system at the number of connections multiplied by the average cost of 
a connection in the 1994 electrification programme one gets R3 176 connection (Eskom 1994 b) 
multiplied by 2 177 464 (from the table above) to get roughly R7 billion as the replacement cost. 
Non-Eskom distributors employ approximately 18 000 people and Eskom employs 18 000 people 
in distribution, making a total of 36 000 employees in the EDI. 
Electrification programme 
Electrification 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Eskom 145 522 208 801 254 383 313 179 
Farmworkers** 12 698 16 074 16 838 15 134 
Local authorities 62 214 91 222 129 951 118 173 
Other 12 121 16 074 34 584 32 281 
Total 232 555 331 909 435 756 478 767 
** 1992 figure is connections from January 1991 to December 1992 
Table 4.3.10: Electrification progress 
(NER1996) 





1 478 987 
The national electrification programme is aimed at addressing the lack of access to electricity of 
most homes in areas previously defined as black. In the long term the plan aims to provide an 
additional 6.3 million household electricity connections between 1992 and 2012. 
(Engineering News, February 16, 1996). Eskom plans to provide 4.2 million of these with other 
distributors providing the balance. 
The table above shows the progress of the electrification programme to date. Eskom has 
connected about 950 million houses since 1991 , accounting for 75% of the total. Figure 4.3.11 
below shows plans for the programme until 1999. Eskom plans to continue with a rate of 
300 000 connections p.a. and other distributors are expected to step up their programmes to 
!50 000 p.a. as difficulties with local government re-structuring are overcome. 
350 
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Figure 4.3.11 RDP electrification plans 
(Eskom 1994b) 
Photovoltaic) off-grid supply to rural areas 
In October the government announced the tmtlatton of a programme to use PV systems to 
electrify 2.5 million rural homes by 2015. Refsa, a newly created wholly owned subsidiary of the 
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principle. Programs are also underway to _!!Se PV to electrify 16 000 rural schools and 2 000 
clinics. By March 1997 plans are for another 3 200 schools to follow and then for 3 000 schools 
to be done yearly after that. (Engineering News, February 16, 1996) 
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4.4 The South Africa nuclear energy industry 
In some respects the nuclear energy industry could be regarded as unimportant in South Africa. 
For instance nuclear energy provides less than 1 % of South Africa's primary energy 
consumption. In other respects the industry has drawn a lot of attention. In the apartheid era, 
during which South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) was associated with the 
manufacture of nuclear bombs the AEC was allocated up to 92% of the DMEA's budget. Even in 
199511996 the AEC receives R489 million (69%) of the DMEA budget (Auf Der Heyde 1995), 
and representation on the AEC board of directors of nine members includes the chairperson of 
the Central Energy Fund, the deputy Director General of the DMEA and the CEO of Eskom, 
indicating its strong links with the energy sector (AEC 1995). Also the total investment in the 
industry since 1930 is estimated at R40 billion (Kantema 1995) with the parliamentary budget for 
the AEC (or its predecessors) accounting for R22 billion since 1971 (Van Horen 1995). 
Thus, despite the low contribution of nuclear energy to South Africa's energy needs, huge past 
investments in the local industry, the current state nuclear budget, and the future of nuclear 
energy warrant a description of the situation in South Africa, as part of the energy sector. 
The South African industry can be seen as covering three areas. The area which has received 
most investment involves nuclear fuels: from uranium mining through enrichment, fuels 
fabrication through to waste disposal. This is the area that will be focused on. The second area, 
associated with the supply of energy to consumers is nuclear electric power generation. This is 
touched on here but dealt with more specifically under the electricity section as it is seen as just 
one of many options for electric power generation for South Africa. The third area, namely high-
technology spin-offs from the South Africa nuclear industry is not seen to be within the ambit of 
the energy sector, and thus the reader is referred to the AEC-2000 (AEC 1995) for information in 
this regard. 
This section must also begin with an acknowledgment that the nuclear industry, both locally and 
internationally, is the subject of extremely robust debate. Views and often "facts" presented in 
this debate differ widely. Because information presented by exponents of opposing views in the 
nuclear debate is often conflicting a description of the sector, which is the aim of this document, 
is problematic. 
This problem has been dealt with in the following way. The section essentially consists of 
material drawn directly from sources which could best be described as being on the one hand, 
critical of the arrangement of South Africa's nuclear industry and on the other hand, supportive 
of the existing industry arrangement. It is hoped that this provides the reader with two sets of 
information which compliment rather than confuse each other. The author has, however, taken 
the prerogative to provide a summary to conclude the section. 
4.4.1 Brief history of South African nuclear fuels industry3 
South Africa's nuclear involvement began in the 1940s, when the country was asked by the Allies 
to investigate uranium deposits with a view to supplying the Manhattan atomic bomb project with 
uranium. By 1950, South Africa agreed to supply all its uranium product to the US and UK for 
weapons purposes, and in 1952 the first full-scale uranium extraction plant was opened. In 1967 
Nufcor was established when the state ceded all uranium resources back to the private owners. 
The South African nuclear industry formally came into being with the establishment of the 
Atomic Energy Board (AEB) on 1 January 1949, and in 1961 the AEB occupied its present site at 
Pelindaba. Apart from lobbying for the establishment of a local nuclear power programme, the 
AEB was also involved in operating the country's SAFARI research reactor, and in conducting 
research into enrichment techniques. In 1969 the Cabinet approved funds for a pilot enrichment 
plant (the so-called Y-plant). A year later the development of an indigenous new enrichment 
process was announced, and the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) was formed. 
Construction of theY-plant began in 1971, although it was apparently commissioned only seven 
years later. Apart form a halt in production between 1979 and 1981, operation continued until 
1989. By 1974 the AEB's brief had been expanded into supplying military technology, when the 
Prime Minister's ad hoc committee decided to construct nuclear weapons using enriched uranium 
from the Y -plant, and in 1977 the AEB was issued with instructions to meet Eskom' s future fuel 
requirements. 
3 The production of this section is with acknowledgment to Dr. Thomas Auf der Heyde for the supply of much of the 
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The AEB commenced construction of both its present conversion plant and the "semi-
commercial" enrichment (Z-) plant in 1979, and a year later also started work on the fuel 
fabrication (BEVA = Brandstof Element Vervaardigings Aanleg) plant. First production from 
the conversion plant came in 1986, while the Z and BEVA plants began production in 1988; in 
the case of the Z-plant problems were experienced during the commissioning process which 
stretched over a number of years. The last link in the chain was put in place when the Vaalputs 
waste repository became functional in 1986, and in the same year the AEC announced plans for a 
nuclear research facility near the Gouritz river mouth in the southern Cape. 
The statal nuclear establishment has been restructured a number of times since its inception as 
the AEB. In 1982, the AEB and UCOR were converted into two companies - the Nuclear 
Development Corporation (NUCOR) and the Uranium Enrichment Corporation, respectively -
with the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) as their controlling body. This year also saw the 
establishment of the Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS) within the AEC. The AEC was then 
further restructured when, in 1985, Nucor and Ucor were amalgamated into the AEC. In 1988 
the CNS became fully independent of the AEC. 
In 1968 a subcommittee of the AEB reported to the Minister of Mines and Planning that a 
350 MW nuclear power station would be viable in the Western Cape by 1978. The decision to 
build the station was pre-empted by Eskom in 1967, when the utility purchased the farm 
Duynefontein, site of the future power station. The contracts to construct Koeberg were signed in 
1976, and in 1984 - after repairs of considerable damage sustained during an ANC attack - the 
first reactor at Koeberg became operational, with the second following a year later. 
Thus, by the end of the 1980's South Africa possessed the major stages in the nuclear fuel chain 
from extraction of uranium, through conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication to a nuclear 
power station and a waste repository. 
At present (July-1996) the AEC only supplies conversion services i.e. the conversion of U03 to 
UF6 to NUFCOR. This increases the value of South African uranium exports. The nuclear fuel 
fabrication facility (BEV A) is still operational but has just completed a reload and is awaiting a 
government decision on its future (DMEA 1996b). Uranium mining falls under the auspices of 
the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of the Chamber of Mines and the Koeberg nuclear power station is 
owned and operated by Eskom. In the past, the AEC constituted an essential pillar in the 
Nationalist government's siege economy; it was considered vital to both energy security and 
military supremacy. As a result, the nuclear establishment received generous state subsidies that 
peaked at R705 million, or 92% of the Department of Mineral and Energy's Affairs budget in 
1987/88. 
The largest share of government funds to the AEC has been used to finance the operation of the 
Nuclear Fuel Production (NFP) division, which operates the conversion, enrichment and fuel 
fabrication plants at Pelindaba and Valindaba, as well as the Vaalputs waste repository. Of all 
the NFP services, only the operation at V aalputs is breaking even, with a turnover of about R3 -
4 million/year. The AEC's Figures reveal that the average production costs at the conversion, 
enrichment (Z), and fabrication (BEV A) plants during the period 1988-92 were between ten and 
twenty times the spot market price during the same period, and this excludes the capital costs of 
the various plant. The most inefficient and expensive of these processes was the enrichment 
plant, which required operating expenditure in the order of R343 million/year with an income of 
only R67 million. This led to the closure of the plant in March 1995. (Author's note. 
Information provided by the AEC (DMEA1996b) records that: "For the 1996 finacial year 
virtually the whole production was exported at spot market prices. Revenue was 45% of operating 
costs. This implies a production cost of just two times spot market price and not 10- 20 times." 
as stated previously in this paragraph.) 
Since 1988, the AEC has been supplying nuclear fuel services to Eskom at prices that are 
between two and four times higher that the spot market prices. This has meant that Eskom has 
subsidised the AEC to the tune of at least R220 million over the period 1988 to 1992. The 
reasons for this procurement policy are not clear. The Nuclear Fuels Corporation (Nufcor) has 
similarly been obtaining far higher prices for uranium delivered locally, presumably to Eskom to 
contract with Nufcor for uranium it could have obtained at much lower prices elsewhere. 
The AEC had the following comments to make on the aspects of the nuclear fuel chain described 
above: (DMEA 1996b) 
"Enrichment: 
During 1993/94 the total operating cost per SWU from the Z-Piant was R485-51. At the· time 
world market prices were: Spot market $68-83/SWU depending also on whether it was restricted 
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or unrestricted-origin material; medium-term contracts $90-110/SWU and long-term contracts 
$120-170/SWU. Considering only sport-market prices and an exchange rate of R$3-00/US, the 
local enrichment production did not look attractive from the economic point of view. In July 
1996 with the spot market enrichment price approaching $1 00/SWU and an exchange rate of R4-
33/US$ it is still not economical but the picture still looks completely different. 
Fuel fabrication: 
BEYA has produced 382 fuel assemblies from 1988 to 1996. This represents average production 
rate of approximately 48 fuel assemblies per annum, or 22t(U)/a. The 1995 price to ESKOM of 
an AFA2G was approximately R52 million/a at 22t(U)/a i.e. approximately R1 087 000 per 
AFA2G. The costs to the AEC at these rates were therefore approximately 45% higher than the 
price to ESKOM. The "world market" price, judged by the competitive tenders received by 
ESKOM, is approximately 10% below the BEY A price to ESKOM. This will have been reduced 
by the latest exchange rate jump. 
Under current conditions, therefore, one may conclude the BEY A costs are less than 50% above 
world market prices. This margin was considerably less in the past, because world market prices 
have come down significantly in recent years. 
There is no such thing as a spot market price for nuclear fuel elements although the costs 
represent only operating costs it must be kept in mind that all facilities were for most of the time 
running at only 25% of capacity. To quote numbers of ten to twenty times the spot market price 
excluding capital costs is wrong. It should also be kept in mind that no utility in the world will 
rely for its nuclear fuel requirements only on the spot market. ESKOM, like any other utility 
cannot rely on spot market prices. Long-term contracts are usually at higher prices in the nuclear 
fuel market. Although the AEC is not in economic terms a world competitor performance has 
not been nearly as bad as indicated (in the paragraphs before this quote - authors comment)". 
(From DMEA 1996b). 
However, the end of the apartheid era also witnessed the beginning of the scaling down of the 
South African nuclear programme. State funding of the AEC, which peaked at R776 million in 
1986/87 (Rl.940 billion in 1995 Rands), has been cut to R489 million for 1995/96, of which 
R175 million is for loan repayments. AEC staff has been cut from approximately 8 200 in 1985 
to 2 200. In March 1995 the uneconomic Z-plant was closed down and the Minister of Mineral 
and Energy Affairs has instructed the investigation of future options for the nuclear fuels industry 
in South Africa. 
4.4.2 The nuclear fuel chain in South Africa 4 
In South Africa uranium is produced as a by-product of gold and is then marketed through 
Nufcor, which is part of the Chamber of Mines. Most of this uranium is exported as oxide but 
some is sold locally to Eskom and the AEC, and since 1992 Nufcor has also been exporting small 
amounts of both natural and enriched UF6. Conversion, and fabrication processes take place at 
the AEC's Pelindaba complex west of Pretoria, while disposal occurs at its Yaalputs site near 
Springbok in the north-western Cape. Eskom contracts both Nufcor and the AEC for some of 
Koeberg' s fuel requirements. To this point, all spent fuel from Koeberg has been stored on site, 
and Eskom has not yet revealed its disposal plans. However, all other radioactive waste has been 
disposed of at Yaalputs. The Council for Nuclear Safety is responsible for licensing all nuclear 
transactions and processes, and for overseeing adherence to regulations governing the industry. 
However, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and international safeguards agreements are 
administered by the AEC. 
The Nuclear Fuels Corporation (Nufcor) 
Nufcor is the Chamber of Mines' uranium marketing organisation. Its ownership alters from 
year to year, since the uranium-producing mining houses own shares in it in proportion to the 
amount of uranium they produce. Uranium-producing mines supply ammonium diuranate 
slurries to Nufcor's plant near Johannesburg, where they are blended and calcified into exportable 
concentrates containing U308. The plant employs about forty people, while the head office in 
Johannesburg has a staff of eight which market uranium mainly to utilities in Europe, North 
America, and the Far East. Nufcor has been marketing South African uranium abroad since its 
4 The production of this section is with acknowledgment to Dr. Thomas Auf der Heyde for the supply of much of the 
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formation in 1967 and, according to data supplied undertook its first local delivery in 1980 
(Scorer 1993). By the end of 1992 Nufcor had exported 89 956ktU out of a total production of 
94 184ktU, generating an income of R6 498 million. Of the total volume produced, 855tU are 
unaccounted for in the data supplied, by Nufcor- possibly this amount constitutes inventory held 
by Nufcor. 
South African uranium production has followed international trends fairly closely, peaking in 
1980 at 6 082tU, constituting 13.6% of uranium produced by the world outside the centrally -
planned economies (WOCA) countries during that year. Since the mid-eighties, however, South 
African production declined faster than WOCA production, so that in 1991 South Africa 
production (1 601tU) constituted just less than 6%. The figure below depicts South African 
uranium production as a function of WOCA production for the period 1970 - 91, while the 
following figure illustrates the performance of Nufcor prices for exported and locally delivered 
uranium in relation to the international spot market price. The data for the latter graph were 
calculated using averaged, annual historical ZAR:US$ exchange rates supplied by the Standard 
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Figure 4.4.1 South Africa uranium production compared with WOCA production 
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Figure 4.4.2 Local, export and spot uranium prices 
(Auf der Heyde 1994) 
1991 
The above figure suggests that Nufcor largely failed to capitalise on the uranium boom of 
1973 to 1979, its prices only reaching parity with spot in 1979. Since then, Nufcor export prices 
have remained marginally above spot, except for the years 1986/87, when its prices dipped below 
spot, perhaps as a result of an initial panic reaction to the imposition of comprehensive anti-
apartheid sanctions in the US. While its performance in the export market has been fairly erratic, 
Nufcor has performed consistently and remarkable well on its locally delivered product, 
managing to persuade local consumers to pay premium prices for home-grown product. 
Thus, during the years 1980 to 1992 the price of locally delivered U308 was on average 71% 
higher than spot, and 38% higher than the export price. Since there would not appear to be any 
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local consumers of large U308 quantities other thl,!n Eskom and possibly the AEC, it is fair to 
conclude that Eskom must have been paying Nufcor at the premium rate estimated above. 
Bearing in mind the discounted prices offered to Nufcor by the AEC, it is furthermore fair to 
assume that Nufcor will have reciprocated by supplying the AEC with uranium at prices that do 
not approach those paid by Eskom. This means that the average 38% increment on the cost to 
overseas clients, or the 71% increment over the spot price, represent minimum premiums paid by 
Eskom, with the real prices perhaps being significantly higher than this. 
Since Eskom has been extremely reticent about communicating its nuclear fuel requirements or 
purchases, it is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the quantities that Eskom will 
have purchased from Nufcor over the past decade. Considering the differential between Nufcor's 
export prices and those obtained for local delivery, it would certainly appear, however, that 
Eskom overpaid not only for NFP services from the AEC, but also for uranium supplied by 
Nufcor. Again, it is unlikely that the real reasons for this unusual procurement policy will 
become public knowledge. What is certain, however, is that the privately-owned houses profited 
from this arrangement between one of their businesses and a statal or parastatal corporation. The 
costs of this arrangement were most likely borne by electricity consumers. 
The nuclear fuel production programme of the AEC 
T ransfornzation of the AEC' s nuclear fuel activities to establish a long-term commercially 
viable nuclear fuel business. 
The management of the AEC' s nuclear fuel production portfolio over the past year 
included the following activities: 
• a uranium conversion plant with a name plate capacity of 1 200 ton U per annum 
which converts uranium oxide supplied by the mining industry to uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6); 
• a uranium enrichment plant with a name plate capacity of 300 000 Separate Work 
Units per annum which produces UF6 enriched in the U235 isotope. (this plant was 
closed down on 31 March 1995); 
• a nuclear fuel fabrication plant with a capacity of 100 ton U per annum which 
produces nuclear fuel assemblies for the Koeberg nuclear power station in the Western 
Cape as well as fuel elements for the Safari reactor at Pelindaba; 
• a national radioactive waste disposal facility, Vaalputs, some 600 km north of Cape 
Town where low- and intermediate- level radioactive wastes are disposed of; and 
• a molecular laser isotope separation programme aimed at the development of new 
competitive uranium enrichment technology that will, in future, add significant value 
to South Africa's uranium exports. 
The programme to transform the AEC's nuclear fuel cycle activities into a long-term 
commercially viable nuclear fuel cycle business, showed progress and a number of key 
objectives were achieved taking cognizance of local and international. market 
developments. 
Market trends 
The local market for nuclear fuel remained static as Eskom reduced its inventory of first 
generation fuel in preparation for the introduction of new technology in 1996. 
The international conversion service market has recently stabilised to the extent that 
production capacity and demand are fairly evenly matched. Some sales from inventory do 
still occur but the spot market and contract prices are now closer matched than before. 
The international market for enrichment services remains severely oversupplied. 
The market for light water reactor fuel fabrication services is also severely oversupplied 
(demand is only about 50% of production capacity), and the trend towards higher fuel 
burn-ups will exacerbate this situation in future. 
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Notwithstanding these market conditions, the AEC succeeded in a few carefully selected 
cases in participating in the export market for conversion and enrichment services and as a 
subcontractor for the manufacture of PWR-nuclear fuel assemblies. 
Conversion of natural uranium to uranium hexafluoride 
The AEC's conversion plant is operated to produce the natural uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6) which is either required to feed the AEC's enrichment plant or exported as UF6. 
This plant has suffered ongoing technical problems since being commissioned in 1986. 
During the past financial year, a major initiative was launched to identify and rectify its 
shortcomings. This included plant modifications as well as organisational changes. 
Operational results achieved in the last quarter of the financial year show an improving 
trend in plant availability and throughput. 
Production and sales 
All export contracts were honoured, but the feed of UF6 to the enrichment plant had to be 
curtailed to a certain degree due to the technical problems experienced in the plant. 
During the 1994/95 financial year, production of distilled UF6 amounted to 527 ton U in 
UF6 which is 17% less than production during the 1993/94 financial year. Total 
conversion sales for 1994/95 amounted to Rll.8 million. Export earnings improved by 
165%, leading to a marginal increase in total conversion earnings of about I% compared 
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Figure 4.4.3 Conversion - production and sales revenues 1988 - 1995 
(DMEA 1996b) 





The AEC's semi-commercial enrichment plant, known as the Z Plant, was shut down 
permanently on 31 March 1995 following a recommendation by the AEC to the 
government. This decision was the result of the high operating costs of this plant which 
rendered it non-competitive compared with the international market. 
During the 1994/95 financial year, production amounted to 156 471 SWU. This is 20% 
Jess than production during the 1993/94 financial year. Revenue from local enrichment 
sales to Eskom declined by 26.9%, whilst enrichment export showed a healthy 48.5% · 
growth over the past year, resulting in total enrichment sales of R58.5 million, an increase 
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Figure 4.4.4 Enrichment - production and sales revenue 1998 - 1995 
(AEC 1995) 
Uranium enrichment: molecular laser isotope separation 
The AEC has been involved in the investigation and development of new uranium 
enrichment capability in the form of the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) 
technology since 1986. In view of the limited local demand for enriched uranium in the 
medium term, the prime driving force behind the development work on the MLIS process 
is the beneficiation of South Africa's uranium concentrates for increased export earnings. 
An economic uranium enrichment process would enable South Africa to at least double the 
value of present earnings by exporting enriched uranium product instead of unenriched 
uranium. 
Construction of the pilot MLIS plant gas loop was recently completed and licensed. The 
performance of this part of the plant is presently being tested with UF6. Progress with the 
lasers for the pilot plant is on schedule, but beam instability is causing some delay in the 
development of the Raman cell. Physical measurement of the cut in the laboratory facility, 
an important parameter for the economy of the process, is behind schedule, but first 
encouraging measurements have recently been successfully completed. 
Due to the AEC' s limited resources and the aim to internationalise this technology, it was 
decided to continue the programme with the support of an overseas joint venture partner. 
Negotiations to this effect have been successfully concluded and this development work is 
now 50% funded by an overseas partner (DMEA 1996b). 
Fuel fabrication 
The AEC's fuel fabrication plant, BEVA continued production of pressurised water 
reactor fuel for Eskom's Koeberg nuclear power station. In addition to fuel produced in 
accordance with the AEC/Eskom contract, the first subcontracted fuel was delivered to 
Koeberg. 
BEY A's technology was also upgraded to meet international trends. This upgrade will 
allow the burn-up warranty of new generation fuel to be increased by 39% from 
33 000 MWd/tU to 46 000 MWd/tU, yielding significant savings to Eskom. Production 
was started towards the end of the year on the first reload utilising the new technology. 
Production and sales 
During the 1994/95 financial year, the production budget was met in full and fuel 
assemblies containing 6,6 tons of enriched uranium were produced. This is 70% less than 
production during the 1993/94 financial year. 
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Figure 4.4.5 PWR fuel fabrication: Production and sales revenue 1988 - 1995 
(AEC 1995) 
(End of extract from AEC 1995 Annual Report) 
The AEC 2000 PLUS PLAN 
(Author's note. The AEC 2000 PLUS PLAN is the plan instituted by the AEC to re-orient the 
AEC in the "new South Africa". The following information was provided by the AEC on the 
plan.) 
"The AEC 2000 PLUS PLAN which was initiated in 1990, provides the redirection of the Atomic 
Energy Corporation from a heavily state-funded strategic parastatal to a commercially driven 
organisation that is largely dependent on own sources of income via the sales of nuclear and 
industrial products and services in local and selected foreign market niches. With its vision of 
Wealth through Technology, the AEC has redirected its high level and very extensive 
technological expertise at the following four key corporate objectives: 
· to enhance South Africa's industrial development and competitiveness 
· to develop and maintain nuclear technologies for future commercial exploitation 
· to contribute to the socio-technological development of disadvantaged communities 
· to cost-effectively manage nuclear-related institutional activities and national and international 
relations in the nuclear and related field. 
Since the implementation of the AEC 2000 PLUS PLAN in 1990, the AEC's annual state 
dependence for operating activities has declined, in real terms, by R621 million per annum (1996 
Rand value) or 72% over this period. This has been achieved through: 
increased product sales into both local and foreign markets; 
closure of a large number of non-commercial operating plants; 
discontinuation of many scientific and research programmes; 
the contracting out of non-mission related internal services; and 
the down-sizing of support functions. 
A further significant decline of state support of more than 50% for operational actiVIties is 
planned through growth with new and very promising projects over the next five years. 
Unfortunately, above reconstruction of the AEC has also resulted in personnel numbers declining 
from a peak of 8 166 in 1986 to a record low of 2 227 currently. This reduction of 72% has 
resulted in a noticeable technology loss for the South Africa. 
Of the AEC's budget allocation of R245 for 1996/97, at least R84 million (34,3%) will be 
channelled to institutional activities that the AEC will perform on behalf of the state as the 
national institution. These activities include international relations (IAEA-membership) 
safeguards, nuclear waste management, site maintenance, operation of national nuclear and 
related facilities such as Safari and the preservation of nuclear technology and related expertise. 
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An amount of R96 million (39% of the AEC's net operating budget) is directed to the 
enhancement of local industry through technology diversification. 
The development of nuclear technologies for future exploitation requires R57,5 million (23%) of 
the net operating budget. 
An amount of R7,5 million (3,2%) is allocated to social investment aimed at the technology 
related upliftment of developing communities. 
Should the current 5-year plan be successfully completed the following benefits to South Africa's 
economy and society could arise: 
foreign exchange earnings of more than R500 million from product exports 
foreign exchange savings of more than R250 million 
possible investment, both local and from overseas, in new production capacity of more 
than R350 million 
medical radioisotope treatments of more than 1,5 million people in South Africa and a 
further 7 million abroad 
skills and technologically focused training of more than 7 500 South Africans 
creation of skilled direct employment opportunities for more than 3 500 persons. 
The repositioned AEC is committed to the creation of wealth for all South Africa's people 
through the effective utilisation and application of this technology. The AEC's well developed 
infrastructure and breadth and depth of advanced skills and competencies are now directed 
towards building a new global competitive South Africa." (DMEA 1996b). 
AEC as a competitor in the world market6 
The NFP division of the AEC generates income of about R90 rn/yr, R80 m of which 
accrues from contracts with Eskom. These agreements oblige the utility to purchase fuel 
from the AEC at prices that are inflated by about R40 rn/yr over what Eskom would have 
to pay for the same products on the international spot market. An additional income of 
R13 m was generated in 1992/93 and 1993/94 from a contract to supply Nufcor with 
products for export. In order to produce this income, the NFP division requires an annual 
operating expenditure of about R280 rn/yr. 
The major reason for the NFP division's apparent economic unviability is the huge 
operating costs of its plants. The AEC's figures reveal that the average production costs at 
the conversion, enrichment, and fabrication plants during the period 1988 to 1992 were 
between 10 and 20 times the spot market price during the same period, and this excludes 
the capital costs of the various plants. In the case of the conversion and BEY A plants, it is 
claimed that the reason for these high operating costs is their under - utilisation. 
Author's note. The AEC provided the following information on the above aspects (DMEA 
1996b). "The major reason for the NFP division's apparent economic viability is the 
under-utilisation of the installed capacity. The NFP facilities were planned to provide fuel 
for four Koeberg-type units of which only two were built. In addition to this Eskom 
continued to import half its fuel requirements. It is not possible to operate capital-
intensive high-technology facilities economically at only 25% capacity". 
In part, the AEC's short-term hopes for survival in the nuclear fuel market appear to 
involve plans to trade in SWU on the international market. This market is over- traded at 
present and will continue to be so for at least the next decade, resulting in fierce 
competition. 
The AEC states (DMEA 1996b) that "the current long term strategy of the AEC is to add 
value to the uranium exports of the country by converting all uranium production to UF6 
and eventually, after proving the MLIS enrichment process, to enrich local production 
and/or generate foreign exchange by selling technology in this regard. The AEC's process 
has recently been evaluated by COGEMA, a prominent French company in the 
international nuclear fuel business who subsequently decided to enter into a joint venture 
6 The production of this section is with acknowledgment to Dr. Thomas der Heyde for the supply of much of the 
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(1: 1 funding ratio) with the AEC for the further development and industrialisation of 
MUS technology". 
The following summarizes some basic figures for the AEC and nuclear fuels production. 
Total U3o8 supplied by Nufcor (COMSTAT) 168 000 tonnes 
Value of Nufcor exports by 1992 R6 498 million 
AEC nuclear fuel production 
Conversion 
- production 640 tonnes of U in UF6 
-sales R11.731 million 
Enrichment 
- production 266 000 swu 
-sales R57.6 million 
Fuel fabrication 
- production 21.3 tonnes of fuel 
-sales R16.5 million 
TOTAL AEC nuclear fuel sales R89.9 million 
Operating expenditure R183.3 million 
Table 4.4.1 Summary of revenue and operating costs - 1994 
(Auf der Heyde 1994, DMEA 1996b) 
AEC public funding R1 OOO's 
Allocation in 1995/96 state budget 
Total nuclear allocation in South Africa budget rate 489 222 
- support for opex and capex 273 209 
-closure of Z-plant 38 000 
- loan repayments 178 000 
AEC public funding 1971 - 1995/96 (1995 R)* 21 000 000 
* From Van Horen 1995 
Table 4.4.2 Summary of funding of AEC from public funds 
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Year AEC/ UCOA CNS Total DMEAI %of 
AEB Am Am Am DoMAm DMEA 
Am 
1971/2 6 670 6390 39938 16 
1972/3 9390 6 709 38 605 17 
1973/4 8 762 8 762 43 992 20 
1974/5 15978 15 978 82 909 19 
1975/6 17 174 51 000 68174 123 093 55 
1976/7 18603 50000 68603 159 647 43 
1977/8 19 987 43000 62 987 168 001 37 
1978/9 22 925 67 481 90406 191 998 47 
1979/80 32 400 99895 132 295 404 828 33 
1980/1 57060 142 300 199 360 431 085 46 
1981/2 76835 173 400 250 235 385 634 65 
1982/3 114 958 200 600 315 558 447645 66 
1983/4 352 921 75 352 996 534 967 66 
1984/5 370 000 75 370 075 557 637 66 
1985/6 525 878 123 526 001 627 553 84 
1986/7 775 504 179 775 683 871 484 89 
1987/8 705 646 183 671 329 768 462 92 
1988/9 619 018 180 619198 745 831 83 
1989/90 640 000 5200 645 200 786 816 82 
1990/1 712 700 6653 719 353 1 133 610 63 
1991/2 685 000 6966 691 966 896 092 77 
1992/3 451 958 5089 457 047 687 205 67 
1993/4 469 096 5398 474494 707 606 67 
1994/5 509 725 5480 515 205 724 592 71 
1995/6 489 222 5400 494 622 716 374 69 
Table 4.4.3 Annual nuclear and total Department of Mines (DoM) and DMEA budget vote 
(Auf der Heyde 1994) (Author's note: The AEC pointed out minor differences betwen the 
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Figure 4.4.6 Annual nuclear budgets and total DoM/DMEA vote 
(Auf der Heyde 1994) 
The data in the figure above reveal five phases. In the early years, the AEB's portion of 
the budget was less than 20%, but in the 1975/6 financial year it rose to 55%, remaining 
above 33% until 198112. The budget then received a second boost and hovered in the 
region of 66% for four years, before rising again, this time to between 85% and 90% in the 
years 1985/6 and 1989/90. The proportion then dropped slightly, to around 66%, where it 
is currently located. Figure 4.4.7 illustrates the actual budgets, in both current Rands and 
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Figure 4.4.7 Annual budgets, in current Rands and adjusted for inflation 
(Auf der Heyde 1994) 
ITEM 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 
DMEAvote 724 592 (100) 716 374 (100) 668 386 (1 00) 




Support for Opex 308 252 273 209 273 442 
and Capex 
Closure of Z- - 38 000 29 408 
Plant 
TOTAL AEC 308 252 (42) 311 209 (43) 302 850 (45) 
SUBSIDY 
[Projected [335 870] [285 528] [184 895] 
subsidy ('93s 
Rs)] 
Actual loan 201 473 (28) 178 013 (25) 81 290 (12) 
repayments 
[Projected loans [201 173] [175 240] [76 338] 
('93 data)] 
Nuclear Safetv 5480 5400 5 771 
Table 4.4.4 Future funding of the AEC 
(Auf der Heyde 1995) 
(End of extract from Auf der Heyde) 







245 179 (32) 
[173 908] 




The table above shows that as a proportion of the DMEA budget the nuclear energy budget is 
reduced very slightly (2%) from 1994/1995 to 199511996. The sharper drop of (11%) in 
1996/1997 is due mainly to the reduced loan repayments. 
As stated at the beginning of this section, detailed information on the nuclear budget has been 
presented not because of its importance to South Africa's energy economy (where it contributes 
less than 1% of primary energy), but because of the huge state outlays of public funds on the 
nuclear budget, and the ongoing, and planned future support using public funds. This final table 
shows that for the 1997/1998 budget, the total nuclear allocation will remain over half the DMEA 
budget at a figure of R477 million. 
(Author's note. The AEC has pointed out (DMEA 1996b) that it is possible that a skewed 
perception of the AEC funding in terms of the DMEA budget could be created by comparing the 
AEC funding with the DMEA budget and that instead, all DMEA related activities, including the 
activities of state organisations such as Central Energy Fund Pty Ltd, should be considered in 
terms of turnover to produce a more balanced impression.) The following updated budget for the 








Loan redemption 14,783 
Bridging 103,300 
Loans interest 59,930 





South African energy supply 
Budget1997 
1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
R'OOO R'OOO R'OOO 
245,399 220,860 168,729 
24,206 178,033 10,174 
0 0 0 
57,084 53,206 36,287 
29,408 21,673' 21,673 
356,097 473,n2 236,863 
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4.5 Biomass7 
In the context of energy supply, biomass in South Africa refers mainly to woodfuel supplied to 
households. Dung and crop wastes play a minor role in household energy supply. Bagasse plays 
an important role in energy supply to the sugar-refining industry. 
Woodfuel supply to households 
Section 3.4.3, Energy demand by household and community facilities, explains the importance of 
woodfuel to a large proportion of South Africa's population. The main point made is that 
woodfuel is a basic fuel for most of the 3.2 million rural households comprised of 0.9 million 
farmworker households and 2.3 million rural households in previously defined homeland areas. 
These people in rural areas make up about half of the total population of South Africa. 
Worldwide, experience has shown that conventional supply-demand economic analysis is often 
inappropriate and unuseful in considering woodfuel supply. This is due to a number of factors. 
The most important are: 
1. On the supply side, besides providing woodfuel, trees provide a multitude of goods and 
services in rural economies, ranging from wood for fencing and building, fruit and medicine, 
through to the role trees play in protecting soil and water. Woodfuel is most often seen as a 
by-product of other functions trees play. As such, direct supply-side measures such as tree 
planting to provide fuelwood are often unsuccessful because the participants in rural 
economies do not perceive sufficient utility in this. 
2. On the demand side, poor rural households operate a complex array of interlinked coping 
mechanisms to survive their poverty. The time spent by women collecting wood does not 
carry any direct cash cost but plays an important role, in the household economy. Also, 
commercialised and semi-commercialised fuelwood collection by poor rural inhabitants on 
communally owned land has complex links to the rural economy. Because of the complexity 
of both of these links it is almost impossible to provide a useful, conventional economic 
supply model to these two main sources of fuel wood supply. 
3. The status of communal natural woodland varies widely even within otherwise homogenous 
areas. Shortages and surpluses occur in specific localities and thus aggregated supply and 
demand statistics are not appropriate to considering interventions. 
4. Analyses of fuelwood supply from energy-economic perspectives have often been in 
disagreement with rural people's perspectives or in disagreement with decision-makers' 
perceptions. As fuel wood collection is traditionally, and in current practice, a woman's 
task, the fuelwood problem is essentially a problem faced by women and their opinions on 
the matter have seldom been drawn out let alone their voices heard. Thus incorporation of 
the technical aspects of an economic analysis of the fuelwood situation into local political 
and cultural arrangements is problematic. 
Because of the factors above and a number of additional issues related to rural development in 
impoverished areas, the best that can be said in describing the fuelwood situation, in the context 
of considering policy for effective interventions, is that the work needs to be situated in a holistic 
rural development strategy. Fuelwood supply issues are best placed in a component of this 
strategy which has recently gained the name of Rural Development Forestry. Fuelwood issues 
would be one of a number of considerations in this component. 
Even though the utility of supply-demand figures is questionable, the following data is presented 
for information. Gandar ( 1994) estimated national fuel wood use at 11 million tonnes per year, of 
which 6.6 million tonnes is used by rural households in former homelands, 3.5 million tonnes by 
farm worker households and 0. 7 million tonnes in urban areas. Aaron et a! (1991) estimated the 
total sustainable supply of wood from natural woodlands for all the former homelands to be 11.6 
million tonnes per year. Williams (1996) estimates that no more than half of the 11.6 million 
tonnes can be regarded as fuelwood. Williams concludes that these figures indicate a significant 
shortfall in woodfuel production. This is corroborated in energy consumption surveys which 
provide evidence of shortages experienced by rural households and woodland denudation in many 
areas of South Africa. 
7 All data on biomass supplied by Anthony Williams of the Energy and Development Research Centre at the 
University of Cape Town, 
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Programmes have been activated to attempt to begin to deal with the woodfuel problem. The 
Biomass initiative is an ongoing South African government programme. The first phase of this 
programme, largely concerned with gauging the woodfuel problem and considering various 
options for dealing with it, is nearing completion. Some of these options are presented in the 
South African Energy Policy Discussion Document (DMEA 1995a). Projects have also ,been 
established to augment the fuel wood supply and over the last 10 years about 6 000 subsistence-
level farmers have established timber plantations with the assistance of commercial timber 
companies (Williams, 1996). However, considering that South African has about 3 million rural 
households, the size of these programmes could be considered to be only at pilot level. 
Bagasse 
Bagasse is a waste product of sugar refining and all consumption is by the sugar-refining 
industry. The DMEA (DMEA & Eskom 1995) reports that bagasse use accounted for 47 PJ in 
South Africa in 1993. This is significant as it represents more than five per cent of total industrial 
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4.6 Renewables8 
Although the theoretical potential renewable energy resource in South Africa is huge, as in most 
other countries of the world technological developments and economic and political pressures 
have not yet progressed to the point where renewable energies make a significant impact on the 
national energy supply. Thus this description of the component of the energy supply system 
driven by renewable sources of energy is limited to a brief description of the potential resource 
and of the limited application of the resource to date. 
Solar energy 
South Africa experiences one of the highest solar radiation levels in the world with daily solar 
radiation levels in the range between 4.5 and 6.5 kWh/m2. Only a very tiny part of the potential 
offered by this resource has been realised. However, South Africa's photovoltaic equipment 
industry is developing: PV panel assembly. totals about 6MW per annum and the solar water 
heater industry has fourteen manufacturers. The table below indicates solar powered installations 
currently in operation. 
Telecommunications photovoltaic generation 2.6MWp 
Domestic photovoltaic generation 1.8MWp 
Water pumping photovoltaic generation 0.7MWp 
Total photovoltaic 5.1MWp 
Domestic solar water heating 220 000m2 
Commercial and industrial solar water heating 34 000m2 
Agricultural solar water heating 2 600m2 
Solar swimming pool heating 227 000m2 
Total solar water heating (collecting area) 483 600m2 
Table 4.6.1 Installed solar capacity 
Wind Energy 
Wind power potential is good along the coast with mean annual speeds greater than 4 rn/s and 
localised areas where the value of 6 rn/s is exceeded. About 400 kW of small wind turbines for 
power generation have been installed. Windpumps for water supply in rural areas are very 
common in South Africa and about 300 000 such machines are in operation. 
Hydro power 
South Africa is generally a dry country with low rainfall and few large rivers. Estimated hydro 
potential is 8 360 MW. South Africa has a total of 600MW of hydro power plants greater than 
10 MW in operation, pumped storage schemes of I 400MW, and 65 MW of hydro plants smaller 
than 10 MW. 
8 All data on renewables supplied by Anthony Williams of the Energy and Development Research Centre at the 













































Governance and policy institutions 
This chapter on governance and policy is included to provide background information on energy 
governance in general and aspects of the South African governance system and institutions in 
particular. Vol. 1, the Energy Policy Discussion Document (EPDD), focuses on policy and 
governance issues. This chapter can be seen as an appendix to the EPDD giving information that 
may be of relevance to the discussions on policy and governance. The debate on governance in 
South Africa is extensive at this time of transformation, and, this chapter does not attempt to be 
complete or definitive. It provides complimentary information to that given in the Energy Policy 
Discussion Document and is thus aimed at being an aid to assessing some of the policies 
proposed in the Energy Policy Discussion Document. 
Firstly, a review of international energy governance issues that may be applicable to South Africa 
is provided as a context for energy governance and policy in general. Then information on 
energy policy institutions and legislation is given specifically for the electricity and liquid fuels 
supply sectors. The electricity section includes a summary of important outputs from the 
National Electrification Forum. This is followed by information on the Central Energy Fund 
(CEF) group of companies, which has played a key role in the upstream oil industry and liquid 
fuels industry in the past and is beginning to act as home of the National Electricity Regulator 
and Renewable Energy for South Africa (Refsa) institutions. The last section provides 
information on South African state expenditure in the energy sector, in terms of both the 
parliamentary budget and other transfers such as the equalisation fund appropriation. This 
information provides one of the key indicators of state involvement in the energy sector. 
5.1 International review of energy governance 
Energy governance is not a uncontentious issue, particularly in South Africa. During initial work 
on development of the process to develop a new energy policy for South Africa the response from 
many parties was that the "market should be left to do its work" and that the government should 
keep away. This was unsurprising in an environment where the energy sector had over the years 
become the de facto policy maker. However, whilst South Africa had provided an energy supply 
system which provided large industrial users and mines with amongst the cheapest energy in the 
world, the preceding chapter shows that there were costs associated with other sectors - for 
example, low-income households were poorly catered for. Also, the resulting system is not a good 
example of an efficient market with easy access to new entrants, strong competition or low levels 
of government involvement. Rather, in most cases, a careful consideration of the information in 
chapter 4 especially reveals that the opposite is more often the case - namely large barriers to 
entry, monopolistic, monopsonistic or oligopolistic market conditions, and pervasive government 
involvement and control. 
This section on international energy sector governance briefly looks at how the state is involved 
in the energy sector internationally. It describes why various governments are, or are not 
involved, how they are involved and how the state makes policy for the energy sector in terms of 
institutional arrangements. Lastly it looks at various forms of ownership and regulation in 
energy industries internationally. This international review provides a comparative background 
for the rest of the chapter that deals with the South African situation. 
The role of the state in the energy sectol 
Given the high level of interlinkages between the energy sector and other economic sectors, its 
size and its strategic significance, it is inevitable that the sector is influenced by national 
economic, social and political goals. Consequently, it is almost impossible to conceive of a 
situation in which the state does not have an impact on the energy sector since, ultimately, the 
state must retain "its central role as director of the economy and the development process. 
Economic policy management and the fight against poverty and underdevelopment are 
responsibilities that governments must assume, regardless of the prevailing political system." 
(Olade 1992). 
1Much of section 5.1. was extracted from material submitted by Mark Pickering of the Minerals and Energy Policy 
Centre as input to the South African Energy Policy Discussion Document (DMEA 1995a). Mr Pickering's analysis 
draws heavily on two recent publications (Oiade 1992) and (lEA 1992) on governance of the energy sector of 
countries of the OECD and South America (see footnotes 2 & 3). 
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International approaches to the role of the State in the energy sector 
Accepting that the state has a legitimate role to play in the governance of the energy sector it is 
useful to examine international variations on the approach to this task. A cautious view should be 
adopted, however, in that while these lessons may be instructive they cannot be conclusive. As 
Olade, the Latin American Energy Organisation, recently observed after an extensive 
investigation into the role of the State in the Latin American and Caribbean energy sectors: 2 
"Which economic, legal and institutional scheme is most appropriate for a given 
country will depend to a great extent on its particular political, social and economic 
situation. There are no blanket models or recipes since what is applicable in one 
country may not be to another." 
On the matter of competition Olade goes on to suggest that: 
"It would be advisable to introduce competition into energy markets provided it 
would enable economic benefits to be maximised from a social standpoint. In doing 
this, the basic economic characteristics of energy markets must be kept in mind: in 
some cases, they are natural monopolies and, in others, competitive markets that 
are generally oligopolistic." 
The lEA ( 1992), came to a similar conclusion after surveying the roles played by its member 
states in their energy sectors: 3 
"The challenge for policy makers is to find a proper balance between relying on 
free and competitive markets, where they can exist, and taking appropriate, cost-
effective action to ensure the nation's economic health and national security. This is 
a sensitive and difficult task, but it can be accomplished." (United States' . 
Department of Energy, Energy security: A report to the President of the United 
State, 1987, quoted in lEA 1992)." 
Arguments for state involvement in energy sector governance 
The lEA (1992) identifies the following: 
1. interventions which affect the economy as a whole: for example commercial 
law or general taxation; 
2. interventions which arise from the fact that the production and use of energy 
have special characteristics: in particular they are perceived as more 
dangerous than most economic activities and are therefore subjected to special 
safety regulation; 
3. interventions specific to the energy sector but arising from policy requirements: 
for example the bans on trade in energy which have been enforced against 
some countries which have repressive regimes or fail to comply with 
international law; 
4. interventions which arise from sectoral policies other than energy policy: 
currently environmental, fiscal and transport policy have a particularly 
significant impact on the energy sector and vice versa; and 
5. interventions for reasons of energy policy: particularly the need to maintain 
energy security. 
Olade concludes that the roles of the state in the energy sector are inherent, regardless of the 
politico-economic situation, and include: 
1. indicative planning; 
2. regulation of natural monopolies; 
3. supervision of competitive markets; 
2 Olade investigated Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Equador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama. Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela: 
3 The International Energy Agency is an autonomous body operating within the framework of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Participating members of the OECD include Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
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4. and, in many cases, company owner, depending on the prevailing institutional, 
technical, economic and financial conditions. This role should be clearly 
differentiated from the state's other roles and should be performed under 
conditions of economic efficiency." (Clade 1992) 
Mechanisms for state intervention in the energy sector 
Clade ( 1992), commenting on need to address the prolonged economic crisis in Latin American, 
within the historical context of a great deal of State intervention in the energy sector, proposes a 
number of broad reforms for Latin American energy subsectors: 
1. restructuring of energy subsectors: which should aim for the most efficient 
structure. Monopolies over infrastructure ownership and management 
should be eliminated and, where advisable from an economic point of view, 
market forces should be allowed to dominate~ 
2. deregulation of competitive markets: for markets dealing in tradeable 
commodities; 
3. re-regulation of monopolies whether natural or legally protected: in order to 
achieve regulation as a market substitute and to replicate the conditions that 
foster the efficiency of natural monopolies~ 
4. private sector participation: which need not mean total privatisation of State 
assets. The characteristics and scope of private sector involvement should be 
examined case by case as a function of prevailing economic and financial 
conditions and political and social considerations; and 
5. corporatisation of· public enterprises: public companies should be 
autonomously managed and subject to managerial accountability criteria. 
They should apply sound business practices and be subject to similar laws 
and the same conditions that apply to private sector companies. 
By contrast the more stable lEA community avoids pondering the more principled questions on 
state involvement and comments on the specifics. Current practice and trends in lEA 
governments in this regard are listed as the following: 
1. control of national resources, particularly oil and gas~ 
2. regulation of the grid based industries against the abuse of monopoly power 
with increasing emphasis .on regulation to promote competition; 
3. strict control on nuclear energy, and in some cases support for these 
industries~ 
4. involvement in large scale contracts for the import of natural gas; 
5. consumer prices and taxes, with a growing use of taxes as an instrument of 
energy and environmental policy; 
6. promotion of efficiency in energy use and of new technologies for both 
production and use of energy~ 
7. a growing framework of environmental regulation related to the energy 
industries; and 
8. emergency response measures (lEA 1992). 
The marked difference between the Latin American and CECD energy institutions in their 
descriptions of potential State interventions in energy markets is no doubt due to the significant 
variances between their economic conditions. Many developing countries face the challenge of 
implementing fairly radical structural adjustments to their economies, energy sectors included, 
while the more developed Western nations appear to be more concerned with the maintenance 
and refinement of their energy systems. 
Trends in the role of the State in the energy sector 
In conclusion then, the international trend in both CECD and Latin American countries is away 
from direct State involvement and towards a greater reliance on market forces to achieve energy 
policy goals. This trend is not absolute, however, as in some areas, particularly around 
environmental issues, there are signs of more government involvement than in the past (lEA 
1992). Furthermore, the nature of the energy sector, its strategic significance and the historical 
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role that most governments have played in it, all ensure a significant role for the State in the 
energy sector that cannot be avoided. 
Government policy making for the energy sector- international experience 
The lEA documents energy policy making arrangements within its 24 member states with such 
clarity that the section of the report dealing with these activities is reproduced in full below: 
The lEA (1992) states: 
EDRC 
"Governmental institutions for formulating and implementing energy policy vary 
widely. The arrangements are determined by the administrative traditions of the 
country, by the structure of the energy sector, by political considerations and even 
by fashions well as by the more objective requirements of energy policy. 
Arrangements have varied over time as well as between countries. In all lEA 
countries, however, there has been found to be a need for a group within 
government which has the responsibility for formulating energy policy. In the 
majority of lEA countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.] this group is 
located under a Minister and in a Department with wide responsibilities for 
economic and industrial policy. In some cases (e.g. New Zealand, Portugal and 
Spain) there is a junior Minister or State Secretary responsible for energy within a 
larger Department. In others the energy group is headed by a Director General who 
is one of the top officials in the Department. (None of these countries have a 
similar arrangement to South Africa with an official at the level of Chief Director 
as head - authors comment.) 
Seven countries [Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Turkey and the 
United States] have separate Departments of Energy. ... These separate 
Departments were usually created in response to the need to control development of 
indigenous resources of coal and gas or in response to the energy crisis of the 
1970s. A separate Energy Department was abolished in New Zealand in 1990 and 
in the United Kingdom in 1992. 
Many other Departments are concerned with energy policy, particularly those 
responsible for finance, external affairs and science and technology .... Departments 
or Agencies responsible for environmental policy take a close interest in energy 
policy and particularly efficiency in energy use. Coordination between the various 
Departments with an interest in energy policy is in most cases sought under the 
general arrangements for coordination within government. The effectiveness of 
coordination naturally varies between countries. 
The extent to which national governments delegate responsibility for implementing 
energy policy to non-Ministerial organisations varies with the general practice and 
tradition of Member countries. In all cases, state activities of a commercial 
character are normally entrusted to state companies or public corporations to some 
extent at arms length from the government. . . . In most countries some aspects of 
implementation are handled by the central departments and others by non-
Ministerial organisations. The latter are used most frequently for research and 
development, energy conservation programmes and regulation of the electricity and 
gas industries. Parliaments play a role in energy policy in all lEA countries. They 
alone can adopt new legislation. Beyond that the role of the Parliament is 
determined by the established framework of accountability of the government to 
Parliament. In some countries, such as Finland, Norway and Sweden, the final 
decisions on energy policy are taken specifically by the Parliament. In others, such 
as France and the United Kingdom, the government determines policy and answers 
for it as part of the general accountability to parliament. In the United States, where 
there is a sharp division between the executive and legislative arms of government, 
powerful committees on energy in both the Houses of Congress hold the 
Administration to account." (lEA 1992: 15, 16) 
Unfortunately the lEA study only examines the role of national or federal 
governments and has little to say about the other tiers of government. It does, 
however, mention that local governments' involvement in the energy sector is not 
normally motivated by reasons of energy policy but it can be relevant to the way in 
which energy industries are regulated. In some countries local government is 








































Governance and policy institutions 5-5 
With regard to the process of policy development the foil owing findings were made (lEA 1 992): 
"There is a plethora of advisory committees to government covering all aspects of 
energy policy. The influence of these committees varies. They are most effective in 
countries where there is a tradition of cooperation between government and the 
social partners - for example, Australia, Japan and some of the smaller countries 
such as Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. In other countries their influence is 
more limited but depends on the personality of the ministers concerned and the 
committee chairmen (sic) and members. 
Nearly all lEA governments issue energy policy documents from time to time. New 
energy policy documents have recently been defined, or are in the process of being 
prepared, in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. The European 
Community has adopted a series of energy policy objectives. These policies are 
designed to achieve an acceptable trade off between conflicting objectives, notably 
energy security, a clean environment and low cost supplies. The weight given to 
· these factors varies over time. In the 1970s and early 1980s energy security was the 
dominant consideration. Economic growth and protection of the environment bulk 
large in the recent energy policy documents. In some countries, such as Canada and 
the Netherlands, new statements of environmental policy include an important 
energy policy component. 
These documents range from fairly general policy statements, as in Germany, to 
lengthy documents based on a mass of underlying analysis, as with the Australian 
"Issues in Energy policy: An agenda for the 1990s" and the United States' National 
Energy Strategy published in 1992 .... all these policies rely in the first instance on 
market forces to bring about a satisfactory level and pattern of energy production 
and use. They all envisage a measure of government intervention to set the 
framework within which the market operates. The extent of intervention varies with 
national circumstances and the economic and political approach of the government 
concerned." 
Structure, ownership and regulation 
In the foreword to a recent lEA review (lEA 1994) of the structure, ownership and regulation of 
the electricity supply industries in OECD countries, Helga Steeg, the lEA executive director, 
commented that: 
"Changing market structures are affecting every major sector of economic activity 
world wide, and the ESI is no exception. Driven by a desire for improved economic 
efficiency, many countries are reforming and restructuring their industries to reap 
the benefits of a more competitive electricity market. While recognising the 
significance of other important policy goals, such as energy security, efficiency and 
environmental protection, Governments are also re examining their involvement in 
energy industries generally and the ESI in particular and ceasing to use the sector 
as a social policy tool. 
The perception of the ESI as a public utility with the obligation of maintaining a 
reliable power supply is changing rapidly to that of a business providing a 
multitude of electricity services in order to satisfy customer requirements profitably. 
This fundamental shift in philosophy has led to new structures, ownership patterns, 
and forms of regulation that allow power companies to respond to the needs of a 
more competitive international market." 
The lEA's opinion is informed by the fact that so many OECD ESis are undergoing a period of 
dramatic change as OECD countries reform their industry structures, ownership's and regulatory 
regimes. 
Underlying these developments are the old debates about the economic role of the sector. Some 
continue to view electricity as a pubic good which deserves special treatment and protection. They 
argue that because electricity is essential for modern life the ESI must serve all its customers 
reliably and without discrimination. Electricity supply cannot be put at risk or denied to the poor 
or remote rural customers. In exchange for the obligation to serve, electricity utilities are granted 
exclusive rights to serve a region, often known as the franchise area. Competition is not, in this 
view, an overriding consideration. This view closely represents the de facto South African 
situation. Others argue, however, that electricity should be treated like any other commodity and 
be subject to competitive markets. Competing suppliers provide other essentials, such as food. 
Although the technical problems associated with competition in the ESI may be more complex 
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there are means to ensure system reliability and--security of supply in competitive electricity 
markets. 
Within the OECD at least six countries have already introduced extensive reforms aimed at 
moving from the first to the second philosophy and other countries are examining their position 
or restructuring in different ways. Ownership of the ESI in lEA countries ranges from integrated 
state monopolies to multiple private companies. No lEA government has totally relinquished 
ownership or some form of control over the ESI. Governments are generally involved at local, 
regional, national and supra national levels. Even in countries with a largely privately held ESI a 
government presence can be found in the form of partial ownership or control through regulation. 
There are potential advantages in public ownership of the ESI, but there is also evidence of 
inefficiency in some countries in the areas of investment, construction, operation, pricing and 
staffing of state owned electricity utilities. While criticism of Eskom's massive over capacity 
problem may be considered as evidence of such inefficiency locally, this is a complex issue which 
has not received adequate study to date. 
Some lEA countries consider that the best way to make the ESI more efficient is through 
corporatisation or privatisation. Corporatisation is the process of re organisation and transfer of 
responsibility from a government ministry to a separate commercially oriented entity. Eskom has 
successfully undergone such a process since its redefinition in 1987 under the Eskom Act. 
Corporatisation generally involves introducing managerial and accounting structures that prepare 
the ground for privatisation and may be a transitional step to ultimate privatisation. 
Privatisation is pursued by governments not only for reasons of economic efficiency but also for 
the reason that the ESI is very capital - intensive and some governments have become reluctant to 
finance electricity investments from state budgets. Whilst this has not been the case in South 
Africa in the past with most of the ESI being self -funding, the financial realities of electrification 
may push government in this direction. Also, governments may wish to gain a once - off cash 
infusion for public coffers through sales of state assets. This has certainly been considered in 
South Africa by past governments and may well be considered by present and future 
governments. Further significant benefits of privatisation are that it imposes market discipline on 
utilities, it places them at arms - length from the government and reduces the possibility of 
government intervention for non - economic reasons. 
Ownership itself does not, however, affect the utility's market power private monopolies can 
behave in the same way as government owned monopolies. Currently South Africa's entire ESI is 
in the hands of the public sector, either under the Ministry of Public Enterprises (Eskom) or local 
government (municipal undertakings). NELF has recommended to Cabinet that the industry 
should remain under public ownership, a position which was accepted by Cabinet at the time. 
A further important determinant of the success of a particular approach to controlling the 
monopoly aspects of the industry is the form of the regulatory regime and its independence from 
government and the industry. Governments of countries with state - owned utilities sometimes 
fail to make a distinction between the role of the state as owner and the broader public interest, 
although in recent years there has been a tendency to establish more transparent procedures such 
as social contracting whereby the utility undertakes to achieve a certain level of technical and 
financial performance (lEA 1994). In South Africa this tendency has been evidenced by Eskom's 
pricing compact with its stockholders whereby it has undertaken to reduce the real price of 
electricity by a certain percentage over a five - year period, given a set of reasonable macro -
economic parameters and envisaged internal efficiency gains. Another related aspect of social 
compacting has been Eskom's publicly stated commitment to achieving a significant proportion of 
the RDP electrification target. Whilst these are encouraging developments they do not, however, 
represent a complete social compact between the utility and the state, nor have efforts been made 
to formalise the social compact concept into a regular and monitored process. 
In large part, the role of the regulator must depend on the nature and structure of the ESI. This 
follows from the fact that very different forms of regulation apply for different ESI conditions. 
The 1994 lEA review identified the following options: 
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"State-owned utilities may be regulated by: 
• social contract; of which the contract de plan agreement between the French 
government and Eledicite de France is a good example; or 
• direct regulation; accomplished by direct government intervention in the 
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Investor owned utilities may be regulated through: 
• detailed/structured or institutional regulation conducted within a given legal 
and institutional framework that grants the regulator powers to prescribe rules 
to which the utility has to adhere. A variant on this theme is the concept of 
performance regulation whereby the regulator establishes strict financial and 
other objectives to which the utility must adhere. The two main types are rate 
of return regulation and incentive regulation. A further variant on this theme 
is conduct regulation which takes its main form in integrated resource 
planning which is a planning process that explicitly provides an opportunity 
for the consideration of supply and demand - side resources using a consistent 
evaluation method and set of financial criteria; or 
• light - handed regulation which, in its simplest form, does not require a 
regulatory framework specific to the energy or electricity sector. Instead it 
involves monitoring the behaviour of the monopoly or dominant firm on the 
basis of principles established by competition legislation in general. The 
monitoring agency may not be a regulatory agency per se, it may be an 
authority established by competition or anti trust law" (lEA 1994). 
(End of extract from Pickering 1995) 
5.2 Governance of the South African energy sector 
5.2.1 Central government governance structures 
The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) 
The Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs and the Chief Directorate: Energy of the DMEA 
currently have responsibility for developing energy policy, framing legislation, administration of 
regulatory controls, funding and management of national energy policy-oriented research, and 
overall control of the CEF and the National Electricity Regulator (NER). 
The DMEA is responsible for administering the following energy acts: 
• Central Energy Fund Act (Act 38 of 1977) 
• Petroleum Products Act (Act 120 of 1977) 
• Nuclear Energy Act (Act 131 of 1993) 
• Electricity Act (Act 41 of 1987 as amended) 
In terms of these acts the DMEA performs certain regulatory functions, particularly in relation to 
the liquid fuels subsector and, more recently, oversight of the NER (formerly the Electricity 
Control Board) and the Council for Nuclear Safety. 
Current functions of the DMEA 
In order to fulfill its role of promoting effective integrated and balanced energy use the Chief 
Directorate: Energy considers itself to be performing the following functions: 
• advising the Minister and others; 
• administration of energy acts; 
• environmental scanning and analysis; 
• policy development, including management of energy policy research; 
• integration with socio-economic activities; and 
• action programmes where appropriate. 
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Figure 5.2.1 Structure of the DMEA 
The chief directorate has a very small staff, indicated in the table below, considering its 
responsibilities and is currently reviewing its structure and capacity. 
Designation of post Authorised posts Posts filled Posts vacant 
Chief director 1 1 0 
Director 3 2 1 
Deputy Director 9 8 1 
Energy Specialist 15 10 5 
Administrative, clerical and other 14 13 1 
staff 
Total 42 34 8 
Table 5.2.1 Chief Directorate: energy posts and staffing (end 1995) 
A number of other national departments play some role in the governance of the energy sector. 
For example whilst the DMEA is responsible for energy policy Eskom and Transnet report to the 
Department of Public Enterprises. 
While the DMEA, in a structural sense, has the clear administrative and policy making 
responsibility and lines of reporting, a strong de facto role in policy development is played by 
other government organisations operated at a central level. The CEF, owners of the Strategic 
Fuel Fund (SFF), Mossgas and Soekor, the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) and Eskom are the 
most important. Many of the operations of both these organisations were clouded in secrecy 
during the era that the CEF was responsible for procuring oil in the face of sanctions, and setting 
up Mossgas and Sasol, and when South Africa was developing a nuclear weapons capability. 
These conditions have only very recently changed and it is not surprising that under the new 
dispensation the roles of these organisations and the relationships between them and various lines 
of reporting in government are not clear. For example, the CEF chairperson's 1994-1995 annual 
review states that "CEF has shed the cloak of secrecy essential to its operations under the old 
dispensation."; and in March 1996 the chairperson of CEF resigned amongst reports of 
difficulties in relationships between CEF and the new parliament. 
Thus, at central level, South Africa has a history of a small administrative and policy making 
organisation, namely the Chief Directorate: Energy. Other players at the central level, on the 
other hand, have operated in secrecy, have had extraordinary powers, and have, with extensive 
public funding (tens of billions of Rands) built up powerful organisations. 
The Central Energy Fund Ply Ltd 
The CEF is the holding company for the state's strategic oil storage and trading arm (Strategic 
Fuel Fund) (SFF), oil and gas promotion and exploration (Soekor) and oil and gas production and 
downstream beneficiation of natural gas (Mossgas). It has also lately become responsible for a 
large rural electrification programme using photo-voltanics via subsidiary Refsa, houses the NER 
and has technology development subsidiaries involved with catalyst development and coal 
development. 
CEF was established in 1964 as the SFF to procure and store crude oil. Since then it has been 
centrally involved in South Africa's strategic operations in the oil and gas industries. CEF, 
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involved in facilitating the privatisation of Sasol. CEF provided loan funds for this purpose and 
carried the financial risk for loss of income to Sasol in the case of the Sasol subsidy not being 
met. 
CEF states in its annual report that its expertise in the management, hedging and accounting of 
foreign loans is widely acknowledged. It plays an active role in oil and financial trading. The 
SFF subsidiary reported R2 504 420 000 as cash and short term deposits in its 1994/1995 balance 
sheet. 
CEF/SFF has 340 employees at a central level (excluding employees in other subsidiaries). In an 
exploratory memorandum to the 1995/1996 budget CEF summarises its main purpose as follows: 
CEF was created by statute to manage the state's commercial and technical 
activities in the broad energy field, and in particular, liquid fuels. 
The specific aims and objectives served by CEF are: 
• Energy policy development and implementation. 
• Value-addition to Republic of South Africa's minerals 
There is potential conflict, or lack of clarity at least, in the roles of CEF and the DMEA in 
that both have a principle objective of energy policy development. However, CEF/SFF, 
with 340 employees being paid market-related salaries to manage huge assets and perform 
daily transactions in international financial markets with sums of money equivalent to the 
entire Chief Directorate: Energy's annual budget, is clearly in a different league to the 
Chief Directorate. (Section 5.3, below, provides further details on the DMEA, Chief 
Directorate: Energy and CEF finances). 
In summary, the governance of the South African energy sector is accomplished by a range of 
institutions each with defined, but often overlapping, roles and functions, which in many cases 
are not entirely clear. 
5.2.2 Electricity governance4 
This electricity governance section first looks at current arrangements in terms of legislation and 
institutions involved in electricity governance in South Africa. This is followed by a detailed 
analysis of one of the problematic cornerstones of theory informing both legislation and 
institutions involved with electricity supply namely the right to supply electricity: The next 
component of this section is a summarised record of some of the key outputs of the National 
Electricity Forum which has had a strong influence on attempting to transform the apartheid 
elec~ricity supply industry. This is followed by a brief description of the newly established 
Electricity Working Group (EWG). 
Current governance arrangements for the ESI 
Currently the following bodies, laws and functions play an important role in governing the South 
African ESI: 
The Constitution of South Africa 
The Constitution provides a framework for electricity governance in that it creates and enables a 
range of bodies to legislate, execute and adjudicate on electricity matters. The Constitution also 
makes specific reference to electricity insofar as it provides that local government bodies shall 
"make provision for access to electricity", but does not go so far as to state that local government 
bodies necessarily have to undertake supply themselves. Rather, the obligation to ensure access is 
determined by applicable law, as discussed below. 
The Constitutional Court and the judiciary 
Disputes concerning the position of the constitution on electricity may be referred to the 
Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court, depending on the nature of the dispute. 
The legislature 
Parliament, combined with the Senate, forms the legislature where laws dealing with electricity 
are passed or amended. Two of the parliamentary committees in particular are concerned with 
electricity related matters: the Committee on Mineral and Energy Affairs and the committee on 
Public Enterprises. 
• Section 5.2.2 was extracted from material submitted by Mark Pickering of the Minerals and Energy Policy Centre 
as input to the South African Energy Policy Discussion Document (DMEA 1995a). 
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Existing legislation concerned with electricity 
Important legislation affecting electricity supply includes: 
• the Electricity Act, No. 41 of 1987, as amended, which creates and empowers the NER; 
• the Eskom Act, No. 40 of 1987, which creates Eskom and its supervisory body the Electricity 
Council; and 
• the Local Government Transition Act, No. 209, 1993, as amended, which provides for the 
restructuring of local government and various matters relating to electricity provision. 
The executive 
Composed of the President, Vice-Presidents and cabinet Ministers, the executive has the 
responsibility to interpret the constitution and laws of the land into policies which are 
implemented through the various government departments. Three of these departments in 
particular have important roles to play in the governance of the ESI: 
• the DMEA, which is responsible for administering the Electricity Act; 
• the Department of Public Enterprises, which is responsible for administering the Eskom Act; 
and 
• the Department of Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, who are responsible for 
administering the Local Government Transition Act. 
In terms of the Electricity Act the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs appoints the NER and 
approves its budget. In practice the NER reports to government via the Chief Directorate: Energy 
in the DMEA. 
In terms of the Eskom Act the Minister of Public Enterprises is empowered to issue certain 
directives to the utility concerning its operation and, in practice, is central to approving annual 
price increases and significant shifts in Electricity Council policies. 
The National Electricity Regulator 
Created in terms of the Electricity Act, the NER is a crucial component of the governance 
framework for the ESI. The role of the NER is to implement government policy on the ESI 
through the mechanism of issuing electricity licences. Any utility wishing to generate, transmit or 
distribute electricity in South Africa has to obtain a licence to do so. This mechanism therefore 
creates the opportunity for government to exercise considerable influence over the development of 
the industry. For instance, government may direct the regulator to establish strict licencing 
criteria as a means of ensuring the rapid rationalisation of the distribution industry structure. The 
empowerment of the NER to regulate the entire ESI has created a policy implementation 
instrument for government that did not previously exist. Along with this has come a policy gap 
that has still to be adequately addressed. 
The Electricity Council 
The Electricity Council is appointed by the Minister of Public Enterprises. Various positions on 
the ·council are reserved for government officials, and other seats are reserved for specific 
stockholder (consumer) organisations who may each nominate a list of up to four individuals, 
from whom the Minister selects one person. Further seats are reserved for the Chief Executive of 
Eskom and up to seven "experts" who are appointed at the minister's discretion. Although the 
Electricity Council is usually described as a "stockholder body" the individuals nominated on to it 
are not legally accountable to their nominating organisations for positions taken within the 
Council and cannot be recalled. The role of the Council, which is clearly defined in the Eskom 
Act, is to supervise the operation of the parastatal. 
Eskom Management Board 
The Management Board of Eskom, including the Chief Executive Officer, is appointed by the 
Electricity Council and also has its duties clearly defined in the Eskom Act. The role of the 
Management Board is to manage the day - to - day activities of Eskom. 
Eskom 
Eskom is a state - owned, or parastatal, organisation which generates, transmits and distributes 
electricity. It is not subject to company tax and has no shareholders. Eskom has a virtual 
monopoly on generation in South Africa and owns the national transmission grid. Following its 
electrification related activities in recent years it has become the largest single distributor in the 
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Provinces 
In terms of the Constitution provinces have no legislative competence with regard to electricity. 
This creates a somewhat anomalous situation in that the Constitution also provides that local 
government is one of the competencies of provinces and, further, that local government has 
certain constitutional rights and obligations with regard to electricity. Prior to the coming into 
operation of the Constitution, provinces regulated the electricity affairs of local government by 
issuing ordinances. The Constitution provides that these existing ordinances remain in force until 
amended or repealed by a competent authority which, in this case, cannot be the provinces. It 
should be noted that in terms of the Constitution provinces are granted the power to plan and 
coordinate the process of development within their boundaries and that aspects of the 
electrification process would fall into this category. 
Local governments 
An important consequence of the Local Government Transition Act (LGT A) is that local 
government's obligation to supply electricity is now subject to the crucial qualification that the 
supply of electricity can be rendered in a sustainable manner and is financially and physically 
practicable. In other words, for the first time local governments rights to supply electricity are 
subject to a means test (Morgan 1995b). A further important consequence of the LGT A has been 
the creation of the anomalous situation whereby although the Provinces have legislative 
competency over local government affairs they do not have legislature competency over electricity 
matters. Despite this, local governments are, in terms of the Constitution, automatically granted 
certain powers in relation to electricity supply. 
An interpretation of the applicable legislation reveals that local government bodies have the (non-
exclusive) right to supply electricity within their areas provided that they satisfy the criteria for 
supply as set out in the Constitution and comply with (applicable) national law (that is they 
comply with the licensing requirements in the amended Electricity Act). The effect of the 
Constitution is thus to make electricity supply a national matter, take it out of the powers of the 
provinces and to make the obligation to ensure access to electricity the responsibility of local 
government bodies. 
In terms of past electricity legislation and provincial ordinances, many local governments have 
established their own municipal electricity undertakings. 
Management of municipal electricity undertakings 
The management of municipal electricity undertakings is generally appointed by and accountable 
to the local authority which owns the undertaking. Unlike Eskom's Electricity Council, there are 
generally no transparent mechanisms for stockholders, other than local voters, to influence the 
decisions of the local authority in directing the operation of the municipal undertaking. 
Municipal electricity undertakings 
Although a few of the major cities have electricity generation plants, most municipal electricity 
undertakings are solely concerned with electricity distribution. Not all local authorities have 
established electricity undertakings, however, and many have chosen to let Eskom or 
neighbouring municipalities distribute within their boundaries. In the past this practice has 
required a license from the Electricity Control Board (the forerunner of the NER). 
Although most individual municipal undertakings are small compared with the scale of Eskom' s 
distribution activities altogether the majority of electricity consumers in South Africa are 
currently supplied by municipal undertakings. 
Customers and other stakeholders 
Customers and other stockholders participate in the governance of the electricity industry through 
a variety of indirect and direct mechanisms. Through parliamentary elections and related party 
political processes individuals are able to influence electricity policy goals. A clear example of 
this is the Reconstruction and Development Programme electrification target which has been 
adopted by the Government of National Unity as a national goal. 
Local government elections also offer individuals an opportunity to influence the electricity -
related policies of those municipalities which own and operate electricity undertakings. 
Electricity consumers, and particularly the organised interests of large consumers, are able to 
influence Eskom' s affairs directly through their positions on the Electricity Council. This 
situation does not, however, apply to municipal undertakings, where councillors have historically 
tended to favour the interests of the voting public, to the cost of non-voting commercial and 
industrial concerns. 
EDRC 
5-12 Governance and policy institutions 
The rights of local government bodies to supply electricity$ 
Historical overview 
The position in South Africa was that anyone who generates, transmits or supplies 
electricity required a license to do so from the Electricity Control Board (the 
electricity regulatory authority). However, successive Electricity Acts have 
exempted various suppliers from such mandatory licensing requirements. Local 
government bodies and departments of state have always enjoyed exemption. 
Eskom has been exempt since 198 7. 
The position in terms of the Electricity Act, 1987 
The Electricity Act, No. 41 of 1987 provides that "no person shall carry on or 
engage in any manner in any undertaking for the generation of electricity or for the 
supply thereof except under the authority of a license issued by the Electricity 
Control Board" (Section 6(1)). However, the Act exempted departments of state, 
local government bodies, Eskom and certain other categories of supplies from the 
mandatory licensing requirements (Section 6(1) (a) (f)). The result was that local 
government bodies did not require a licence from the Electricity Control Board to 
supply electricity within their areas of jurisdiction. This has been the position since 
(at least) the initial Electricity Act, 1922 came into operation. 
Local government bodies were authorised to supply electricity in terms of various 
provincial ordinances, which gave local government bodies the power to establish 
works for the supply of light, heat and power (for example, see Section 83 of the 
Transvaal Local Government Ordinance, No. 17 of 1939). In the case of Eskom 
versus the Chairman of the Electricity Control Board and Others (discussed later) 
the Court held that local government bodies were vested with rights to supply 
electricity in terms of the provisions of the Electricity Act, and not just in terms of 
provincial ordinances. 
Insofar as the supply of electricity in local government areas is concerned, the 
Electricity Act made the following provisions: 
Section 15 (I) ''The sale and supply of electricity within the jurisdiction of local 
government authority shall be under the control of that authority, except insofar as 
any other undertaker has lawfully acquired the right to supply within that area or 
any potion thereof, whether under a license of by agreement with the local 
authority or otherwise." 
Section 17: ''The right to supply electricity within the area of jurisdiction of a local 
authority or to construct transmission of distribution lines shall be subject to the 
consent of that authority: Provided that if it is alleged that such consent is 
unreasonably withheld, the manner shall be decided by the Electricity Control 
Board after a public hearing at time and place of which not less than 14 days notice 
shall be given to the parties by the Board." 
The following electricity supply options were accordingly possible within local 
government areas: 
1. the local government body had the right to supply electricity within its areas of 
jurisdiction and did not require a licence from the Electricity Control Board to do 
so; 
2. Eskom, or any private undertaker, could acquire the right to supply electricity 
within any local government area by entering into an agreement with the local 
government body to do so; and 
3. Eskom, or any private undertaker, could acquire the right to supply electricity 
within any local government area from the Electricity Control Board where the 
Board decided that the local government body was unreasonably withholding its 
consent to such supply being undertaken by Eskom or the private undertaker. 
It is important to make the point that local government bodies have never enjoyed 
the exclusive right to supply electricity within their areas of jurisdiction. Any other 
supplier (including private suppliers and Eskom) could acquire the right to supply 
5 This extract is reproduced with acknowledgment that it is drawn from a document produced for the NELF working 
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by consent (of the local government body) or, if such consent was unreasonably 
withheld, by ruling of the Electricity Control Board. Competing claims to supply 
electricity were accordingly possible and the Electricity Control Board would be the 
final adjudicator (subject to the right a litigant would have to appeal the decision of 
the Board to the relevant Minister in terms of the Electricity Act, 1987). 
The question arises as to whether section 17 of the Electricity Act (which provides 
that a local government body cannot unreasonably withhold its consent to supply by 
another party) applied only to the case where the local government body was not 
already supplying electricity itself or whether the Section could be used to 
dispossess a local government body of its supply rights. (To do this the Electricity 
Control Board would have had to be satisfied that the local government body had 
already withheld its consent, and to come to this conclusion the Board would 
presumably have had to be convinced that the applicant (to supply) could provide a 
superior service to customers at lower cost). It is submitted that the only reasonable 
interpretation of the section is that a person wanting to supply electricity at any 
time within the area of a local government was obliged to obtain the consent of 
such body, which consent could not be unreasonably withheld. This section could 
therefore be used to dispossess local government bodies of their supply rights. 
Implications of the decision in the case of: 
Eskom versus the Chairman of the Electricity Control Board and the Local Affairs 
Board 
This is one of very few cases which appear to have come before our courts 
concerning conflicting rights to supply electricity. The facts were as follows: the 
Local Affairs Board became the local government body in the township of 
Dainfern. Eskom was supplying electricity to (all) consumers in the township. The 
Local Affairs Board applied to the Electricity Control Board to take over the supply 
of electricity from Eskom. Eskom resisted on the basis of its existing right to 
supply. All the parties agreed to approach the courts for a decision. One of the 
difficulties faced by Eskom was that it did not have an agreement with the local 
government body to supply within the area (as is required in terms of the Electricity 
Act). The court held that Eskom's right to supply electricity in the area terminated 
immediately the area fell within the jurisdiction of the local government body. 
Eskom elected not to appeal the decision. Eskom could, however, have relied on the 
provisions of Section 17 of the Electricity Act, applied to the local government body 
for consent to supply and, if such consent was refused, appealed to the Electricity 
Control Board. In any event, the provisions of later legislation have fundamentally 
changed the position. 
The impact of the coming into operation of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 
The coming into operation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1993 (the Constitution); the Local Government Transition Act, No 46 of 1994 and 
the future coming into operation of the Electricity Amendment Act, No. 46 of 1994 
(the Electricity Amendment Act) has fundamentally effected the rights of local 
government bodies to supply electricity. 
The supply of electricity is not a matter over which Provinces have legislative 
competency (Section 126 (1) and Schedule 6 of the Constitution). The Provincial 
Ordinances authorising local government bodies to supply electricity are now, 
except for the transitional arrangements in the Constitution, ultra vires the powers 
of the Provinces. However, the Constitution provides that all laws which were in 
force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue in 
force subject to any repeal or amendment of such laws by a competent authority 
(Section 229 of the Constitution). The Provincial Ordinances authorising local 
government bodies to supply electricity accordingly remain valid until they are 
repealed of amended by a competent authority which, in the case of electricity, 
cannot be the Provinces. 
The Constitution also established local government (Section 174 (1) of the 
Constitution) and provides that the powers, functions and structures of local 
government shall be determined by law of competent authority (Section 175 (1)). 
The "competent authority" is the Province because local government falls within 
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the legislative competency of the Provinces (Section 126 (1) and Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution). 
Insofar as the supply of electricity is concerned, the Constitution provides as 
follows: 
" Section 175 (3). A local government shall, to the extent determined in any 
applicable law, make provision for access by all persons residing within its area of 
jurisdiction to . . . electricity provided that such services and amenities can be 
rendered in a sustainable manner and are financially and physically practicable." 
(Constitution 1993) 
It is important to note the following: 
1. the Constitution does not give local government bodies the exclusive right to supply 
electricity, rather it provides that they shall "make provision for access to 
electricity" (i.e. local government bodies do not necessarily have to undertake the 
supply themselves); 
2. the obligation to ensure access is determined by applicable law (i.e. in this case the 
Local Government Transition Act and the Electricity Act); and 
3. local government's obligations are subject to the critical qualification that the 
supply of electricity can be rendered in a sustainable manner and is financially and 
physically practicable. 
For the first time local governments' rights to supply electricity are now subject to a 
means test. 
It is also important to highlight an anomalous situation which has resulted. In 
terms of the Constitution, the Provinces have legislative competency over local 
government affairs, but they do not have legislature competency over electricity 
matters; yet local government is given certain powers in relation to electricity 
supply. 
Local government bodies accordingly have the (non - exclusive) right to supply 
electricity within their areas provided that they satisfy the criteria for supply as set 
out in the Constitution and comply with (applicable) national law (i.e. comply with 
the licensing requirements in the (amended) Electricity Act). 
The effect of the Constitution is to make electricity supply a national matter, take it 
out of the powers of the provinces and make the obligation to ensure access to 
electricity the responsibility of local government bodies. 
The effect of the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 
The Local Government Transition Act promotes the restructuring of local 
government by providing for the amalgamation of previously racially separate local 
governments. The Act provides for the establishment of three types of urban local 
government bodies, namely transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs); transitional 
local councils (TLCs) and local government coordinating committees (LGCCs) and 
for different types of rural local governments, namely services councils, sub 
regional councils or district councils. 
Insofar as the supply of electricity is concerned, the Local Government Transition 
Act provides that: 
1. the powers of a TMC shall be at least the powers and duties listed in Schedule 2 
(Section (1 )(b)(a)). The bulk supply of electricity is included in the said schedule. 
The Act provides further that the TMC may, it its discretion, decide not to exercise 
such power or perform such duty (section 7(1) (b) (aa) (bbb)); 
2. no specific mention is made of electricity powers in relation to TLCs. (The Act is 
silent here); and 
3. the powers and duties of any LGCC shall be at least the power to en.sure access by 
all persons residing within the areas of jurisdiction of the individual local 
government bodies to electricity if so agreed by all the individual local government 
bodies (Section & (l)(c)(i)(aa)). The section includes the proviso that if the 
individual local government bodies do no have the ability, jointly or severally, to 









































Governance and policy institutions 5-15 
thereto to be provided on its behalf by any other competent body (Section 7 
(l)(c)(i)(aa)). 
The above provisions relate to transition council during the pre interim period. The 
same provisions apply during the interim phase except that the option of the LGCC 
falls away. 
The Local Government Transition Act does not deal with electricity supply powers 
of rural local governments. 
Of course the rights and powers of local government bodies to supply electricity in 
.terms of the other legislation mentioned earlier continue in force. It is submitted 
that the Local Government Transition Act has effected the following changes to the 
previous positions, namely: 
1. TMC's have acquired the power to the bulk supply of electricity (which term is not 
defined); and 
2. The supply of electricity by LGCCs is now also subject to a means test. 
The effect of the Electricity Amendment Act, 1994 
The Electricity Amendment Act, 1994 carne into operation on the 1 March 1995. 
The Act changes the name of the ECB to the National Electricity Regulator (NER) 
and removes the exemption which Eskom and local government bodies enjoy from 
the mandatory licensing requirement. The result is that all suppliers of electricity 
have had to be licensed by the NER. 
Conclusion 
Taking the above developments into account it is submitted that the position with 
regard to the supply of electricity within local government areas is as follows: 
1. local government bodies (TMCs, TLCs, and LGCCs) have the right to supply 
electricity within their areas of jurisdiction provided that they acquire a license 
from the NER to do so. The NER is the body which determines whether local 
government bodies can meet the criteria to supply set out in the Constitution, the 
Local Government Transition Act and also comply with the NER's own licensing 
criteria; 
2. Eskom or any other private undertaker can acquire the right to supply electricity 
within any local government area with the consent of such local government and 
provided further that they obtain a licence from the NER to do so; 
3. where Eskom or any private undertaker wishes to acquire the right to supply 
electricity within any local government area and the local government body 
unreasonably withholds its consent, the NER has the power to decide the issue and 
has the power (on good cause) to dispossess the local government body of its rights 
to supply; 
4. TMC's have now acquired the right to the bulk supply of electricity provided that 
the NER licenses the TMC accordingly. (This is necessary because the TMC is a 
new concept which had to be specifically catered for). 
The position about the right to supply is confusing especially because conflicting 
rights are possible. The whole issue around rights to supply will have to be clarified 
in future legislation. 
(End of extract from (Morgan 1995a) 
National Electricity Forum (NELF) proposals 
1994 Cabinet resolution on NELF proposals 
The Cabinet approved that: 
• Eskom's generation and transmission business should be retained in its present form; 
• local government authorities which presently operate their own power stations should be 
allowed to continue to do so subject to regulation by a National Electricity Regulator (NER); 
• the Electricity Control Board (ECB) should be utilised as the independent NER and new 
members should be selected and nominated by the NELF through a transparent process for 
consideration by the appropriate minister; 
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• the main role of the National Regulator will be -inter alia to issue licences, regulate price and 
tariff structures, regulate service standards, regulate the achievement of electrification targets 
and settle disputes; 
• there should be a rationalisation phase for the restructuring of the ESI, during which 
- local government undertakings that are efficient, can comply with the 
requirements of the National Regull;ttor and elect to do so, should continue to 
supply electricity in their agreed areas of jurisdiction; 
- Eskom should take over the electricity supply of the previously independent 
(TBVC) and self-governing territories. Legislation through a Presidential 
Proclamation should be prepared to this end; and 
- local government undertakings who elect not to supply directly or those who 
cannot satisfy the Regulator's criteria for supply, will be obliged to transfer their 
supply rights to another supplier (Eskom or another local government supplier); 
• a national domestic tariff system be developed and implemented as soon as possible by the 
Regulator; and 
• the ring - fencing (managerially and financially) of local government electricity undertakings 
and running them as separate business units as well as the taxation of electricity be referred to 
an ad hoc committee of ministers consisting of the Minister without Portfolio and the 
Ministers of Finance and of Local Government. (Convenor). 
The Cabinet also noted the probable financial implications for the electricity account of the 
relevant local authorities which would result from the merging of fragmented local authorities as 
well as the probable need for external sources of funding for specific parts of the electrification 
programme. Proposals on how to deal with these and related matters will be considered at a later 
stage. · 
Criteria to be used by the NER when adjudicating on retention or transfer of supply rights 
The NELF proposal is for the NER to use the following criteria when ruling on the right to 
supply: 
(i) Capability of supplier to provide an acceptable service to all customers, including large 
customers: 
• technical capability; 
• acceptable pricing policy (i.e. fair cost allocation); 
• price stability; 
• long-term viability of supplier (i.e. infrastructure, human resources and financial capacity); 
• reliability of service; 
• quality of supply; and 
• safety of supply system. 
i. Ability to meet Government's electrification targets for the area. 
ii. Market responsiveness and customer focus of supplier. 
iii. Management competency of supplier. 
iv. Economic viability of supply area: 
• common economic system; 
• customer consumption patterns; 
• affordability levels; 
• acceptable financial returns; and 
• opportunity for cost pooling. 
v. Impact on existing or future supply network configurations. 
vi. Transfer of supply rights must promote the technical, operational and financial viability of a 
particular area of supply, must balance geographic and economic factors to maximise 
operational efficiency, and must also take into consideration the technical characteristics or 
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vii. Transfer of rights must not impede progress towards the realisation of the evolving end state 
model. 
Ring-fencing 
NELF recommends that local government electricity undertakings should be ring - fenced 
managerially and financially. By ring fencing is meant that an undertaking is run as a separate 
business unit at arm's length and according to specific criteria, making it possible to identify 
costs, revenue, resources, performance, etc. The criteria could include the following: 
• all transfers from the undertaking to non-electricity services must be visible; 
• undertakings must operate separately under normal business conditions and follow a business 
culture; 
• generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) must be followed; 
• interdepartmental cost allocations must be done based on fair cost of service; and 
• the structure should provide for a separate, dedicated financial function to enable sound 
management practice and financial discipline (AMEU 1994). 
Obviously, ring- fencing would have to be applied to all distributors of electricity. 
The Cabinet referred NELF's ring - fencing proposal to an ad hoc committee of the .Cabinet 
consisting of the Ministers for the RDP, Finance and Local Government for further study. 
NELF's recommendations on the financing of electrification are as follows: 
1. Loans from loan sources should be expanded to include provision for electrification. 
2. The Development Bank of South Africa. should increase and fast track electrification 
support, with NELF's assistance, where necessary. 
3. Electricity undertakings should make maximum use of their own financial abilities. 
4. Fiscal transfers should be channeled to local authorities through Government structures, and 
to Eskom as direct transfers. 
5. An independent national electrification financing agency should only be formed if an 
electrification levy is introduced. 
NELF recommends that the following principles should apply to the re-employment of staff: 
1. In respect of staff take-overs 
• No loss of employment should take place; 
• employees of distributors being taken over should be absorbed into the organisation 
responsible for the re-employment; 
• re-employment of staff should be negotiated between all relevant parties, with inclusion of 
trade unions; and 
• re-employment should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act of 1994, the Labour Relations Act of 1956 and other 
applicable legislation, industrial agreements and procedures. 
2. In respect of salaries and conditions of service 
• Existing salaries and conditions of service should initially be retained; 
• disparities should be systematically addressed through negotiations; and 
• although human resource management policies exist, basic standards should be reviewed to 
ensure standardisation. 
3. In respect of training, re-training, development and affirmative action 
Attention should be given to 
• general re-training, training and upliftment of the skills base with special emphasis on adult 
basic development; 
• affirmative action; 
• capacity development in communities; and 
• development of managerial skills. 
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(End of extract from NELF proposals). 
The Electricity Working Group 
One of the first tasks of the NER, after its establishment on 1 March 1995, was to require all 
electricity generators, transmitters and distributors of electricity to apply for licences. After 
considerable problems in evaluating applications submitted by many distributors, owing largely to 
lack of clarity on policies which determined the conditions under which licences were to be 
granted, during August 1995 the NER decided to issue permanent licences to generators and 
transmitters but to only issue temporary licences to distributors of electricity. 
The NER then called on government to set up a working group to make recommendations on the 
future structure of the electricity distribution industry (EDI). The establishment of the Electricity 
Working Group (EWG) in September 1995 was the result. By March 1996 the EWG had not yet 
reached a point of making recommendations. However, a document for discussion purposes only 
was produced by the end of November 1995. The document included a framework for evaluation 
of recommendations on the industry, an identification of structure options and came to a 
conclusion that, at that stage, the most appropriate structure for the EDI would be a Single 
Decentralised Distributor. In this structure electricity· would be supplied by autonomous, 
decentralised regional distributors supply geographically distinct areas of the country. These 
distributors would collectively own and control the Single Decentralised Distributor which would 
be responsible for setting common policy, funding the business, allocating subsidies etc. 
However, the above conclusion has clearly been noted by the EWG as being for discussion 
purposes only and the EWG is still busy with the task of unraveling the legacy of the connection 
between funding and organisation of highly inequitable race-based local authorities and the ED I. 
5.2.3 Liquid fuels governance6 
The relationship between the government and the oil industry in South Africa over 
the past several decades is characterised by a considerable degree of state 
involvement, intervention and control of many aspects of the industry's business 
activities including refining, marketing, pricing, technical issues and future 
planning. 
Prior to 1979, the Department of Trade and Industry handled the administration of 
state/oil industry matters while the Department of Environmental Planning and 
Energy was responsible for planning. The Minister was advised by the Energy 
Policy Committee, with a Secretariat provided by this department. Many decisions 
involving state spending, such as the construction of Sasol, were taken by the 
Cabinet on the recommendation of this committee. The Department of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs was formed in 1980 as a result of a major rationalisation of the 
public service in 1979/80. All major oil industry matters involving the government 
were then handled by this department. 
State energy planning and administration was delegated to the National Energy 
Council (NEC) in 1987. This parastatal body was instituted in terms of the Energy 
Act, 1987 (Act 42 of 1987) in order to establish a more market-related and 
economically sound energy industry, a better balance between economic and 
strategic issues, and goal-oriented state-financed energy research, by close 
interaction between the public and private sectors. The Council thus provided a 
forum in which the oil industry could assist in energy planning. The Council was 
abolished in 1993 due to a reassignment of national financial priorities by the 
government, in which the earmarking of funds acquired through levies for spending 
outside the national budget, as in the case of the NEC, was no longer acceptable. 
The functions of the NEC were subsequently rationalised and transferred to the 
DMEA. 
In recent years the state has moved marginally away from regulation, but still 
retains tight control in many areas of the oil industry, while participating in on 
going debates on the advantages and disadvantages of deregulation. The 
profitability of refining operations is no longer controlled, but wholesale marketing 
6 Much of section 5.2.3 was was extracted from material submitted by Dr Robert Scott as input to the South African 











































Governance and policy institutions 
operations are monitored on an industry-wide basis and margins are adjusted when 
minimum or maximum permitted profits are exceeded; retail margins are 
controlled by means of a formula based on the performance of a sample of service 
stations, retail price maintenance on petrol is still rigidly enforced and controls on 
the wholesale price of diesel and paraffin still exist. The State has also been 
involved, but in more of a coordinating role, in technical matters such as the octane 
structure and lead content of petrol. 
In the past year there has been a complete relaxation in the strict secrecy pertaining 
to virtually all oil industry matters, such as crude oil acquisition, storage, refinery 
capacities, production volumes and national fuel demand. This followed the lifting 
of the United Nations oil embargo against South Africa in 1994. 
The following legislation governs state involvement in the oil industry: 
-Central Energy Fund Act, 1977 (Act No. 38 of 1977), as amended. 
-Petroleum Products Act, 1977 (Act No. 120 of 1977), as amended. 
The DMEA, assisted by its parastatal institution CEF (Pty) Ltd., is responsible for 
the administration of these laws. In addition to the above, there are several 
agreements in place, often at the insistence of the state, which tend to regulate the 
oil industry in one way or another to protect national, industry or consumer 
interests, and various organisations such as the oil companies, Sasol, Mossgas, 
Central Energy Fund Pty Ltd , Strategic Fuel Fund and Motor Industries 
Federation are involved. 
(End of contribution by Dr Robert Scott) 
5.3 State funding of the energy sector 
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This section does not attempt to give a complete description of all state expenditure in the energy 
sector but, instead, identifies some key areas in which the state funds energy sector activities. 
Although not all state transfers are strictly within the area of governance they are the concern of 
governance structures because these structures need to account for both the planning and 
implementation of the expenditure of significant amounts of public funds. 
5.3.1 The energy-related budget of the DMEA 
1995/96 1996/97 
PROGRAMME 5 -Chief Directorate: Energy 
- Energy management 5 812 000 6 112 000 
- Electrical energy 7 520 000 9 037 000 
- Energy for development 5 625 000 9 610 000 
-Transport energy 1 578 000 1 362 000 
Programme 5 total 20 535 000 26 121 000 
Atomic Energy Corporation 
Z-plant closure 273 209 000 273 442 000 
AEC - strategic loans 38 000 000 29 408 000 
Strategic loan re-payment 178 013 000 81 290 000 
AEC total 489 222 000 384140 000 
Council for Nuclear Safety 5 400 000 5 771 000 
Central Energy Fund Pty Ltd 1 000 0 
Total energy- related 515158 000 668 386 000 
Table 5.3.1 DMEA energy-related budget summary 
(DMEA 1995b) 
1997/98 
6 258 000 
12 405 000 
13 700 000 
1 245 000 
33 608 000 
223 506 000 
21 673 000 
232 062 000 
477 241 000 
7 398 000 
0 
777 727 000 
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The 1995/6 energy-related budget for the DMEA is R716 374 000. Programme 5 indicated in the 
table above is the budget for the Chief Directorate Energy which is responsible for developing 
and administering energy related policies of the South African government. The Chief 
Directorate: Energy enjoys about 4% of the energy related expenditure. It has to be pointed out 
that these are very small percentages in terms of the Department's budget and that the amounts 
are small considering the size of the sector detailed in the rest of this document and the problems 
being experienced in the sector. Many commentators, including the International Energy 
Agency, which carried out an in-depth analysis of the South African energy sector in 1995, have 
made a direct link between the on-going problems in the energy sector and a lack of capacity in 
the DMEA. One of the obstacles to developing the required capacity is small amount budgeted 
for the Chief Directorate: Energy. 
Explanation of individual items in the table 
The amount allocated to "strategic loan repayment" refers to obligations entered into before the 
change of government for repayment of loans by the AEC and cannot easily be changed although 
it does not necessarily have to be administered through the DMEA budget. The Z-plant closure is 
also part of the unavoidable inheritance from the previous government. However, other amounts 
are budgeted for yearly and in terms of directives of the new government should be done on a 
"zero- based" principle. 
In terms of understanding budget priorities it is useful to simplify the figures in table 5.3.1. 
above. 
percent* 
1.8 5 812 000 Energy management 
2.4 7 520 000 Electrical energy 
1.8 5 625 000 Energy for development 
0.5 1 578 000 Transport 
6.4 20 535 000 Total: Chief Directorate: Energy 
85.5 273 209 000 Atomic Energy Corporation -
1.7 5 400 000 Council for Nuclear Safety 
0.0 1 000 Central Energy Fund Pty Ltd 
100.0 319 680 000 Total energy related-
* Of total energy- related less Z-plant closure and strategic loan repayment 
** Less Z-plant closure and strategic loan repayment 
Table 5.3.2 Energy-related"'* DMEA budget for 1995/96 
The AEC budget of R273 209 000 accounts for more than 85.5% of the energy-related budget 
(less Z-plant closure and strategic loan repayment) that could be fairly said to be set by zero-based 
budgeting. The Chief Directorate: Energy accounts for 6.4% and the Council for Nuclear Safety 
for 1.7%. 
The energy management budget comprises mainly staff costs in the Chief Directorate: Energy. 
Electrical Energy, energy for development and transport energy correspond to the three Energy 
Directorates, and the budget is mainly for professional services (mainly research and pilot 
projects). 
Energy management and transport energy remain relatively unchanged from 1995/1996 to 
1996/1997. Changes in the Energy for Development and Electrical Energy budgets can be in part 
attributed to increased activity in energy efficiency, low-smoke coal, biomass and off-grid 
electricity pilot projects. These increases result in an overall increase of 27% in the programme 
5 (non-nuclear) budget. 
The AEC budget 
The AEC budget (excluding loan repayments and costs of closure of the Z-Plant) for 1995/96 was 
R 273 209 000 for 1995/96 compared with R 308 252 000 for 1994/95, a decrease of 11 percent. 
This then rises slightly in 1996/97 before dropping by 18 percent in 1997/98. More details on 
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Period Annual average % of DMEA budget 
(Nominal Rm) 
1971/72 to 1975/76 21.2 32.0 
1976/77 to 1980/81 110.7 40.8 
1981/82 to 1985/86 363.0 70.3 
1986/87 to 1990/91 686.2 79.9 
1991/92 to 1995/96 524.5 70.3 
Total1971/72 to 1995/96 8 528.0 69.3 
Table 5.3.3 Subsidies to the South African nuclear industry 
(Van Horen 1995) 
Other state expenditure in the energy sector 










The budget presented to parliament described above does not give a complete picture of state-
controlled expenditure in the energy sector. In the 1994/1995 years other amounts considerably 
larger than the parliamentary budget were disbursed by the CEF. Also, CEF, and companies in 
the CEF group posted large provisions for past or expected future losses in their balance sheets 
which can be seen as public funds which have been expended. 
Over the years Soekor has spent about R1.24 billion of public funds exploring the Bredasdorp 
Basin off Mossel Bay for example, expenditure on Soekor by CEF for 1994/1995 was accounted 
for as follows: Soekor's balance sheet reflects an amount ofR1 315 839 000 which is a long term 
loan from parent company CEF. CEF's balance sheet reflects this loan. In 1994/1995 CEF 
advanced an additional loan of R113 892 million to Soekor and increased provision for non-
payment of Soekor's loan from Rl 115 900 000 to R1 229 773 000 an amount of 
Rll3 873 million. In effect this amount was expended - a fact presented in CEF's income 
statement under an item named Provision against loans to subsidiaries. (This amount advanced 
to Soekor exceeds the Chief Directorate: Energy's budget by five times). The following were 
accounted for in a similar way in 1995 CEF annual report. 
Rands 
Loans to Soekor 113 273 000 
Loans to Enerkom 4 648 000 
Loans to Mossgas '" 7 139 145 000 
Total 7 257 666 000 
(I) A grant ofR5 155 000 was made to CEF by the DMEA to fmance phase IT of the Enerkom Oxicoal 
project. 
(Zl The provision for non-payment ofMossgas's debt to CEF follows on a report by the Auditor General 
which was critical of the carrying value of the investment previously shown in CEF's balance sheet. 
Table 5.3.4 Increases in provision for non-payment of loans to CEF group companies by the 
CEF holding company 
(CEF 1995) 
CEFincome 
Whilst most other government expenditure is funded from taxes, which, in conjunction with 
expenditure, are subject to the government budget presented to parliament, CEF funds its 
activities from its own revenues. Whilst Mossgas has not generated sufficient income to even 
service its debt obligations and Soekor' s exploration costs have yet to be adequately rewarded by a 
large oil or gas find, SFF manages to produce a large operating surplus. Whilst the figures given 
in the 1994/95 annual financial statements are not sufficiently detailed to provide a breakdown of 
SFF's revenue sources the control of about R2.5 billion in cash and short term deposits at 
31 March 1995 represents a considerable asset for generating funds. The other main asset for 
generating income is SFF's control of about 40 million barrels of oil 
(at US$ 17/barrel = 680 million US$) with an approximate value of R2. 7 billion. This oil, 
combined with storage facilities represents a considerable state-owned asset in terms of South 
Africa's energy supply system. 
Synfuel subsidies 
Although these have been mentioned in more detail in section 4.2 on liquid fuels a summary is 
repeated here to complete the picture of large transfers of public funds in the energy sector. 
These are financed by the imposition of the equalisation levy on liquid fuel sales and 
administered by CEF. 
EDRC 
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Rands 
Subsidy to Mossgas 413 000 000 
Subsidy to Sasol 1 100 000 000 
Total 1 513 000 000 














































6.1 Conclusions drawn from previous chapters 
The main conclusion drawn from chapter 1 is that the previous orientation of policy in South 
Africa and the way that policy was made had a strong negative effect on the development of 
information for public policy making in the energy sector. In the post-1994-election period an 
attempt has been made to improve this situation but the availability of information formulated to 
facilitate good policy making is still inadequate. 
From chapter 3 on energy demand it is clear that the arrangement of the energy sector reflects 
the historical structure of both the economy and society and that over the past fifty years these 
structures have changed fundamentally. Future planned changes in the economy, as indicated by 
the extract from a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) document and changes in society, as 
exemplified by the national electrification programme and the rapid growth in demand for petrol 
caused by motor vehicle use, have important implications for changes in energy demand patterns. 
Government social and economic policies play an active role in shaping these changes and it is 
important that energy policy that is developed by government is well coordinated with other 
policies. 
The first conclusion from chapter 4 on the energy supply system is that in terms of resources, 
primary production and the supply of energy to industry, commerce, households in the previously 
defined white local authority areas and transport fuels, South Africa has a well-functioning 
energy supply industry that provides good quality products country-wide at amongst the lowest 
prices in the world. However, there is also significant room and a need for improvements: 
• firstly, in developing energy supplies that are more appropriately orientated towards the 
majority of the population who still remain without electricity - these people also often pay 
needlessly high prices for other fuels and suffer severe health and environmental problems 
associated with the household energy use; 
• secondly, to address the role of state enterprises such as the Central Energy Fund, the 
Strategic Fuel Fund, Soekor, Mossgas, and the Atomic Energy Corporation which were 
essentially developed to serve the economy and society of the previous era but whose 
usefulness now needs to be re-evaluated, and; 
• thirdly, to re-examine the structure and regulation of the energy supply subsectors, which are 
clearly the result of past national economic and social policy, in the light of the social and 
economic policies of the new dispensation. 
The second conclusion that emerges from chapter 4 on energy supply subsectors is that there is 
pervasive intervention by the state, both historically, in developing the energy supply system, and 
currently, in ownership, intervention and regulation. While the coal production system is 
privately owned its main customers are either parastatals or previously state-owned synfuels 
plants which are still strongly influenced by government regulation. State-controlled transport 
infrastructure and tariffs have a strong influence on other coal prices. All phases of the electricity 
industry namely generation, transmission and distribution, are almost entirely publicly owned. 
The liquid fuels industry has a history of state involvement through development of a large 
synfuels industry and regulation of product imports and regulatin of prices and the industry 
remains tightly regulated. 
An overwhelming conclusion emerges from chapter 5 on governance. The energy governance 
structures and budgets inherited from the previous government, which had very different needs 
from the present, are still in place. The DMEA Chief Directorate: Energy is struggling to carry 
out its responsibilities with inadequate staffing of 35 civil servants of whom only 21 are 
professionals, and a budget of about R26 million. However, parallel to this, the CEF/SFF 
organisation with assets such as R2.5 billion in cash and short term deposits to generate operating 
funds and a staff of 340 who are paid market related salaries, is also involved in policy 
development. Also, while the DMEA's activity, specially its budget and expenditure, is under 
close scrutiny of the new government, decision on expenditures of amounts an order of magnitude 
greater than the entire Chief Directorate: Energy's budget are made by CEF/SFF outside of this 
type of public scrutiny. Within the parliamentary budget, the AEC continues to receive about 
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85% of the energy related budget of the DMEA (excluding provisions for past commitments such 
as strategic loans and the Z-plant closure). 
An additional conclusion from chapter 5 on governance is that the size of flows of public funds 
in terms of revenue and appropriations in the energy sector outside of the parliamentary budget 
are orders of magnitude larger than the flows within the budget. This raises questions of 
integrated economic planning and accountability which are unequivocally stated policies of the 
new democratically elected government. 
In summary the Chief Directorate: Energy does not have the capacity to develop adequate policy 
for these large organisations under its responsibility or to provide the necessary independent 
evaluation of their performance. 
6.2 Gaps in information 
As stated in the preface and introduction, the production of this document has been largely in 
response to the lack of an overall description of the South African energy sector to be used in 
conjunction with the Energy Policy Discussion Document. Prior to the publication of Energy 
Statistics No 2 (DMEA & Eskom 1995) in late 1995, the most comprehensive set of official 
published government statistics on the energy sector was Energy Statistics No 1 (DMEA 1989) 
which excluded all information on liquid fuels, including for example, the amount of coal used to 
manufacture liquid fuels. South Africa Energy Statistics No 2 does include liquid fuels but 
important quantities, such as imports and exports of refined products are excluded. Also, the 
document was published at the end of 1995 but statistics are only given up until 1993. The 
collection and collation of data needs to be streamlined so that more current data are available. 
To produce a current description of the energy sector in South Africa requires the assembly of 
information from a wide variety of sources. In many cases the only sources are the large energy 
suppliers who are under no legal obligation to provide data and in many cases are very reluctant 
to do so. In other important cases, particularly for data on consumption of energy, data have not 
been collected. 
The International Energy Agency produced a report on the South Africa energy sector (lEA 
1996) which was released in May 1996. In that report it states: 
"The lack of good data is a major weakness in the energy policy making process in 
South Africa. It also hinders transparency in the energy sector." 
In the same report the lEA also states: 
"The energy policy making capacity of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs is 
currently weak, in part due to the fact that historically most energy policy making has de 
facto been performed by the energy industry itself." 
While the situation in South Africa has improved vastly since the repeal of, for example, the 
provisions of the Petroleum Products Act which prohibited the publication of information on 
liquid fuels, the situation is far from satisfactory in terms of information on the energy sector. 
This makes it impossible for government to produce policies for the sector in the inclusive, 
accountable and transparent manner which it has committed itself to and also. makes it very 
difficult for the public and civil society to engage effectively in the policy process and to monitor 
the results of the policies which are implemented. 
In theory, new South African legislation pertaining to freedom of information would oblige the 
state to make information that it collected on the energy sector available to any party that 
requested the information. Also, the government does not have a legal right to compel energy 
suppliers , or users, to provide energy data. Paradoxically, the combination of these legal 
conditions makes it even less likely that many parties will divulge statistics than they were in the 
past. 
At present, the large energy suppliers have arguably the best data available on their particular 
subsectors. Some suppliers publish good statistics. However, information is generally not 
available in a coherent form across the whole energy sector. Government will only be able to 
change the practice of making energy policy when it provides both itself, the public and civil 
society with the information necessary for making an input to policy decisions and monitoring the 
implementation and results of those policies. This can only be achieved if the structures and 
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